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Abstract
A considerable amount of research on uncertainty in supply chain management has 
been undertaken, but in such works transport has been regarded as a marginal 
activity within supply chains. Also, the link between the supply chain and the 
environmental performance of transport operations has been established at a macro 
level. Supply chain uncertainty can have a significant impact on the efficiency of 
transport operations at the micro level. Inefficiencies in road freight transport 
operations can have a knock-on effect on the cost of transport and the level of CO2 
emissions in supply chains. Therefore, the mitigation of supply chain uncertainty 
within transport operations can minimise the risk of disruptions in the delivery 
process, so transport resources can be utilised in the most efficient and least 
polluting manner. Furthermore, in logistics research, there has been a focus on 
measuring the absolute and/or average performance of road transport operations. 
One aspect of performance measurement that appears to be under-researched is 
the impact of unexpected events upon transport performance.
The overall aim of this thesis is to link the uncertainties originated within the supply 
chain and externally with the economic and environmental performance of road 
freight transport operations and also to identify potential mitigation tools and/or 
approaches to minimise their effects. This aim has been achieved in two research 
stages, the first one deductive and the second stage inductive.
In the deductive stage, a conceptual model was developed by adapting existing 
manufacturing-focused uncertainty frameworks. This model has been refined 
through the application of focus groups and confirmed in a structured questionnaire- 
based survey. The outcome of this stage of the research was the four main 
uncertainty clusters that affect more transport operations in UK. These uncertainty 
clusters are: delays, variable demand and/or inaccurate forecast, delivery constraints 
and insufficient supply chain integration and coordination. Furthermore, the main 
uncertainty cause found in the focus groups was unplanned road congestion.
In the inductive stage, uncertainty evaluation assessments in three FMCG 
distribution networks were undertaken to evaluate the effects that different 
uncertainty causes have on the economic and environmental performance of such 
operations. An ‘extra distance’ measure was developed for these assessments, 
further complemented by including the time dimension of performance in two of 
them. As a result of this, a new and innovative transport uncertainty evaluation tool 
has been developed. According to the empirical findings of the case studies, the 
main uncertainty clusters found in the deductive stage of the research are the 
uncertainty clusters that contribute more to the generation of unnecessary kilometres 
run within the distribution networks assessed. Moreover, delays at loading and/or 
unloading bays are the main cause of additional time within the delivery process.
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Figure 1.1 Underlying concept of the thesis
In this chapter, the research problems encountered at the beginning and throughout 
the research will be introduced, together with the objectives of this PhD. The chapter 
also outlines the methodology undertaken to address the gaps identified in the 
literature on uncertainty and transport performance. Finally, a summary of the 
findings will be presented.
1.1 Theoretical perspectives of the thesis
Before introducing the problem proposition and objectives of the thesis, it is pertinent 
to discuss about the wider theories considered for undertaken the research project 
and also other theories that were not considered, but can be linked to the research 
topic. There are a number of theories that have been considered to develop this 
thesis. They are process-based orientation, network and systems theories. Also, the 
PhD topic can be linked to other relevant fundamental theories that have been 
applied in logistics and supply chain management. These theories are transaction 
cost economics and the resource dependency theory.
Several authors recommend applying a process-based orientation to evaluate and 
improve the performance of organisations (Porter 1985, Davenport and Short 1990, 
Hammer 1996, Grover et al. 1995, Walton 1996). A process-based view involves 
identifying both the external elements, processes executed to respond to macro- and 
task-environment impacts, and internal factors, processes driven the strategy of the 
organisation and determining the organisational structure, of the organisation’s 
environment that affect processes (Kiraka and Manning, 2005). In the case of this 
PhD, the supply chain process considered is freight transport, this process include
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1.0 Introduction to the thesis
Scientists at the Mauna Loa observatory in Hawaii say that CO2 levels in the 
atmosphere now stand at 387 parts per million (ppm), up almost 40% since the 
industrial revolution and the highest for at least the last 650,000 years 
(http://www.esrl.noaa.aov/amd/ccqQ/trends/). According to DEFRA (2006), freight 
transport contributes 6% of the total CO2 emissions of the UK. However, within the 
transport sector, road freight transport represents 22% of the total UK CO2 emissions 
(Department for Transport, 2007). Hence, freight transport has become a relatively 
far more important supply-chain function than in the past, due to its impact on the 
environment. There is a need for freight transport to be used in more flexible and 
responsive ways, to respond effectively to customer demand (Narus and Anderson, 
1996) while at the same time minimising the impact of transport on costs and on the 
environment (Morash and Clinton, 1997; Duclos et al, 2003). The overall aim of this 
PhD is to:
Link the uncertainties originated within the supply chain and externally with the 
economic and environmental performance of road freight transport operations and 
also to identify potential mitigation tools and/or approaches to minimise their effects.
In order to achieve this aim, it is important to introduce the underlying concept of this 
thesis, which is shown in Figure 1.1. Uncertainty should be linked with inefficiency in 
transport operations. Uncertainty originated within the supply chain and externally 
can generate extra or unnecessary transport movements within distribution networks 
and delays within the delivery process. This can increase the total transport cost and 
the 1CO2 emissions of the network. However, when uncertainty generates delays 
within the delivery process without causing vehicles to miss the next load scheduled 
for them, ‘extra time’ is added to the transport plan. ‘Extra time’ increments the total 
transport cost, but it does not increase the total CO2 emissions of distribution 
networks.
1
through synergistic relationships between the network members’ (Bolumole et al., 
2007). These two theories have been applied in the thesis to firstly define the 
boundaries of the conceptual model (the five sources of uncertainty affecting 
transport operations) and secondly select the unit of analysis for the thesis (the 
logistics triad as the minimum network arrangement of any supply chain).
Transaction cost economics is other theoretical perspective that can be linked to the 
research topic of the thesis. Transaction cost economics is based on the economic 
assumption that decisions regarding a company's ownership are focused on 
reducing the sum of its transaction and production costs (Coase 1937; Williamson 
1975) and any excessive costs may generate transactions that can be transferred to 
the company’s partners (Bolumole et al., 2007). Companies can achieve their main 
goal, maximising profits, by participating in three different governance structures: the 
market (one-off transactions for standard investments), hierarchical structures 
(vertical integration through direct ownership); and hybrid structures (combining 
elements of the market and hierarchical mechanisms) (Bolumole et al., 2007). 
According to Williamson (1975), ‘production costs can be defined as the cost of 
building and running an “ideal” machine, while transaction costs as the costs which 
are generated by departures from perfection, such as friction’. In transaction cost 
economics, there are three key variables: frequency, uncertainty and asset 
specificity (Halldorsson et al., 2007). The application of a transaction-based view has 
been found in a number of recent logistics research studies, e.g. restructuring of 
supply chains (Croom, 2001), logistics outsourcing activities (Halldorsson, 2002), 
and buyer-supplier relationships (Mikkola, 2003), Uncertainty can prevent 
manufacturing and freight transport operations within logistics triads to achieve their 
target costs, since unexpected events can make these operations to deviate from 
their initial plans. Transaction cost economics as a theoretical perspective was not 
considered for the development of the research topic of this PhD, but it can be linked 
to the results of the thesis. Since, analogies of the Williamson’s (1975) definition of 
production and transaction costs can be made from the transport costs originally 
planned by transport operations and the transport costs incurred after uncertainty 
events occurred.
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Other theoretical perspective that can be linked to the thesis is the resource 
dependency theory. This theory focuses on competitive advantages generated by 
the ownership of heterogeneous assets (financial, physical, human, technological, 
organizational, and reputational) and capabilities (combination of two or more 
assets) (Grant, 1991; Penrose, 1959; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). As Halldorsson et 
al. (2007) stated, this theoretical perspective is the starting point for many strategic 
supply chain decisions. As the theory of logistics outsourcing emphasizes (Boyson et 
al., 1999), the role of 3PL within supply chains is based on the need that 
manufacturers and retailers have of focusing on their core competences. In the 
thesis, the 3PL (transport operation) as the entity that take most of freight transport 
decisions acts as a buffer for most of the demand uncertainty and operational 
inefficiency generated by their partners. Also, the 3PL (transport operation) 
outsources to road freight transport subcontractors unexpected increases in volume 
required to be moved at short notice in an attempt to minimise the negative effects of 
demand uncertainty originated by their customers.
In the beginning of the thesis, the process-control, network and system theories have 
been considered to develop the research topic as opposed to the other theoretical 
perspectives mentioned because of the fact that the main aim of the researcher was 
to identify and measure high frequency and low-to-medium impact events that affect 
road freight transport at tactical and operational levels. Transaction cost economics 
and the resource dependency theory were not considered since they relate more to 
the strategic planning of logistics and freight transport. However, they can be 
implicitly linked to the research topic developed in this PhD.
i
1.2 Problem proposition and objectives
A considerable amount of research on uncertainty in supply chain management has 
been undertaken (Davis, 1993; Mason-Jones and Towill, 1998; Van der Vorst and 
Beulens, 2002; Geary et al, 2003; Peck et al, 2003), but in such works transport has 
typically been regarded as a marginal activity within supply chains (Stank & Goldsby, 
2000) and has not been considered explicitly. To start addressing these 
shortcomings, it is necessary to determine what forms of uncertainty affect transport
5
The first stage of the research is deductive in nature, since the research objectives 
are derived from the literature. These objectives are outlined in Chapter 2. These 
objectives are to:
• Determine the uncertainty causes affecting freight transport operations by 
adapting and translating existing manufacturing-focused uncertainty 
frameworks to make them suitable for the analysis of uncertainties affecting 
transport operations
• Evaluate the causes of supply chain uncertainty that impact on the 
environmental and economic performance of the road freight transport sector
• Clarify how transport operations mitigate uncertainty..
The second stage of the research is inductive in nature, because the research 
objectives were derived from the first two case studies (Chapters 7 and 8). These 
objectives are to:
• Introduce the concept of ‘extra distance’ as a means of assessing the 
marginal impact that deviations from the transport plan have on the economic 
and environmental performance of road freight transport operations
• Evaluate the uncertainty causes affecting freight transport operations in terms 
of their impact on the environmental and economic performance of these 
operations and identify potential mitigation tools and/or approaches to 
minimise their effect
• Develop a decision-making tool, based on a combined assessment of ‘extra 
distance’ and ‘extra time’, for the diagnosis of the effects that different causes
I of uncertainty have on the performance of road freight transport operations, in 
terms of cost and CO2 emissions.
1.3 Outline of the methodology
The literature on the topic of this thesis is at a conceptual stage, since little empirical 
research has been developed so far. In logistics, there have been two main 
epistemological perspectives, positivism and critical realism. The epistemological 
perspective taken in this PhD is critical realism, since the research topic needs to be
7
operations. Previous, research has introduced the concept of the logistics triad 
(Beier, 1989; Bask, 2001). The logistics triad is formed by three entities, the shipper, 
the carrier and the customer, working together to deliver value to the end consumer 
while keeping the total cost of the supply chain down. Only when the various 
different sources of uncertainty affecting the use of transport in the logistics triad 
have been identified will it become possible to determine what their relative impact is 
on transport performance. Following such diagnosis, it becomes possible to improve 
the performance of logistics operations within supply chains.
Recently, the link between the supply chain and the environmental performance of 
transport operations has been established at a macro level. McKinnon (2007) 
developed a framework where six sustainability ratios link the supply chain 
processes with CO2 emissions generated by freight transport operations. However, 
these ratios can also be influenced by uncertainty in freight transport at operational 
level. Supply chain uncertainty can have a significant impact on the efficiency of 
transport operations. Inefficiencies in road freight transport operations can have a 
knock-on effect on the cost of transport and the level of CO2 emissions in supply 
chains. Therefore, the mitigation of supply chain uncertainty within transport 
operations can minimise the risk of disruptions in the delivery process, so transport 
resources can be utilised in the most efficient and least polluting manner.
In addition, in logistics research, there has been a focus on measuring the absolute 
and/or average performance of road transport operations (Fowkes et al, 2004; 
McKinnon and Ge, 2004). One aspect of performance measurement that appears to 
be uhder-researched is the impact of unexpected events upon transport performance 
(for example, Department for Transport, 2007). In effect, the marginal impact of 
supply chain uncertainty on freight transport performance at an operational level has 
not yet been explored. There is evidence of performance measures detailing the 
number of incidents that occur, and also macro-level measures of planned versus 
actual distance travelled. However, there have not been any studies that have 
assessed the impact of supply chain uncertainty in terms of the extra movements 
and extra time required within the transport network.
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explored first at a superficial level and subsequently explained at a micro level. At 
the beginning of this PhD, the topic was clarified at a macro level through the 
application of methods that include practitioners and simultaneously using 
quantitative methods to generalise their perceptions. Therefore, the topic was 
explored first at a conceptual level and later refined through the application of focus 
groups. The findings from the focus groups were confirmed in an online structured 
questionnaire-based survey.
The research topic also needed a great deal of explanation at a micro level to 
develop diagnostic tools that could inform future decision making in companies, 
supply chains and industry. In achieving that, the researcher explored what occurs in 
real-world scenarios, so the case study method was applied by mixing qualitative 
and quantitative data collection techniques taking a similar approach to the work of 
Van der Vorst and Beulens (2002). Thus, in the final stage of the research, 
uncertainty causes were evaluated in three (Fast Moving Consumer Goods) FMCG 
distribution networks. Also, in these three case studies, a decision-making tool for 
the diagnosis and mitigation of uncertainty causes was developed.
1.4 Outline o f the thesis
Deductive
stage
Chapters 4, 5 
and 6
Synthesis
stage
Chapters 10 
and 11
Chapters 2 
and 3
Exploratory
stage
Inductive
stage
Chapters 7, 8 
and 9
Figure 1.2 Research stages of the rest of the thesis
This section presents an outline of the rest of the thesis to give a clear structure to 
the reader. Figure 1.2 summarises the research stages of the PhD. The following is 
a list of the chapters together with their overall content:
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• In Chapter 2, the gaps in the literature on supply chain uncertainty and 
transport are explored. In this chapter, the three objectives from the deductive 
stage of the PhD are formulated
• Chapter 3 presents a discussion of the methodology and methods applied in 
undertaking the research
• Chapter 4 includes a conceptual model of uncertainty and transport 
developed from the literature. This model is the theoretical foundation of the 
thesis. It categorises transport uncertainty in five sources: shipper, customer, 
carrier, control systems and external uncertainty.
• In Chapter 5, the conceptual model developed in the previous chapter is 
refined through the application of seven focus groups. In the focus groups, 
four main clusters of uncertainty were found: delays, variable demand and/or 
inaccurate forecast, delivery constraints and insufficient supply chain 
integration and coordination.
• Chapter 6 presents the application of a structured questionnaire-based survey 
used to confirm the findings from the focus groups. The four main clusters 
identified in the focus groups were confirmed in this survey
• In Chapter 7, the definition of ‘extra distance’ is developed in a case study 
based on a primary distribution network from the UK FMCG sector. In this 
case study, the uncertainty causes identified are evaluated in terms of their 
economic and environmental impact and their frequency
• In Chapter 8, the ‘extra distance’ measure is complemented by introducing an 
‘extra time’ measure. A combined assessment of ‘extra distance’ and ‘extra 
time’ is undertaken in a secondary distribution network from the South African 
FMCG sector. In this case study, the uncertainty causes identified are 
evaluated in terms of their economic and environmental impact and their 
frequency
• Chapter 9 presents the third case study of this PhD. In Chapters 7 and 8, due 
to the fact that the two distribution networks assessed do not make available 
to the researcher appropriate telematics data, the effects of route diversion 
due to unplanned road congestion and road restrictions could not be 
measured. In Chapter 9, the assessment undertaken in Chapter 8 is repeated 
but in addition includes route diversion in the ‘extra distance’ assessment
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• Chapter 10 presents a synthesis of the findings from the deductive and 
inductive stages of the thesis. This chapter aims to highlight the overall 
contribution of the PhD. Also, based on the findings from the two stages of the 
research, in this chapter, a refined decision-making framework for the 
diagnosis and mitigation of uncertainty in road freight transport operations is 
developed and discussed
• Finally, Chapter 11 includes statements to link the objectives from the two 
stages of the research, which have been outlined in this chapter, with the 
overall findings of the thesis. Additionally, this chapter highlights the 
limitations and further enquiries and/or opportunities of for future research 
derived from this thesis.
i
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complexity of supply networks, and as a result, can impact on relevant supply-chain 
factors, e.g. information visibility and communication between partners.
Also, at the asset and inter-organisational levels, due to globalisation pressures, the 
geographical dispersion of supply network has considerably increased in the last 20 
years (Peck et al, 2003). In parallel, Warburton and Stratton (2005) identify that risks 
with globalisation can affect supply chain performance: “The decision to move to low- 
cost offshore supply resulted in the responsiveness of supply chain deteriorating and 
the accumulation of expensive excess inventory, markdowns and even write-offs”. 
From a transport perspective, uncertainty can arise from the increase of outsourcing 
and geographical dispersion within the supply network. In addition, Rossi (2009) 
determined that a more centralised network could present lower risks in several 
regards, such as technology, supply chain, process, demand, and risk of exposition.
Previous, research has introduced the concept of the logistics triad (Beier, 1989; 
Bask, 2001). As shown in Figure 2.1, the logistics triad is formed by three entities, 
the shipper, the carrier and the customer, working together to deliver value to the 
end consumer while keeping the total cost of the supply chain down. The shipper is 
the entity that ships and supplies the goods, the carrier is the logistics provider. In 
research on the logistics triad, the role of the carrier is often considered to be 
passive or marginal (Mason and Lalwani, 2004). The organisations responsible for 
supplying or demanding goods (i.e. suppliers and/or customers) are assumed to be 
the prime decision makers and hold almost all power in the relationships (Mason et 
al, 2007).
Carrier
Supplier Customer
* Physical ^  ^  Information Flow ^  Relationships 
Figure 2.1 Logistics triad (adapted from Bask 2001)
17
holding and obsolescence costs (Mason-Jones and Towill, 1999). Either way, 
uncertainty can lead to increased total costs. The supply chain partners can either 
invest in state-of-the-art ICT systems to keep the level of inventory down and control 
the transport movements with their distribution networks, or they can also have slack 
capacity to help them respond to any variation of demand. Traditionally, in the 
supply-chain uncertainty literature, little attention has been paid to the causes and 
consequences of uncertainty within freight transport operations. Uncertainty affecting 
transport operations can lead to unnecessary transport movements within 
distribution networks, and as a consequence, it can increase the cost and CO2 
emissions of such operations. Therefore, in this thesis, the objective is to address 
this gap in the literature.
Successful managers today need to take a broad view of the role and responsibilities 
of transportation management in an integrated supply chain (Stank and Goldsby, 
2000). Recently, transport has become a relatively far more important supply-chain 
function than in the past due to its impact on the environment. In order to cope with 
the uncertainties originated within the supply chain and externally, there is a need for 
freight transport to be used in more flexible and responsive ways, to respond 
effectively to customer demand (Narus and Anderson, 1996) while at the same time 
minimising the impact of transport on costs and on the environment (Morash and 
Clinton, 1997; Duclos et al, 2003). Seen in this light, it is clear that, whilst effective 
transport operations can enable the delivery of customer value to an extent where 
integration of transport operations into the overall supply chain is critical to improving 
supply chain performance (Stank and Goldsby, 2000; Mason and Lalwani, 2004), to 
date- there appears to have been a failure in properly integrating transport into supply 
chains. As a result, the economic and environmental effects of uncertainty on freight 
transport operations are likely to be greater, since the supply chain is less 
responsive to unexpected events.
This thesis considers transport uncertainty in terms of variations in a number of 
factors, including transit times, schedules (for example, to take into account delivery 
windows), volume and transport mode. A traditional approach to investigating the 
logistics impact of uncertainty is the use of ‘Inventory Theoretic’ models following 
Baumol and Vinod (1970). Typically, these models identify the total costs of transport
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2.4 Uncertainty and risk in supply chains
Sometimes the term uncertainty is confused with risk, so it is important to clarify how 
these two concepts differ. Risk is a function of outcome and probability and hence is 
something that can be estimated qualitatively most of the time and in some cases 
quantitatively. If the probability that an event could occur is low but the outcome of 
that event can have a highly detrimental impact on the supply chain, the occurrence 
of that event represents a considerable risk for the chain. Uncertainty occurs when 
decision makers cannot estimate the outcome of an event or the probability of its 
occurrence. However, uncertainty increases the risk within supply chains, and risk is 
a consequence of the external and internal uncertainties that affect a supply chain.
Increases in the uncertainties in supply and demand, globalisation, reduction in 
product and technology life cycles, and the use of outsourcing in manufacturing, 
distribution and logistics resulting in more complex supply networks, can lead to 
higher exposure to risks in the supply chain (Christopher and Lee, 2004). Haywood 
and Peck (2004) highlight that “a number of managerial trends including JIT delivery, 
supplier rationalisation programmes and widespread outsourcing of non-core 
activities have all served to increase the efficiency of supply networks”, but at the 
same time, “there are concerns that these measures appear to have increased 
supply chain vulnerability” (Svensson, 2000).
Peck et al (2003) have developed a risk framework where they define risk at four 
levels:
• ' Linear pipeline level
• Asset or infrastructure level
• Inter-organisational level, and
• Wider macroeconomic level.
In the linear pipeline, quality failures, suboptimal performance, volatility in demand or 
changing market place requirements can increase risk. At both the asset and inter- 
organisational levels, the ownership of the asset or infrastructure is an essential 
factor that contributes to supply chain risk. Outsourcing can lead to increases in the
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between carriers within a distribution network due to lack of horizontal 
communication within the network. Parallel uncertainty can lead to an increase of 
empty miles within distribution networks. Unforeseen uncertainty is the consequence 
of deterministic chaos and long-term planning. In this case, a supply chain can have 
a very good long-term planning process, but many things can change that are 
unforeseen when the long-term plan is undertaken, so contingency planning needs 
to be included in the long-term plan. These contingencies can lead to an increase in 
the fixed cost of transport. More recently, Peck (2009) established that one of the 
main causes of supply chain risk is that business contingency planning tends to 
extend only as far as the ability of an organisation to maintain its own core 
operations under otherwise normal external conditions. Furthermore, chaotic 
uncertainty is general, non-deterministic chaos that cannot be predicted by a 
mathematical function.
Macro Level Micro Level
General
Variation
Variable, multi-goal and 
constraints
Foreseen
Uncertainty Amplification and parallel
Unforeseen
Uncertainty
Deterministic chaos and long­
term planning
Chaotic
Uncertainty
General non-deterministic 
chaos
Table 2.1 Micro-level Types of Uncertainty in Supply Chains (Prater 2005)
Prater’s (2005) framework categorises uncertainty in terms of its predictability. The 
overall aim of this thesis is to link the uncertainties originated within the supply chain 
and bxternally with the economic and environmental performance of road freight 
transport operations and also to identify potential mitigation tools and/or approaches 
to minimise their effects. However, it is first necessary to define supply chain 
uncertainty. According to Van der Vorst and Beulens (2002),
Supply chain uncertainty refers to decision making situations in the supply chain in 
which the decision maker does not know definitely what to decide as he is 
indistinct about the objectives; lacks information about its environment or the 
supply chain; lacks information processing capacity; is unable to accurately 
predict the impact of possible control actions on supply chain behaviour; or, lacks 
effective control actions.
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and inventory, and how these vary according to choice of transport mode or 
transport carrier. Most relevant here is the fact that the issue of uncertainty is 
addressed through the cost of increased safety stock held to prevent stock-outs due 
to variability in transit times. Such methods are still used, as for example by Swan 
and Tyworth (2001) in their study of the impact of unreliability in American rail freight 
services. However, this thesis measures the effect of uncertainty in terms of the two 
dimensions of transport performance, time and distance, rather than its impact on 
inventory levels within the supply chain.
A large body of research employing a wide range of methods continues to highlight 
the inventory impact of transport-related uncertainty. Closs et al. (2003), for 
example, investigated rail wagon delays specifically in the chemical sector, and 
concluded that even quite small changes in rail transit times and, more relevantly 
here, transit time variability, could significantly reduce safety stock levels for the 
shippers concerned. Stank and Crum (1997) examined the impact of border delays 
between Mexico and the USA, on both Just-in-Time (JIT) and non-JIT sectors. 
Amongst their conclusions they identified that, particularly in the JIT sector, some 
possible inventory reductions were being foregone to achieve greater transport 
reliability, for example through the use of more consolidated services implying larger 
consignment sizes than firms would consider ideal. In an analysis of transit times 
and their variability on ocean liner shipping routes, Saldanha et al. (2006) suggested 
that the issue of variability over-rode that of absolute speed, and hence carriers may 
be better off adding slack time into their published schedules in order to achieve 
better reliability. In this thesis, the overall aim of the researcher is to link the 
uncertainties originated within the supply chain and externally with transport 
performance in terms of unnecessary time and distance.
Whilst such a focus on trade-offs between transport costs and inventory costs is still 
highly relevant in many circumstances, the research studies in supply chain 
management previously mentioned tend to be based on a traditional paradigm of 
individual actions by supply chain players acting in a non-co-operative environment. 
There is a need for alternative approaches that build on more modern supply chain 
thinking, which emphasises the potential benefits of co-operation between supply 
chain partners to prevent actions by one player causing spill-over effects elsewhere
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2.0 Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
There is a need to give much more attention to the transport functions of the supply 
chain. In current times, this has become even more important, since transport 
operations have a considerable impact on the environment. The focus of this thesis 
is on clarifying the relationship between supply chain uncertainty and the 
performance of freight transport operations. In order to achieve this, it is necessary 
first to explore the existent literature on manufacturing and supply chain uncertainty, 
together with the relationship between supply chain uncertainty and risk. Also, it is 
important to establish the links between supply chain uncertainty and green logistics. 
Consequently, in this chapter, a literature review will be undertaken to link supply 
chain uncertainty and risk with the environmental performance of freight transport 
operations.
The chapter first presents a background on the literature developed in the topic. It 
then proceeds by defining uncertainty in broader terms based on the degree of 
predictability of different types of uncertainty. Following that, a section on supply 
chain risk, vulnerability and uncertainty is presented to clarify the relationship 
between these topics of research. Subsequently, the relevant literature on supply 
chain uncertainty is introduced and the first three research objectives of the thesis 
are derived from this literature. Subsequently, the links between supply chain 
uncertainty and the environmental performance of freight transport operations are
drawn.
*
2.2 Background to the topic
Uncertainty affecting different operations within supply chains presents a major 
obstacle to the delivery of superior customer value (Davis, 1993; Mason-Jones and 
Towill, 1999). Faced with such uncertainty, manufacturing, logistics and retail 
companies in the supply network will typically either aim to track the variations, 
hence leading to increased on-costs, or else buffer themselves against such 
variations through inventory, thereby, as a consequence, risking additional stock
11
in the chain. One of the potential benefits of co-operation between supply chain 
partners is that when the carrier is properly integrated into the supply chain, the 
freight transport operation is likely to be more responsive to uncertainty.
Recent UK research, for example Lalwani et al. (2004), have highlighted the fact that 
freight transport planning and procurement can be the responsibility of either the 
supplier or the customer, depending on the terms on which business is transacted. 
The traditional nature of relationships within the logistics triad is that the carrier does 
not take a strategic role in the decision making process within the supply chain. 
However, due to growing adoption of practices such as ‘factory gate pricing’, where 
retailers effectively purchase ex-works from their suppliers and co-ordinate collection 
of goods with their existing outbound transport movements to improve vehicle 
utilisation, it is increasingly common for transport to be arranged and managed by 
the customer (Potter et al., 2007). Models based on the logistics triad, therefore, 
need to be able to accommodate the effects of different arrangements of 
responsibility for the organisation, procurement, management and control of freight 
transport operations.
2.3 What is uncertainty?
As Table 2.1 depicts, Prater (2005) developed an uncertainty framework that can be 
used to classify different uncertainty causes by establishing their degree of 
predictability. This framework classifies uncertainty from macro to micro level. At a 
macro level, uncertainty is typified as general variation, foreseen uncertainty, 
unforeseen uncertainty and chaotic uncertainty. General variation consists of 
variable, multi-goal and constraint uncertainties, which can be defined as the general 
variation that a process has. This is the most predictable type of uncertainty.
Foreseen uncertainty is caused by amplification and parallel interactions. An 
example of amplification is the demand amplification that usually occurs from 
customers to their suppliers due to insufficient information visibility. Demand 
amplification can force road freight transport operations to run unnecessary transport 
movements, and as a consequence, this can have a negative effect on cost and CO2 
emissions. Also, an example of parallel uncertainty is the potential duplication
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Rapidly changing circumstances on the part of suppliers or their customers result in 
significant uncertainties for carriers who must respond to such changes, often at 
short notice (Boughton, 2003). As a result, carriers may build considerable amounts 
of flexibility into their service offerings, perhaps in terms of volume, route, fleet mix 
and time, with cost implications. It appears that there are low levels of understanding 
and consideration of how the actions of one triad member impact on the operations 
(and the costs, revenues and profits) of the others. One important benefit of the 
model developed in the following chapter is that it will help logistics triads to assess 
the impacts of supply chain and external uncertainties on logistics operations. The 
model will also be a foundation framework for the diagnosis and reduction of 
uncertainty affecting the logistics triad.
2.4.1 Frameworks for assessing uncertainty
Table 2.2 shows the most recent uncertainty frameworks considered for developing 
the conceptual model for the thesis. Most of them have as a unit of analysis a dyad 
formed by the supplier and its customer. Also, some of them consider networks of 
suppliers, warehouses and retailers (Wilding 1998a, Wilding 1998b, Peck et al.
2003). Furthermore, Geary ate al. (2003) and Van der Vorst and Beaulens (2002) 
consider a manufacturing process affected by its supply chain as a single entity as 
their unit of analysis. The most relevant aspect from all these frameworks is that with 
the exception of Waters (2007) all of them do not consider transport, at least not 
explicitly, into their analysis of uncertainty. In this PhD, the aim is to explore of how 
uncertainty affects transport as one of the main process of the supply chain. Hence, 
in selecting the uncertainty framework for developing the thesis conceptual model, 
the researcher was influenced by three wider theoretical perspectives: the process- 
control, system and network theoretical perspectives.
The reason for taking a process-based orientation is that it was necessary to treat 
transport as a process that in reality is planned, monitored and controlled from a 
central planning office in most of distribution networks. Transport is not considered in 
any of the uncertainty frameworks shown in Table 2.2. As mention in Chapter 1, a 
typical transport operation plan and execute deliveries for its customers centrally and
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Authors Brief description Unit of 
Analysis
Inclusion
of
transport
Supply 
chain level
Waters (2007) It classifies uncertainty in two sources: internal 
and external uncertainty and recommend 
mitigation strategies to respond to these two 
sources. ~
Supply
chain
Yes at the
strategic
level
Strategic
Wilding
(1998a)
It classified three sources of uncertainty affecting 
the supply chain: demand amplification, parallel 
interactions and deterministic chaos.
Network No Operational
Wilding
(1998a)
It is an extension of the Wilding’s (1998a) but 
focusing on deterministic chaos.
Network No Operational
Table 2.2 Frameworks for assessing uncertainty
As it have mentioned in Chapter 1, the application of a network theoretical 
perspective is reflected on the fact that the unit of analysis throughout the thesis is, 
as Figure 2.1 shows, the logistics triad (supplier, carrier and customer) proposed by 
Bask (2003). The logistics triad (Bask 2003) influences highly on the development of 
the conceptual model. It facilitates the transition between the supply-chain-based 
uncertainty framework and the conceptual transport-based framework developed in 
the thesis. In most distribution networks, the transport planning office in a typical 
distribution network communicates and deals with a network formed by suppliers and 
customers. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 1, the boundaries of the 
conceptual model were defined by applying a system theoretical perspective. In 
both, the deductive and inductive stages of the thesis, a network view was taken to 
identify the main causes of uncertainty affecting transport operations within supply 
chains, but these main causes of uncertainty were categorised based on the 
boundaries of the conceptual model.
Various uncertainty frameworks have been considered to develop the conceptual 
model since transport as a process is affected considerable by uncertainty originated 
by suppliers, customers and external sources. Hence, the Uncertainty Circles 
(Mason-Jones and Towill 1999) shown in Figure 2.2 were selected because the 
initial objective was to identify sources of uncertainties which can affect transport 
operations. Although this framework is aimed at monitoring and controlling supply 
chain variation impacting on a manufacturing process, its generic principles can be
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in the presence of failures in the network the transport planning the transport 
operation by re-planning the initial transport plan. Hence, a process-based 
orientation is suitable to explore and measure transport uncertainty in a distribution 
network.
Authors Brief description Unit of 
Analysis
Inclusion
of
transport
Supply 
chain level
Davis (2003)
The framework links supplier performance and 
demand uncertainty with manufacturing 
inefficiency. It is focused primarily in medium 
impact events that occur very frequently at 
operational level.
Dyad No Operational
Geary et al 
(2002)
This uncertainty framework aims at linking 
uncertainty causes from each source of 
uncertainty of the Uncertainty Circle (Mason- 
Jones and Towill, 1999) framework with different 
types of effects.
Process No Operational
Mason-Jones 
& Towiii 
(1998)
It includes four main sources of uncertainty 
affecting manufacturing operations: the supplier, 
the demand, the factory and control systems. This 
framework is an extension of the Davis’s (1993) 
uncertainty model.
Supply
chain
No Operational
Peck et al. 
(2003)
It proposes four levels of supply chain risk, 
process/value stream, asset and infrastructure 
dependencies, organisational and inter- 
organisational networks, and the environment. It is 
linked to the Mason-Jones and Towill (1999) 
framework as well.
Network No Strategic and 
operational
Prater (2005) It categorises uncertainty affecting supply chain in 
four main categories: general variation, foreseen 
uncertainty, unforeseen uncertainty and chaotic 
uncertainty. The boundaries of these frameworks 
include the strategic and operational levels.
Dyad No Strategic and 
operational
Svensson
(2000)
i
It classified uncertainty into two categories: 
sources and categories of disturbances. Sources 
of disturbances can be classified as direct or 
indirect disturbances and categories of 
disturbances are divided into quantitative and 
qualitative disturbances.
Dyad No Operational
Svensson
(2001)
It includes two dimensions of uncertainty: time- 
and relationship dependence.
Dyad No Operational
SCOR Model 
7.0
It includes plan, source, make and deliver as the 
main source of uncertainty. This framework can be 
applied at either strategic or operational.
Dyad Not
explicitly
Strategic and 
operational
Van der vaart 
(1996)
It attempts to identify all the uncertainty sources 
that could affect a materials procurement function 
in the supply chain.
Process No Operational
Van der Vorst 
& Beaulens 
(2002)
It adds three dimensions to the Uncertainty Circles 
from Mason-Jones and Towill (1999): quantity, 
quality and time. This framework has been based 
on the Uncertainty Circles, (Mason-Jones and 
Towill, 1999).
Dyad No Operational
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the logistics triad -  the set of relationships between the supplier of the goods, the 
customer for the goods and the logistics provider (or carrier) (Figure 2.1). As has 
been mentioned previously, the conceptual model developed for this thesis has its 
roots in previous research on the logistics triad where it has been argued that this 
represents the minimum set of dimensions for supply chain analysis (Beier, 1989; 
Bask, 2001).
2.5 Linking supply chain uncertainty to the environmental performance of 
freight transport operations
Recently, the link between the supply chain and the environmental performance of 
transport operations has been established at a macro level. McKinnon (2007) 
developed a framework where six sustainability ratios link the supply chain 
processes with CO2 emissions generated by freight transport operations (Figure 2.3). 
However, these ratios can also be influenced by uncertainty in freight transport at 
operational level. In the specific case of road freight transport, as can be seen in 
Figure 2.3, there are six ratios that can impact on the level of CO2 emissions of 
transport operations. These ratios are handling factor (the number of links in the 
supply chain), average length of haul, modal split, average load on laden trips, 
average empty running and fuel efficiency (McKinnon, 2007). Transport uncertainty 
can have a negative impact on these key ratios.
• Handling factor: this is affected by supply chain structure. At an operational 
< level, inappropriate sourcing (Christopher and Lee, 2004; Giunipero and
Eltantawy, 2004), problems in supplier capacity (Cavinato, 2004) and location 
and storage uncertainty (Van der Vorst and Beulens, 2002; Fowkes et al.,
2004) can have a negative impact on supply chain structure. These can make 
the information flow and communication between supply chain partners less 
transparent and reliable.
• Average length of haul: the efficiency of vehicle routeing influences this ratio. 
A rigid routeing plan can lead to inefficiencies in the transport routeing 
process (Naim et al., 2006). This can cause diversions due to unplanned road 
congestion. Also, insufficient fleet capacity can be a cause of disruption of
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strategic component of the supply chain or a specific source of supply chain 
uncertainty.
The recent body of work on supply risk and vulnerability has added an important new 
dimension of exogenous events to the Uncertainty Circle (Peck et al, 2003). 
Examples of such events might include terrorism, industrial action, disease 
epidemics and severe weather conditions. Transport operations may be seriously 
affected either directly through such events or more indirectly through government 
regulations and controls aimed at preventing their occurrence or minimising their 
impact. Furthermore, businesses may decide to change their strategies, including 
their supply chain strategies, to minimise the future impact of government 
interventions such as taxation changes or new regulations that may be looming on 
the horizon but whose shape is not yet known for certain. Whilst the work of Peck et 
al (2003) has added value to the supply chain uncertainty literature, external 
uncertainty needs to be more fully defined and integrated with the other sources of 
uncertainty initially proposed by Mason-Jones and Towill (1999).
Other supply chain uncertainty frameworks such as Wilding 1998a, Peck (2003) and 
Prater (2005) could have been used to develop the conceptual model, however they 
are more suitable to measure very high impact events which occur very infrequently. 
These frameworks are more suitable for studying uncertainty affecting supply chains 
at strategic levels. On the other hand, the combination of the Uncertainty Circles 
(Mason-Jones and Towill 1999) and the logistics triad (Bask 2003) enables the 
research to achieve one of the main objectives of this PhD, which is to measure 
uncertainty that affects day-to-day road freight operations most of the time affected 
by low-to-medium impact events that occur very frequently.
The first objective of this thesis is:
To determine the uncertainty causes affecting freight transport operations by 
adapting and translating existing manufacturing-focused uncertainty frameworks to 
make them suitable for the analysis of uncertainties affecting transport operations.
This objective will be achieved by developing a transport-focused uncertainty model 
from a supply chain perspective. The foundation stone of this model is the concept of
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3.0 Methodology
This chapter aims to present and justify the methodological path selected for this 
PhD and provide detailed information on the application of the research methods 
used by the author, which are focus groups, survey and case studies. Firstly, two 
epistemological perspectives, positivism and critical realism, are presented, 
discussing how these have influenced logistics research and the topic explored in 
this thesis. Following that, the existent methodological issues of logistics research 
and evidence of the application of methodological triangulation in logistics are 
discussed. Subsequently, a section on the research methods used in the PhD and 
their application in the logistics discipline is introduced. Also, at the end of the 
chapter, the author concludes with a synthesis of the methodological path applied.
The discipline of research in this PhD is logistics. Logistics plans, implements, and 
controls the flow and storage of products, services, and related information from 
suppliers to end consumers in order to meet customers’ needs (Stock and Lambert,
2001). Arlbjorn and Halldorsson (2002) have defined the hard core of logistics as the 
physical and demand information flows. However, they have stated that the logistics 
discipline has a protection belt, which are the areas of logistics research that do not 
explicitly relate to the hard core of the discipline. This presents considerable 
confusion, since a proportion of researchers within the logistics discipline have 
tended to undertake research by borrowing theories from other fields. This will be 
discussed following presentation of the three epistemological perspectives that best 
reflect research methodology in logistics. Subsequently, the methodological issues 
of th4 logistics discipline are discussed and the methodological path of the PhD is 
introduced. Finally, the applications of the methods used in the thesis, focus groups, 
survey and case study in logistics are discussed.
3.1 Epistemological perspectives
In this section of the chapter, three epistemological perspectives, positivism, 
interpretivism and critical realism are discussed, emphasising the main differences 
between them and the implications and limitations that are involved in their
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The second objective of this thesis is:
To evaluate the causes of supply chain uncertainty that impact on the environmental 
and economic performance of the road freight transport sector.
Also, the third research objective of this PhD is:
To clarify how transport operations mitigate uncertainty.
This will be explored in the deductive stage of the PhD, Chapters 4 to 6, but 
explained in-depth in the case studies presented in Chapters 7 to 9.
2.6 Concluding remarks
So far, the existent literature on supply chain uncertainty and transport has been 
examined. Three research objectives have been derived from this literature review. 
The first is to determine the causes of uncertainty that impact on freight transport 
operations and the second is to evaluate them by applying a methodological 
triangulation strategy. In this thesis, the literature review does not include the 
development of the conceptual model of thesis, due to the fact that it can be argued 
that a conceptual model can be part of the research path of the thesis.
In the next chapter, the methodology applied in this thesis will be discussed. Then, a 
transport-focused conceptual model is developed by categorising the existing 
literature on supply chain and transport uncertainty. After that, in the two following 
chapters, the conceptual model is refined by applying focus groups and confirmed by 
applying a questionnaire-based survey. Thus, the first two objectives of the thesis 
will be largely answered in the Chapters 4, 5 and 6. The third research objective 
derived in this chapter will be addressed initially in the survey (Chapter 6) and after 
in more detail in the case study chapters (Chapters 7, 8 and 9). Jointly, the results 
from these three chapters will help to generalise the finding of the thesis as a whole. 
Subsequently, the model will be tested at a micro level by the application of the case 
study method to quantitatively evaluate all the uncertainty causes impacting on road 
transport operations in terms of the consequences that they have on the cost and 
CO2 emissions of road transport operations.
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Moreover, unpredictability in arrival times and reduction of efficiency of 
multimodal hubs (Fowkes et al., 2004) can inhibit the split from road to rail.
• Average load on laden trips: this ratio can be affected by two factors: vehicle 
utilisation on laden trips and vehicle carrying capacity by weight and volume. 
If carriers have single vehicle configuration carriers are forced to choose a 
type of vehicle that may not always match the customer requirements in terms 
of volume and commodity type (Naim et al., 2006),. Also, transport delays due 
to inefficiency at the supplier and/or carrier can have a negative effect on the 
average load on laden trips (McKinnon & Ge, 2004), since, due to delays, a 
potential full load in a single vehicle can become two half-full vehicles.
• Average empty running: the level of back haulage can affect this ratio. If 
demand for transport is not managed in a holistic way, empty miles between 
destination of inbound shipments and origin of outbound shipments can 
increase (Esper and Williams, 2003), and as a result, the overall vehicle 
utilisation can decrease. The level of back haulage is a key factor in achieving 
high levels of fleet utilisation. Difficult and non-standard orders (Boughton, 
2003; Fowkes et al„ 2004; Vickery et al,, 2004) in terms of location of 
destinations can have a negative effect on the level of back haulage.
• Fuel efficiency: the degree of exposure to traffic congestion can affect this 
ratio. Road congestion is increasingly affecting transport operations 
(McKinnon and Ge, 2004). If traffic congestion levels are predictable, then this 
can be planned for, but in many cases congestion results in variable and less 
predictable travel times and hence a less reliable service (Van Schijndel and 
Dinwoodie, 2000; Golob and Regan, 2001). However, when a lorry is running
{ at low speed because of high levels of traffic congestion, its fuel efficiency can 
be negatively affected.
Supply chain uncertainty can significantly impact on the efficiency of transport 
operations. Inefficiencies in road freight transport operations can have a knock-on 
effect on the level of CO2 emissions in supply chains. Therefore, the mitigation of 
supply chain uncertainty within transport operations can minimise the risk of 
disruptions in the delivery process, so transport resources can be utilised in the most 
efficient and least polluting manner.
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• “Science must be conducted in a way that is value-free”. Therefore, research 
should be undertaken in an objective manner, so a researcher should not accept 
that his values and beliefs can sometimes bias his research.
3.1.2 Interpretivism
Interpretivism offers a holistic perspective on a given issue and allows complex 
social situations to be explored and explained. This supports the researcher in 
coping with the existent complexities of the real world (Remenyi et al., 2005). 
Interpretivists “have the view that a strategy is required that respects the differences 
between people and the objects of the natural sciences and therefore requires the 
social scientist to grasp the subjective meaning of social action” (Bryman and Bell,
2007). They believe that the subjectivity of the actors needs to be considered. The 
principles of Interpretivism are:
• Reality is made by a combination of multiple constructs and is influenced by 
the person who holds them (Guba, 1990)
• Meaning is imposed on the object by the researcher and an interaction 
between the researcher and the object from which meaning is obtained 
(Crotty, 1998)
• In order to understand what is happening and why it is happening, there is a 
need to focus social research on the meanings and values of actors (Crotty, 
1998)
• The researchers are an active part of the research process and lack a neutral 
point of observation (Mentzerand Kahn, 1995)
• The interpretive approach focuses on understanding a phenomenon rather 
than on measuring, explaining or predicting it (Mentzer and Kahn, 1995; 
Bryman and Bell, 2007).
3.1.3 Critical Realism
Regarding epistemology, critical realism is a philosophical perspective that can be 
positioned in the middle of the spectrum between positivism and interpretivism. From 
an ontological position, both positivism and critical realism seek for objectivity in
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2002). In logistics, there has been a predominance of positivist research based on 
quantitative methods (Frankie et al, 2005). However, a discipline might underscore if 
its academic works are not conducted based on a wide methodological approach 
(Dunn etal, 1993).
3.1.5 Positivist research in logistics
In logistics, two quantitative methods that can set their roots from the positivist 
perspective are analytical modelling and survey (Frankie et al., 2005). Analytical 
modelling is applied to simulate material and information flows of simplified supply 
chains and to explore what-if scenarios that are difficult to investigate in a real 
supply chain. Due to the fact that logistics networks are extremely complex, systems 
need to be simplified to a large extent. An example of a study that has followed this 
approach is Lee and Tang (1997). These types of academic works have attempted 
to model logistics flows defining quantitative logistics parameters. Between them 
there is a common feature, they have developed their models from basic 
assumptions, e.g. a single-product system, constant demand, a single supplier and 
customer, and so on, and meanwhile the real-world systems are multi-variable 
networks composed of many combinations of products, suppliers and customers. On 
the one hand, these authors have oversimplified real-world scenarios to simulate 
them. On the other hand, there have been other academic research works where the 
researcher(s) have embedded more detail into the models. From some of these 
works supply chains have implemented new strategies to improve their performance. 
An example of this type of analytical modelling is the work that Disney et al. (2003) 
undertook to determine the impact of Vendor Management Inventory (VMI) in 
transport. This particular work has had a considerable impact on the UK grocery 
industry.
Other logistics researchers have based their works mainly on quantitative surveys 
applying assumptions that are largely from a positivist perspective (Stock et al, 2000; 
Li et al, 2005). They have tended to link independent variables, such as best 
practices or facility location, with performance. In their studies, they tested the 
association between variables that often have a vague or subjective definition and
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• “Human factors need to be considered to disentangle structures beyond 
superficial social events” (Bryman and Bell, 2007).
Positivism seeks for the simplification of systems through the isolation of variables or 
system closure. However, the impossibility of achieving experimental closure is a 
barrier to a scientific approach in studying social science (Collier, 1994). 
Researchers should explore and analyse research problems as an open system, but 
“although closure of the system is tricky and not all critical realists think that can be 
overcome, Baskhar’s response is to look for analogues or substitutes in social 
science for the role of scientific experiments” (Benton and Craib).
In critical realism, the application of grounded theory is recommended for the 
development conceptual models (Glasser and Strauss, 1967). Recently, there have 
been contradicting views regarding the application of grounded theory. Grounded theory 
is one of the main methodologies which critical realists applied. Glasser and Strauss 
(1967) emphasise that ‘grounded theory is an inductive research methodology which 
consists of a set of research stages resulting in the development of conceptual 
categories/concepts’. They also said that ‘these categories/concepts are interlinked to 
each other as a theoretical explanation of actions/decisions/behaviour of the actors 
participating in a research project’. As Allan (2003) stated, ‘this view of grounded theory 
contradicts the traditional way of developing theoretical models, where researchers 
derive their models from the literature’. However, according to Strauss and Corbin 
(1990), ‘researchers require being aware of the vast body of theoretical codes to 
improve their sensitivity during the data collection process and starting from zero 
theoretical knowledge may cause researchers to be immerse in the more difficult 
challenges of grounded theory’.
3.1.4 Influence of positivism and critical realism on logistics research
Positivism and critical realism are the two main approaches applied to explore 
logistics phenomena, since hardly any research in logistics has applied 
interpretivism as a sole perspective. It is very difficult to establish the boundaries of 
the logistics discipline, as “its protection belt is very broad” (Arlborn and Halldorsson,
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social science research (Bryman and Bell, 2007). However, positivists believe that 
neutrality on the researcher’s part is perfectly achievable; whereas, critical realists 
acknowledge that their values and beliefs could bias their research, but they apply 
methods to mitigate this effect.
Critical realism was “pioneered by a number of works in the UK during the 1970s, 
such as Harre’s realist philosophy and Hesse’s models and metaphors in scientific 
thinking” (Benton and Craib, 2001). A number of UK authors influenced its 
development (Keat, 1971; Keat and Urry, 1975; Benton, 1977; Baskhar, 1998). 
However, “Baskhar’s work has provided the most systematically developed and 
influential version of the approach, especially in its account of social science” 
(Benton and Craib, 2001).
Critical realists advocate the need for disentangling the structures that generate 
events in the real world. These structures are not observable at the superficial level, 
so researchers need to apply the practical and theoretical work of social science to 
identify them (Baskhar, 1989). Therefore, social science requires the application of 
different methods and procedures more capable of addressing the fact that human 
beings are the main actors in social systems, contrasting this with natural sciences” 
(Bryman and Bell, 2007). Hence, the assumption that positivists make that the same 
methods applied in natural sciences can be applied in social sciences is rejected.
Benton and Craib (2001) discussed the principles of critical realism:
• Critical realism shares with positivism the principle that “the external world is 
* independent of our knowledge of it”
• However, critical realists believe that “the external world is knowable and 
open to change” (Benton and Craib, 2001), so it differs from the positivist 
principle in that only theory developed from directly observable phenomena 
are valid
• For critical realism, “the structures of the real world need to be explored in 
detail, since the surface that usually positivist research covers can be 
misleading” (Benton and Craib, 2001)
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are difficult to measure. They describe the surface of what is happening in logistics 
operations by applying structured questionnaires to a large sample.
These two approaches have many positivist features in common. First, they require 
oversimplification and system closure to apply the deductive approaches of natural 
sciences. Secondly, they only regard as knowledge theories developed from 
observable phenomena. Thirdly, they do not consider actors’ perceptions about 
these phenomena. Therefore, their studies mainly describe the real world at a 
superficial level. They have influenced logistics theory in the early stage of their 
research topics by describing the whole, but after that more detailed research was 
needed.
3.1.6 Critical realist research in logistics
Recently, critical realism has gained the interest of an important number of logistics 
researchers. In logistics research, there is a trade-off between theoretical rigour and 
industrial relevance (New and Payne, 1995). It is important to apply both quantitative 
and qualitative research to develop and improve logistics research (Naslund, 2002, 
cited by Magan et al, 2004). A considerable number of logistics authors have applied 
different kind of triangulation to achieve depth and industrial relevance in their 
studies, and meanwhile, achieving high standards of theoretical rigour.
According to Easterby-Smith et al (1991), there are four sorts of triangulation, data 
triangulation, investigator triangulation, methodological triangulation, and 
triangulation of theories. Methodological triangulation has been applied to consult 
actors about results of quantitative studies. New and Payne (1995) developed a 
logistics performance model applying initially a quantitative survey, after which they 
consulted 53 logistics practitioners in a series of panels. Mangan et al (2004) 
developed a decision-making model of ports management. They applied first an 
inductive approach to clarify the overall features of the UK port industry, and then 
ran in-depth case studies to determine cause-and-effect relationships. 
Subsequently, they developed a decision-making model to forecast the impact of 
management decisions of a panel of 10 logistics practitioners. These two studies
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The research topic also needed a great deal of verification at the micro levels (e.g. 
company- and employee- levels) to develop diagnostic tools that could inform future 
decision making in companies, supply chains and industry. In achieving this, the 
researcher needed to explore what occurs in real-world scenarios, thus mixing 
qualitative and quantitative techniques in the application of the case study method, 
such as the work of Van der Vorst and Beulens (2002).
3.1.8 Research methodology and the thesis topic
Due to the lack of intensive research developed in the logistics discipline and the 
unexplored stage at which the research topic was at the beginning of the PhD, the 
topic needed first to be clarified at a superficial level, before being explained at a 
company level to truly develop cause-and-effect models that reflect the real world 
and achieve an acceptable level of rigour. It is necessary to consider the perception 
of practitioners, but to triangulate their qualitative opinions with other sources of data 
(e.g. hard company data and simulation models). Therefore, critical realism is the 
most adequate perspective in this case, although positivist researchers can still 
contribute by developing research works to add theoretical rigour to the topic.
The author needed to address the deductive objectives of the thesis in order to 
identify and evaluate the sources and causes of uncertainty that impact on the 
environmental and economic performance of transport operations and to clarify how 
transport operations mitigate uncertainty. Subsequently, the inductive objectives of 
the thesis needed to be addressed, firstly to define how these uncertainties can be 
measured at the micro level, and secondly, to evaluate their impact on the economic 
and environmental performance of transport operations. Therefore, methodological 
triangulation was required and the critical realism principles were applied to 
complete this research project.
3.2 Methodological issues in logistics research
In comparison with other fields and/or disciplines such as psychology, strategic 
management and human resources, relatively little attention has been given to 
methodological issues in the logistics literature. As New and Payne (1995) observe,
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have considered the social interactions that can exist in the real world, while 
applying quantitative methods to achieve rigour in their studies. Also, they have 
taken account of the overall picture, subsequently disentangled the structures 
beyond the superficial level to develop valid models.
Other logistics researchers have used data triangulation in the application of case 
studies. Van der Vorst and Beulens (2002) have applied the case study method 
using different means of data collection. They ran three detailed case studies to 
observe how supply chain uncertainty has an impact on logistics performance. In 
these case studies, qualitative methods such as participant observation and semi­
structured interviews were used, after which quantitative methods such as hard-data 
statistical analysis and value chain mapping were applied. Subsequently, they 
developed a quantitative business simulation model to generalise their results. 
Firstly they started consulting practitioners at a very disaggregate level to 
disentangle their social structures and secondly they generalised the results of the 
case studies they ran by developing a quantitative model.
Overall, critical realists have influenced this field by applying methodological and 
data triangulation. They have included in their research projects logistics 
practitioners who manage real-world operations. They have developed valid and 
reliable cause-and-effect models without oversimplifying the very often complex real- 
world scenarios. However, they have also applied the survey method to define the 
overall picture at a superficial level at the beginning of their studies, or in other cases 
at the end of their research projects, applied business process simulations to 
quantitatively generalise the outcomes of their case studies.
3.1.7 Author’s own research perspective
The author’s academic career has developed from a scientific engineering 
background at an early stage to a more qualitative background focusing on clarifying 
logistics practices. In this PhD, the author has continuously considered the 
perceptions of practitioners regarding the research topic. The literature on the topic 
of this thesis is at a conceptual stage, since little empirical research has been 
developed so far. The author starts the thesis by taking a deductive approach, but
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3.3 Methodological path of this thesis
The methodological path of this PhD can be described as iterative and multi- 
methodological. As proposed by van der Zwaan and Engelen (1994), in order to 
develop new theories, researchers need to follow a research path that is often 
characterised by three stages: exploration, explanation and validation. Kerssens-van 
Drongelen (2001) has applied a combined deductive and inductive methodological 
path in his PhD research. In this PhD, the author has followed a similar 
methodological route: exploration, verification and explanation.
Figure 3.1 shows the methodological path of this PhD. Initially, the researcher took a 
deductive approach by consulting the existing literature on supply chain uncertainty. 
First, at a conceptual stage, a critical literature review was undertaken to categorise 
the uncertainties identified by previous research works in the topic of supply chain 
1 uncertainty. The outcome of this stage was a transport-focussed uncertainty model. 
After that, in order to refine the conceptual model, the opinions of UK logistics 
practitioners were consulted through the application of seven focus groups, following 
which the results of the focus groups were verified by designing and running an 
online structured questionnaire. Subsequently, the researcher applied an inductive 
approach to develop a new and innovative tool to link uncertainty with the economic 
and environmental performance of road transport operations. An initial pilot case 
study was undertaken of a logistics provider from the UK FMCG sector. The ‘extra 
distance’ measure was developed to evaluate the relative importance of different 
uncertainties in terms of cost and CO2 emissions. In developing this tool, the 
literature was consulted, but such a measurement tool was not yet developed. 
Therefore, as in the case of Kerssen-van Drongelen (2001), an inductive approach 
was taken. Subsequently, two case,studies were run to improve the validity of the 
tool developed in the first case study and to improve the findings of the overall 
thesis.
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Transport-focussed uncertainty model
-  7 focus groups
-  An online structured questionnaire
A pilot case study 
2 case studies
Conceptual
Expert opinion
Empirical
Refined
uncertainty
framework
v  Deductive 
Approach
Inductive
Approach
Figure 3.1 Methodological path of this PhD
3.3.1 Conceptual-based research in logistics
As Figure 3.1 depicts, the first stage of this thesis was to conceptually develop a 
model that would extend the existent literature on supply chain uncertainty to freight 
transport. This conceptual model provides guidance to the research undertaken in 
the focus groups. Logistics researchers develop conceptual models in order to:
• Explore the existent gaps in the literature and set future research agenda
• Integrate different and complementary literature into a model
• Have a framework that can support learning and knowledge creation of
academics and practitioners in the logistics discipline.\ ^
A considerable number of logistics researchers have developed conceptual models 
in the past. An example of this is the conceptual framework developed by Mason- 
Jones-Towill (1999). They developed a model on the information decoupling point to 
improve supply chain performance. Furthermore, Yang et al (2004) integrated all the 
previous literature on postponement into a conceptual framework. Moreover, Yang et 
al (2005) extended this conceptual model to determine the impact of postponement 
on transport to add the environment as a key factor of performance. All this research 
has set the future agenda on their topics of research. However, after developing a
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conceptual model an investigator needs to conduct primary research using opinion- 
based research methods, empirical research methods, or analytical modelling.
In the following sections, a discussion on the methods applied to undertake the 
research will be presented. This discussion includes the opinion-based and empirical 
research method used in the thesis.
3.3.2 Opinion-based research in logistics
Following the development of the transport-focussed uncertainty model at a 
conceptual level, the opinion of logistics practitioners needed to be consulted. The 
reason for this was that the conceptual model categorised different uncertainties into 
five uncertainty sources found in the literature; however, the literature does not 
clarify how important these uncertainties were. As Figure 3.2 shows, two opinion- 
based research methods were applied to refine the conceptual model, first by 
applying the focus group method interrogating UK logistics experts from industry and 
the government in seven discussion panels, and secondly undertaking a survey in 
which 56 UK logistics practitioners participated.
Conceptual
^ —  -  ------- Transport-focussed uncertainty model
Expert opinion
*-----------------  7 focus groups
-----------------  An online structured questionnaire
Empirical
<-----------------  A pilot case study
yf-----------------  2 case studies
Refined
uncertainty
framework
Figure 3.2 Opinion-based research methods applied to refined the conceptual model
V  Deductive 
Approach
^  Inductive 
Approach
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The following two sections present a discussion on how to apply focus groups and 
the survey method, together with examples of the application of these two methods in 
operations management, supply chain management and logistics and the potential 
limitations of these two research methods.
3.3.2.1 Focus group method
Focus groups can be defined as group interviews. They have not been extensively 
used within logistics and are still less popular as a research method (Larsen and 
Halldorsson, 2004) compared, for example, to case studies (Dinwoodie and Xu,
2008).The focus group method is a group dynamic that aims to control the direction 
of the research (Krueger 1998a). It can also be defined as a qualitative method that 
explores the perceptions of the participants. The focus group method is an 
interpretivist method.
Qualitative research is based on the assumption that ‘the world can only be 
understood from a point of view of the individuals who are directly involved in the 
activities which are to be studied’ (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003). However, ‘many 
regard qualitative researchers as soft scientists or even journalists’ (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2003). The focus group method, in contrast, makes interaction between 
several participants a key part of the data collection process, with group discussion 
generating and testing new ideas and opinions. The researcher can also tailor the 
structure and content of a focus group discussion to the particular needs of the 
research project, making it a very flexible data collection technique.
According to Frankie et al. (2005), “there would seem to be a number of potential 
opportunities provided by the use of multiple methods in the logistics discipline”. 
Focus groups can be applied to complement other methods. As Jack and Raturi
(2006) recommend, in methodological triangulation researchers should choose 
methods with complementary strengths and non-overlapping weaknesses. 
Combining qualitative and quantitative data can improve the rigour and reliability of 
research findings. When the research topic has not been studied in the literature, 
focus groups can be used as a means to refine a conceptual model, so the
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researcher can have a better idea of associations between variables before 
designing a survey. Focus groups can also provide further validation of a conceptual 
model that has already been tested against statistical data. Furthermore, They can 
be used to guide the research of a series of case studies, because through the group 
sessions the researcher is able to confirm the design of the case studies in terms of 
research themes, scale and scope (Krueger, 1998a).
Before discussing the advantages and disadvantages of the focus group method, it 
is important to introduce the main characteristics. Krueger (1998a) has established 
the main features of this method:
• It is a focussed discussion that starts open and ends by focusing on the
specific aspects that the researcher is particularly interested in investigating
• It involves experts in a specific field and the level of group members’
knowledge on the topic is one of the factors influencing the optimum group 
size
• The group composition should be designed to maintain a balance of 
similarities and differences between participants, so the facilitator can ensure 
an interactive group discussion
• Focus groups are conducted in series, so that when a point of theory 
saturation is reached the researcher can stop the data collection.
Its application has advantages and drawbacks. The focus group literature highlights 
the advantages of this method:
• It is an innovative way to solve business problems (Bryman, 2004)
• The researcher has a high degree of flexibility regarding the research plan 
(Krueger 1998a)
• Focus group discussions are formed by a small group that can represent a 
large population (Krueger, 1998a)
• Data collection is cost-effective (Patton, 2002)
• Interaction among participants enhances data quality (Patton, 2002).
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However, it has certain limitations that need to be considered during the planning 
stage:
• The researcher has less control over proceedings than in individual semi­
structured interviews (Bryman and Bell, 2007)
• The analysis process is a rather time-consuming activity (Bryman and Bell, 
2007)
• Focus group facilitation requires flexibility and a set of specific skills on the 
part of the researcher (Bryman and Bell, 2007; Patton, 2002)
• The divergent views of individual members can be inhibited by dominant 
views from the rest of the group (Bryman and Bell, 2007; Patton, 2002)
• A focus group strategy is beneficial for identification of major themes but not 
so much for the micro-analysis of subtle differences (Krueger, 1998a)
• Compared with most qualitative methods, focus groups typically have the 
disadvantage of taking place outside the natural settings where social 
interactions normally occur (Madriz, 2000)
• The available response time for any particular individual is restrained in order 
to hear from everyone (Patton, 2002).
The role of focus groups in multi-methodological path in logistics research
Due to the fact that in this PhD methodological triangulation has been applied and 
the focus group method is an important aspect of the methodological path of the 
thesis, a literature review on the contribution of focus groups to multi-methodological 
research projects in logistics and supply chain management has been undertaken.
x
Through a comprehensive search of the logistics literature, it is possible to identify a 
number of papers where the research design includes focus groups. In particular, the 
search focused upon journal articles and targeted databases such as Science Direct, 
Emerald Insight and EBSCO Business Source Premier. The main search term was 
‘focus group’ and either ‘logistics’ or ‘supply chain’. Both terms are used to reflect the 
different perspectives people have on the relationship between logistics and supply 
chains (Larsen and Halldorsson, 2004). The term ‘workshop’ is also substituted for 
‘focus group’, and papers containing the term consulted to see whether the research 
was, in effect, using focus groups.
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As depicted in Appendix 1, the focus group method has contributed in different ways 
to multi-methodological path in logistics research projects. The papers found in the 
literature search were then classified into a number of distinct categories, reflecting 
the main types of research identified by Saunders et al. (2007):
• Descriptive -  one example of such an application exists in the literature,
where the focus group method was used to examine the current state of 
automotive supply chains (Holweg and Miemczyk, 2002)
• Exploratory -  these papers used focus groups to investigate a particular
issue. This category can be further sub-divided into three:
o Sole method -  these papers directly use the findings of the focus
groups to draw conclusions about the issue being investigated. Cullen 
and Webster (2007) use no other method, while Mangan and 
Christopher (2005) and Manuj and Mentzer (2008) complement their 
focus groups with other methods (a survey and interviews 
respectively). In this case, the methodological path applied did only 
include focus groups, which does not reflect the approach that logistics 
researchers have applied most of the time in the past 
o Construct development (Sink et al. 1996; Mentzer et al. 1997;, 
Dinwoodie 2001; Lancioni et al. 2001; Golicic et al. 2003; Guinipero et 
al. 2005; Evangelista and Sweeney, 2006 and Tian et al. 2008) -  this is 
the largest grouping and uses the focus group to identify the main 
constructs for a wider scale survey. Similarly to the papers under this 
category, in the particular case of this PhD, focus groups were applied 
as an exploratory method and their findings were used to design a 
structured questionnaire 
o Other -  two other papers applied focus groups in an exploratory 
manner. Christopher and Juttner (2005) used the focus group findings 
to influence their choice of case studies while Rae-Smith and Ellinger 
(2002) assess the impact of an action research study. The latter is the 
only example found of exploratory focus groups being used after other 
empirical research methods.
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• Explanatory -  in this category, the focus groups are used to assess in more 
detail causal relationships observed by the use of other methods. Two distinct 
groupings exist:
o Survey results -  these papers use focus groups to provide more depth 
to survey findings. In the examples from New and Payne (1995) and 
JGttner (2005), a number of focus groups are used because of low 
survey response rates. Rinehart et al. (2004) and Bernon and Cullen
(2007) use fewer focus groups as their response rates are higher 
o Other opinion based methods -  here, the focus groups provide more 
depth as well as the potential to further generalise the findings. 
Methods used prior to the focus group discussions include interviews 
(Dainty et al. 2001; Blackhurst et al. 2005), a workshop (Juttner et al. 
2007) and a Delphi study (Melnyk et al. 2008).
More details on the contribution of focus groups in multi-methodological path in 
logistics research can be found in Appendix 1. They have been analysed on the 
basis of the following factors: research approach, role of focus group within the 
research strategy, research design, format of the focus group and the analytical 
process. These are key stages in the focus group method and are discussed in more 
detail shortly.
The focus group process
Figure 3.3 depicts the different stages in the application of the focus group method 
and the factors that influence each stage. First of all, the research problem needs to 
be defined. This decision is reflected in the categorisation of logistics research in the 
previous section. After defining the research problem, the focus group procedure 
needs to be designed. The literature suggests that two factors determine the 
controllability of the group discussion and the quality of the data gathered: group size 
and composition.
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Figure 3.3 Adapted generic focus group process (Krueger 1998a, Morgan 1998)
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Figure 3.4 depicts how group size can influence the group discussion controllability 
and the quality of the data. According to Krueger (1998a), as Figure 3.4 shows, in 
order to achieve ideal levels of data richness and group control, a focus group 
session should have between 6 and 10 members. If a focus group session has more 
than 10 members, the facilitator needs to apply alternative strategies to manage the 
group effectively, such as splitting it into smaller groups. If the facilitator has enough 
assistants, the group can be divided into two. Otherwise, the facilitator needs to 
extend the time arranged for the session. On the other hand, if there are fewer than 
6 members, the group discussion can be poor. However, if the group members are
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experts from a particular field, the minimum acceptable number of members is 4, 
since each participant has a greater contribution to make in terms of knowledge and 
insight (Morgan, 1998). Referring to Appendix 1, it seems that in logistics, focus 
group size has tended to be at the larger end of the scale. Further, it appears that 
the focus groups conducted in Europe tend to be smaller in size than those in North 
America. Only two examples from the latter region had 10 or fewer participants in 
their focus groups (Lancioni et al., 2001; Golicic et al., 2003).
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Figure 3.4 Effect of group size on quality and controllability (Krueger, 1998a)
In terms of group composition, the mix of interests and expertise must clearly reflect 
the purpose of the research. Some diversity of background and knowledge is, 
nevertheless, required to build new ideas and make group participants ‘think outside 
of the box’. On the other hand, it has been suggested that group discussions work 
best if conducted with like minded people (Eggins et al., 2008). Therefore, in the 
design stage, the research team needs to find the right balance between similarities 
and differences within group members (Krueger, 1998a). If participants are too 
similar, the group discussion may not be sufficiently holistic, open and innovative. 
However, if they are too different and there are no evident synergies between them, 
group discussions can become diffuse and unproductive.
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The literature also considers how focus group discussions should be conducted. It is 
important to decide on whether a structured or unstructured approach is taken. A
structured approach presents the participant with a number of potential topics related
to the issue being discussed. In contrast, the unstructured approach poses a few 
prompting questions to initiate a free discussion between participants. The evidence 
from the papers in Appendix 1 suggests that, for logistics, an unstructured approach 
is more popular for exploratory studies and a structured approach for explanatory 
studies.
The facilitator should have certain skills to reach the standard required in terms of 
data quality and controllability. According to Krueger (1998a) and Morgan (1998), the 
facilitator should play different roles to ensure a rich and interactive discussion:
• Expert consultant in the topic discussed, having a similar level of knowledge 
of the subject to that of the group as a whole
• Challenger, questioning the opinions of participants, making the group rethink 
their assumptions and not allowing dominant members to divert the 
discussion onto less relevant topics
• Referee, intervening when there is conflict between participants
• Discussion leader, actively facilitating and guiding the group
• Effective interrogator, capable of asking probing questions
• Mentally alert and free from distractions
• Listening and taking notes at the same time, keeping a written record of the 
discussion.
i
The approach taken to facilitate focus groups should be directly linked to the initial 
research objectives. However, the approach can be modified to take account of the 
specific circumstances of each new group and the level of theory saturation achieved 
previously.
In order to achieve a high level of data quality in the analysis stage, it is good 
practice to employ an assistant facilitator to ensure that group discussions are 
appropriately recorded and notes taken (Krueger, 1998a). Their facilitation skills can 
complement those of the main facilitator.
49
Venue layout and equipment are other important success factors in the organisation 
of focus group sessions. The venue layout needs to ensure that all the participants 
are able to listen to the facilitator and fellow participants and they can easily see the 
presentation used to support the facilitation. The venue layout needs to be a room 
that offers a considerable amount of flexibility in terms of chairs and tables, so that it 
can be possible to re-arrange the layout depending on the number of attendees that 
turn up.
The other two stages in the application of the focus group method are data analysis 
and participant feedback. The literature briefly describes three factors that the 
researcher should consider when analysing focus group data, namely frequency, 
extensiveness and intensity of participants’ opinions (Krueger, 1998b). The majority 
of papers in Appendix 1 adopt some form of clustering exercise, either manually or 
with the help of software. However, the literature does not consider further the 
quantitative approaches that can be used in the analysis stage to improve objectivity 
and rigour. It is also important to test for theory saturation to ensure that the findings 
are as complete as possible. According to Krueger (1998a), theory saturation is 
reached when an additional focus group does not add any new theme to the data 
collected, but adds more cost to the data collection process. In effect, the opinions 
expressed within a focus group are the same as those identified through previous 
focus groups. Generally speaking, theory saturation tends to be reached after the 
fifth session (Krueger, 1998a; Morgan, 1998). Only one paper in Appendix 1 
explicitly tests for theory saturation (Cullen and Webster, 2007). This could raise 
concerns in the other cases as to the credibility of the findings, although they do all 
deploy methodological triangulation which reduces the risk of bias.
The process culminates in the writing of a final report and dissemination of feedback 
to participants (Krueger, 1998a).
3.3.2.2 Survey method
Quantitative research is considered more rigorous since validity and reliability can be 
statistically proven (Bryman and Bell, 2007; Patton, 2002; Saunders et al., 2007). 
This statistical validity is often gained, however, at the expense of a deeper
50
understanding of attitudes, behaviour and processes, much of which requires the 
collection and interpretation of qualitative data. A survey can be applied to 
interrogate practitioners or customers by using mailed questionnaires, telephone 
calls, personal interview about themselves or about the social units in which they live 
or work (Rossi et al., 1983). The survey method is based on the assumption that the 
sampling process of a survey obtains information about a large population with a 
known degree of accuracy (Rea and Parker, 1992).
In operations management, work on the survey method has derived three types of 
survey research (Pinsonneault and Kraemer, 1993; Filippini, 1997;, Malhotra and 
Grover, 1998). Forza (2002) has defined these three types of survey research:
• Exploratory - this type of survey research is applied when the aim is to gain 
insights about the topic. Usually a conceptual model has not been developed 
and the topic needs to be better understood. Also, it can help the researcher 
to find initial evidence of associations between variables and define the 
boundaries of the model. As can be seen in Appendix 1, Rinehart et al. (2004) 
and New and Payne (1995) have applied the survey method as an exploratory 
tool.
• Confirmatory - this type of survey research is used when well-defined 
concepts and models on the research topic are available in the literature. It 
has the aim of testing the validity of existing theories and explaining these 
theories much more. In this type of survey research, the investigator needs to 
develop hypotheses that serve as linkages between concepts. Evangelista
< and Sweeney (2006) and Tian et al. (2008) applied the survey method after 
developing a conceptual model from the literature and refining that model by 
using focus groups (see Appendix 1). When they designed, piloted and ran 
their surveys, the conceptual model was based on a sufficiently robust body of 
theory
• Descriptive - this type of survey research has the objective of understanding 
the relevance of a research topic. Its main objective is not theory 
development, although it can guide both theory building and theory refinement 
(Dubin, 1978; Malhotra and Grover, 1998,; Wacker, 1998). An example of the
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application of descriptive survey research in logistics is the model of supply 
chain practices and performance developed by Li et al. (2005).
The survey research process
Forza (2002) developed a framework to guide researchers on how to undertake 
survey-type research in the field of operations management. He developed the 
theory-testing survey research process, which consists of the following six stages:
1. Link to the theory level - at this stage, the researcher needs to conduct a 
search of secondary sources including the literature, databases and 
government reports. This stage has the objective of:
• Defining boundaries of the survey in terms of the unit of analysis and
population, and
• Developing the constructs of the survey and linkages between them based 
on the initial hypothesis of the survey.
2. Design -  At this stage of the survey, the research needs to consider the 
existent external constraints to clarify the data needed in the survey.
According to Zikmund (2002), samples are defined as subsets or parts of a
larger population. According to Saunders et al (2007), there are two sorts of 
sampling strategies: probabilistic and non-probabilistic. Also, the sample of a 
survey needs to be defined and researchers use probabilistic samples that 
most of the times are selected randomly to reduce the risk of bias. Moreover, 
the profile of the survey invitees needs to be selected at this stage. According
 ^ to Kotzab (2005), over three quarters of invitees from surveys run in logistics 
hold senior management positions. However, the decision of how senior the 
respondent should be is made based on how strategic is the topic 
investigated in the survey. Furthermore, the investigator needs to select the 
data collection technique and develop the measurement instrument for the 
survey. Saunders et al (2007) defined two types of questionnaires, self­
administered and interviewer-administered. Nevertheless, according to 
Kotzab (2005), about 60% of samples of survey papers published in the
Journal of Business Logistics between 1993 and 2003 applied a non-
/
probabilistic sampling strategy. In the case of this PhD, the researcher has
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selected a self-administered questionnaire to avoid influencing the responses 
of the survey participants.
3. Pilot testing - At this stage, the researcher needs to select a smaller sample to 
test the validity of the survey constructs and the initial hypothesis and also to 
check the appropriateness of the questions. This pilot sample can be selected 
randomly or purposively, since it is important to know that the pilot participants 
who will assess the validity of the survey are willing and able to do so.
4. Collect data for theory testing - At this stage, the investigator administrates 
the data that is returned by the survey invitees and identifies the clusters of 
samples with low response rate, and in the follow-up process, focuses 
attention on these clusters. In addition, at the end of this stage, the researcher 
should estimate the degree of non-response bias and take an informed 
decision regarding when to stop the data collection.
5. Analyse data: In operations management and logistics, usually this stage 
involves testing the significance of the relationship between the survey 
variables and determining the degree of strength of the correlation between 
independent and dependent variables. Other researchers have applied cluster 
analysis without focusing on the correlation between variables. In this PhD, 
the aim of the survey was to determine the degree of importance of the 
uncertainty clusters found in the focus groups, rather than concentrating on 
clarifying the relationship between variables. Also, it is important to notice that 
any data analysis process depends highly on which type of data is collected. 
According to Saunders et al (2007), two types of data can be gathered
j through the application of a survey: categorical data- nominal and ordinal, and 
quantifiable data- discrete and continuous. The former is data that cannot be 
quantified but can be ranked, such as in the case of the data obtained from 
the early questions of the survey in this PhD; and the latter is data that can be 
quantified from the perception of respondents, such as the data gathered in 
the second part of the survey in this PhD, or from hard measurements.
6. Generate report - In the survey report, the investigator needs to draw both 
theoretical conclusions and managerial implications for the survey 
respondents. Additionally, the researcher needs to provide information about
i
the further opportunities derived from the survey.
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It is important to mention that from the survey process developed by Forza (2002) 
the steps that influence the quality of research more are steps No. 1 to 4. According 
to Frohlich (1998) and Forza (2002), at the stage of linking to the theory level (Step 
No. 1), the researcher has the opportunity to select an industrially relevant topic, so 
they can find central government institutions such as the Department for Transport to 
sponsor the survey. At the design and pilot testing stages, the investigator can 
ensure the validity and appropriateness of the questionnaire and select respondents 
who are highly interested in the topic. Also, identifying respondents from multiple 
mailing lists can assist the researcher in securing a high response rate. At the pilot 
stage, the survey can be pre-tested and the researcher also assesses the formatting 
of the questionnaire. When the researcher is conducting the survey, Frohlich (1998) 
recommended a pre-notice letter and a polite appeal in the actual invitation letter to 
encourage practitioners to contribute to the survey. In addition, Frohlich (1998) 
suggests that survey respondents should be offered a report based on the survey 
findings. In the case of postal mail surveys, the researcher should include a pre-paid 
postage envelope to allow respondents to reply to the survey without incurring any 
additional cost for themselves. Furthermore, Frohlich (1998) emphasised the 
importance of a persistent follow-up process. According to Kotzab (2005), 37% of 
survey papers published in the Journal of Business Logistics between 1993 and 
2003 applied one round of follow-up reminders and 12% applied two rounds of 
follow-up reminders. This means that according to Kotzab (2005) 51% of these 
papers did not apply Frohlich’s (1998) recommendation of undertaking a follow-up 
after an invitation is send to the potential survey participants.
i
The survey method applied on its own can have a number of limitations:
• It is only capable of describing and/or explaining the surface of a topic 
(Bryman and Bell, 2007; Saunders et al, 2007).
• Low response rate has always been an ongoing concern in conducting 
mail surveys (Greer et al., 2002). Nowadays, access to the opinion of 
logistics practitioners is very restricted by confidentiality and productivity 
rules set by companies.
• Measuring a construct from the perception of practitioners based on a 
Likert-type scale can carry a considerable degree of subjectivity.
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According to Forza (2002), only about 10% of operations management papers 
published in recognised academic journals (JOM, MS, ME, DS, IJPR, IJOPM and 
POM) have triangulated the survey method with another research method. On the 
other hand, in the recent literature search undertaken in this PhD to explore the 
contribution of the focus group method to the multi-methodological path of research 
undertaken in logistics and supply chain management, 14 out of 22 papers applied 
focus groups to complement the survey method.
3.3.3 Empirical research
Following the focus groups and the survey, the relationship between uncertainty 
causes and the economic and environmental performance of transport operations 
needed to be measured. Therefore, three case studies were designed and run, two 
from the UK and one from South Africa (Figure 3.5). In order to measure the 
frequency and impact of uncertainty on the performance of transport operations, it 
was necessary to design and run a pilot case study in an initially selected primary 
distribution network from the UK FMCG sector. In this pilot case study, a 
measurement assessment tool called ‘extra distance’ was developed and tested. 
Subsequently, two additional case studies were selected, designed and run in two 
secondary distribution networks from FMCG sector in the UK and South Africa.
Transport-focussed uncertainty model
7 focus groups
An online structured questionnaire
A  p ilo t case  s tu d y  
2 case  s tu d ie s
Conceptual
Expert opinion
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Figure 3.5 Empirical research methods applied as an explanatory tool
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The next section includes background information about the case study method and 
its application in logistics and supply chain management.
3.3.3.1 Case study method
“A case study is an empirical enquiry that (1) investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real life context, especially when (2) the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2003, pg. 13). A case study is 
one which explores a real-world situation to answer specific research questions and 
which seeks a range of evidence, and which has to be abstracted to obtain the best 
possible answers to the research questions (Gillham, 2000).
According to Aastrup and Halldorsson (2008), the application of the case study 
method in logistics and supply chain management research can derive its origins 
from the critical realist perspective, since its aim is to clarify generative mechanisms 
that underlie practice and performance. The case study method is inductive and 
qualitative in nature, in contrast to strategies which apply experimental designs 
seeking to establish universally applicable statements, associated with deductive 
and quantitative research (Dinwoodie and Xu, 2008). In the case of this PhD, an 
inductive approach was applied in the first case study and tested in the other two 
case studies. Also, the case studies applied in this thesis are based on the 
triangulation of quantitative data on uncertainty events that generate unnecessary 
distance and time and interviews with the practitioners in charge of the transport 
operations studied. Consequently, the approach used in the case studies is a mix of 
quantitative and qualitative data collection techniques. This contradicts the view of 
Yin (1993) and Dinwoodie and Xu (2008) that the case study method is a merely 
qualitative method.
Yin (1993) has defined three types of case study research: exploratory, explanatory, 
and descriptive. According to Yin (2003), the aims of these three types of case 
studies are:
• Exploratory - to define the questions and hypotheses of a future research 
project or determine the feasibility of the desired research or data collection
56
approach. The first case study in this PhD project aimed to develop and test a 
new measure to link uncertainty with the economic and environmental 
performance of road transport operations, thus having a similar objective as 
the latter aim proposed by Yin (2003). According to Dinwoodie and Xu (2008), 
this type of case study research has been applied in logistics to:
1. understand a process better,
2. derive tentative hypotheses for future research, or
3. prototype a proportion of a novel context
• Descriptive - to present a comprehensive description of a research topic 
within its context
• Explanatory - to collect data to explain cause-and-effect relationships between 
variables and explain how events occur. Following the pilot case study, the 
two subsequent cases have in broad terms a similar objective; however, they 
also have the aim of ensuring the development of a robust measurement 
system designed to evaluate the link between uncertainty and transport 
performance. This type of case study research has been categorised by 
Dinwoodie and Xu (2008) in three sub-categories: validation studies, theory 
refinement and theory extension. Validation studies have been used in 
logistics: (1) from a positivist perspective, often via application of a procedure, 
to differentiate between items, (2) to illustrate the benefits of an approach, or 
(3) from a qualitative viewpoint, to further case study selection to identify 
further cases of interest (Dinwoodie and Xu, 2008). On the other hand, theory 
refinement studies has been applied in logistics: (1) to refocus previous
\ studies, (2) to analyse the dynamics of change, (3) to study the impact of 
intervention (these last two usually described as action research), or (4) to 
research specific processes (Dinwoodie and Xu, 2008). Furthermore, theory 
extension studies have been applied in logistics: (1) to explore the generic 
principles of strategies or characteristics of supply chain management in other 
contexts or sectors, or (2) to contribute to a non-conclusive theory.
Stake (1995) added three other types of case studies: Intrinsic - when there is an 
explicit interest in the case on the part of the researcher; Instrumental - when the 
case study is applied to explain its evidence further to the researcher; Collective -
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when a group of cases is studied. Explanatory case studies are usually applied for 
explaining causal investigations (Tellis, 1997). In the case of this PhD, explanatory 
case study research has been applied to triangulate the findings of case studies with 
the research evidence obtained during the initial stages of this PhD.
Scholz and Tietje (2002) have introduced the concept of embedded case study as ‘a 
research method that considers more than one unit of analysis and usually are not 
limited to qualitative analysis’. Also, they stated that an embedded case study allows 
a multiplicity of techniques to be applied to the different units of analyses. In logistics 
and supply chain management research, from a total of 109 journal papers published 
between 1996 and 2008, 68 papers based their findings on a single case study and 
41 of them used multiple case studies (Dinwoodie and Xu, 2008). A total of 15 of 
these papers have as unit of analysis a network or supply chain and 65 of them have 
as unit of analysis an organisation (Dinwoodie and Xu, 2008). In addition, 49 of them 
did not use another method to complement the findings of their case studies 
(Dinwoodie and Xu, 2008). In this PhD, the unit of analysis of the three case studies 
is a distribution network formed by three organisations: supplier(s), logistics provider; 
and customer, since it was important to assess the whole network instead of one 
organisation. The unit of analysis of the case studies has been selected based on 
the concept of the logistics triad (Beier, 1989; Bask, 2001). Also, it is believed in this 
PhD that case study research should be part of a methodological triangulation 
strategy rather than the methodological path alone.
In ter,ms of the quality factors that need to be considered while designing and 
running a case study, Mayring (2002) proposed six quality' factors: process 
documentation, safeguarding interpretations by argument (or feedback from the 
practitioners), research process structured by rules based on an initially agreed and 
approved data collection protocol by the practitioners, closeness to the study items 
(defining the boundaries of the data collection), communicative validation (constantly 
seeking feedback from practitioners), and triangulation by applying interviews and 
seeking the opinion of different actors. In addition, Yin (2003) stated that the validity
of a case study should be initially assessed in terms of its constructs, when collecting
/
the data internally in the organisation, and after finishing the case study, externally 
by comparing the case study with another from the same sector.
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Stuart et al. (2002) have proposed five stages of case study research:
1. Development of the research questions - The research questions are 
developed depending on the research objective of the case study. At this 
stage, the type of case study proposed by Dinwoodie and Xu (2008) is 
selected
2. Instrument development - First the researcher needs to define the unit(s) of 
analysis for the case study, deciding which stage of the supply chain will be 
studied. Also, the researcher needs to choose and secure access to the case 
study or a number of case studies, depending which approach is taken
3. Data gathering - At the beginning of the data collection, the case study is in an 
exploratory stage where the researcher is identifying the appropriate sources 
of evidence for the case study. After that, the data gathered is validated by the 
researcher through the application of semi-structured interviews to 
appropriate practitioners
4. Data analysis - Usually in operations management, data from case studies is 
primarily in the form of transcripts from interviews, so a technique to compare 
data from multiple case studies needs to be selected. However, in the case of 
this PhD, comparisons are drawn in three dimensions: (1) merely quantitative, 
the findings from the evaluation of the impact of different supply chain 
uncertainty on transport performance; (2) depending on the data available, 
how the assessment tool has been applied; and (3) from interviews, the 
researcher has determined the uncertainty mitigation approach applied by the 
three case study companies
5. j Case quality- This stage is executed when the researcher disseminates the
results of the case study to the company management staff and to other 
practitioners from other companies but from the same industry. Both 
recommendations have been applied in this research project, the findings of 
the first case study have been validated in the other two and the findings from 
the first two case studies were validated in a workshop where the audience 
was comprised of practitioners from the UK road transport sector.
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A number of authors have identified the weaknesses of case study research in 
supply chains:
• The investigator did not specify the reason for selecting a single case 
study (Seuring 2008, Asstrup and Halldorson 2008). The selection of 
the three case studies was based on the characteristics of the FMCG 
sector where uncertainty can considerably affect transport performance
• Just one stage of the supply chain is approached, ignoring the network 
characteristics of supply chains (Seuring 2008, Asstrup and Halldorson 
2008). In this research project, a triad perspective was maintained in 
the three case studies
• Data collection has been undertaken via few interviews and analysis of 
the company website (Seuring 2008). In this PhD, the findings of the 
three case studies are based on the triangulation of performance data 
gathered from the companies and continuous involvement of the 
logistics managers in charged of the transport operations studied
• The papers did not properly clarify how the data was analysed (Seuring 
2008). In this thesis, the data was analysed by applying a quantitative 
case-and-effect exercise
• Finally, how the rigor of the research was ensured (Seuring 2008). The 
rigor of the findings from the three case studies has been ensured 
through the internal dissemination within the three companies and their 
customers and suppliers, together with external dissemination within 
the sector to which they belong.
i
3.4 Concluding remarks
In this PhD, a multi-methodological approach has been applied for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, the philosophical approach of the PhD candidate can be positioned 
in the critical realist perspective. Secondly, the topic of research was unexplored at 
commencement of the PhD, so the surface of the topic needed clarification before 
explaining the mechanisms of the topic at a micro level. From the literature review a 
conceptual model was developed and the initial objectives required the interrogation 
of practitioners at a macro level. To do this, the researcher took a deductive research
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approach. Before starting any case study, the literature on how the impact of 
uncertainty on transport performance can be measured at micro level was searched, 
and no evidence of any measurement system was found. Therefore, an inductive 
research approach was taken following the realities and recommendations from the 
first case study. However, the measurement system developed in the first case study 
was refined in the two subsequent case studies.
This PhD offers evidence of the advantages of taking a multi-methodological 
approach. Findings from the initial stages of the research assist the researcher in 
generalising the results from the case studies. Also, the findings from the conceptual 
model, focus groups and survey defined the scope of the case study. Furthermore, 
the combined deductive-inductive approach can be used as a exemplar case when 
future researchers explore the macro level and subsequently explain the findings 
from the macro level through the application of case studies.
The research methods applied in this research project can be supported in the future 
with the application of business simulation methods, so the framework of transport 
uncertainty can be validated and fully generalised.
3.5 Contribution
To Methodology in logistics research
This chapter highlights the benefits of applying methodological and data triangulation
*
in logistics research. In addition, it demonstrates that there is a lack of balance 
between academic rigor and industrial relevance in logistics research and a critical 
realist approach can be used to address this problem. Moreover, it shows when a 
deductive approach is applied, as well as the benefits of applying an inductive 
approach when studying a phenomenon at the micro level. Regarding the methods 
applied in this PhD, specifically in the case of the focus group method, from the 
generic literature, two frameworks have been developed to guide future applications 
of this method in logistics. Furthermore, the chapter includes a review that 
demonstrates how focus groups can complement other research methods. This 
review can also guide future research in logistics.
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To PhD
This chapter justifies the multi-methodological approach applied in the PhD. 
Additionally, it justifies the application of the research methods used in the four 
stages of the PhD research methodological path. It highlights the limitations of each 
method applied in the PhD and how they were addressed in their application.
i
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4.0 Conceptual model
4.1 Introduction
In the literature review chapter, the literature on supply chain uncertainty and risk 
has been explored. Also, the aim of this chapter is to start answering the first 
objective of the thesis, which is:
Link the uncertainties originated within the supply chain and externally with the 
economic and environmental performance of road freight transport operations and 
also to identify potential mitigation tools and/or approaches to minimise their effects
This aim will be achieved by considering perspectives from wider theories such as 
system and network theories and process-based orientation. The Uncertainty Circle 
framework (Mason-Jones and Towill, 1999) has been selected as a starting point for 
the development of the PhD conceptual model since it takes a supply chain 
perspective to assess uncertainty affecting manufacturing operations. As it has been 
mentioned in Chapter 2, transport will be treated as a supply chain process 
throughout the thesis. The aim of the conceptual model developed in this chapter is 
to frame the rest of the research undertaken in the thesis. Because, it facilitates the 
identification and evaluation of uncertainty events which affects transport operation 
at tactical and operational levels.
4.2 Method
I
The literature review developed previously in the thesis supports the choice of the 
logistics triad as the initial concept around which to integrate all the supply chain 
uncertainty literature (Beier, 1989). Because most attention has been paid in the past 
to uncertainty research from a manufacturing perspective, a need was identified to 
undertake a comprehensive search for literature focusing on uncertainty within 
transport operations, or affecting transport operations. Hence, a thorough search 
was conducted using databases such as ABI/INFORM, Emerald, ScienceDirect, 
IngentaConnect, EBSCO Business Source Premier, academic journals, electronic
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journals, trade magazines and reports, including information from freight best 
practice surveys.
The methodological framework formulated in the methodology chapter will be used. 
This part of the research is undertaken by developing a conceptual model from the 
existing literature on the topic. This recognises that to date the logistics triad 
uncertainty model has been developed purely as a conceptual model. In the 
following chapters, it will be further developed and validated through the application 
of research methods such as focus groups, surveys and case studies. The data 
obtained from such empirical research will be used to develop, refine and validate 
the model, so that it can be used both in the industry and for further academic 
research.
Before embarking on the literature search, a plan of the potential areas and themes 
to be interrogated was undertaken. The principal objective was to develop a holistic 
supply chain uncertainty framework, but focusing on supply chain uncertainty issues 
that can potentially impact on the economic and environmental performance of 
transport operations. A series of keyword combinations were selected for the search. 
The starting point was the phrase ‘transport uncertainty’ with alternative words for 
each part also considered. The idea was to find uncertainty causes that can directly 
impact on transport performance. However, in many cases, the impact was more 
indirect, so other key words were needed. Due to potential ambiguity between the 
terms ‘uncertainty’ and ‘risk’, both were used. In the literature, there are papers on 
risk that also relate to supply chain uncertainty. The literature shows that ‘flexibility’ is 
a possible response to uncertainty in supply chains (Naim et al 2006) and was 
therefore included as an alternative keyword to locate previous works on uncertainty 
in a less direct manner. ‘Uncertainty’, ‘risk’ and ‘flexibility’ were also used as 
keywords in combination with keywords that are similar to ‘transport’, ‘supply chain’, 
‘manufacturing’, ‘demand’ and ‘external’ (Figure 4.1). An additional avenue was to 
identify key academic journal papers in the topic area and to examine the references 
cited in these papers.
A systematic approach to synthesising the literature was adopted. Firstly, a 
spreadsheet was constructed to summarise all the causes of uncertainty found in the
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relevant papers identified in the search. Secondly, those causes were categorised 
into the five main sources of uncertainty of the model which will be discussed in 
more detail later. After that, in order to define where uncertainty originates from, a 
series of clusters were developed within each of the five uncertainty sources.
Uncertainty
Risk
Flexibility
Figure 4.1 Keywords for the literature search
4.3 Transport and supply chain uncertainty
Logistics
Supply chain
Transport
Manufacturing
Demand
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In this section of the paper, the logistics triad uncertainty model will be presented 
and the logic followed in developing the model will be explained. The starting point 
for the development of the model was the Uncertainty Circle (Mason-Jones and 
Towill, 1999). The Uncertainty Circle has been developed from a manufacturing 
perspective. This model has been refined at this stage of the thesis to identify 
different sources of uncertainty within the logistics triad taking a transport 
perspective. This is because, according to the literature review, uncertainty affecting 
transport operations seems to be under researched. The refined model can be seen 
in Figure 4.2. The conceptual model considers the carrier as the transport process 
and adds external uncertainty, reflecting Peck et al.’s (2003) framework, to highlight 
the fact that logistics operations are open systems. Uncertainty can be initiated from 
any one source and can potentially affect other members of the logistics triad. In this 
respect, it is important to bear in mind the point made earlier that responsibility for 
the transport operation may rest with either the upstream or the downstream partner.
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Perfect sharing of information will mean that all triad members have access to full 
information, which will eliminate such asymmetries, but some triad members may 
have a vested interest in masking information, especially when things are not going 
well, and hence perfect sharing of information is unlikely in practice.
Now, the causes of transport uncertainty identified in the literature will be integrated 
and categorized and the resulting conceptual model presented.
Control
External
Uncertainty External
Uncertainty
Carrier
Custom erShipper
Figure 4.2 Transport-focused uncertainty model 
4.3.1 Uncertainty related to suppliers
In this section, the focus is on the sources of uncertainty which can be related to 
inappropriate management at the source of the goods to be transported. The review 
of relevant literature, summarised in Table 4.1, highlights the fact that selection of 
ineffective suppliers or poor supplier performance (reflected perhaps in lack of 
adequate supply capacity at peak times, poor product quality or other inefficiencies 
within the manufacturing process at suppliers) can be a significant source of 
uncertainty within the logistics triad. From the perspective of outbound transport, this
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is because there could well be effects on whether loads of product are ready for 
despatch on time, or on the likelihood of full or part loads being rejected by 
customers (and hence having to be returned). Similarly, problems in the 
manufacturing operation itself, such as ineffective scheduling, problems with quality 
control or operational problems such as machine breakdown, can also delay the 
loading of products at the supplier’s facility or lead to high rates of product return. 
According to a freight best practice report published by the Department for Transport 
(2007), 7% of the delays within the delivery process originate at loading bays. A 
significant number of authors highlight the potential impacts of poor inventory and 
order management on transport performance. Operational problems in the storage 
process can impact on quality and create unnecessary returns (Van der Vorst and 
Beulens, 2002). This can also create the need for unnecessary transport 
movements.
A smaller number of papers discuss the impact of suppliers failing to engage in 
effective supply chain management with their customers; for example, not with 
customers to obtaining accurate demand forecasts for planning purposes. Such poor 
demand forecasting between different supply chain members can produce significant 
levels of amplification in orders within the chain (Mason-Jones and Towill, 1999), 
with knock-on effects on transport demand, and as a result, it can generate 
inefficiency in transport operations. A lack of supply chain integration and control 
can also cause duplication and fragmentation in the delivery process (Cavinato, 
2004). Furthermore, limited communication in the ordering process can cause 
suppliprs to amplify the demand from customers, so artificial transport demand can 
be generated. See Potter and Lalwani (2008) for a greater analysis on the impact of 
demand amplification on transport. Demand amplification can have a serious 
environmental knock-on effect on transport operations.
The relatively large amount of literature identified and discussed in this section 
reflects the topicality of management issues such as supplier management, quality 
management and inventory reduction in recent years, and whilst most of the
literature in such fields does not consider transport impacts to any great extent, the
/
potential impacts on the efficiency of transport use are recognised.
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Area Cause of Uncertainty Authors Papers
Supplier
Problems in supplier 
capacity
Cavinato (2004), Giunipero & Eltantawy (2004), 
Childerhouse & Towill (2003), Mason-Jones & 
Towill (1999), Van der Vorst & Beulens (2002)
5
Inefficiency of supplier Christopher & Lee (2004), Geary et al. (2002), 
Esper & Williams (2003), Serel (2008), Shah 
(2009), Huang et al. (2009), Chiang (2008), 
Avhinder et al (2009)
8
inappropriate sourcing Christopher & Lee (2004), Giunipero & 
Eltantawy (2004), Tseng (2009), Rossi (2009)
4
Supply Chain 
Management
Lack of supply chain 
integration and control
Geary et 2002, Cavinato (2004), Childerhouse 
& Towill (2003)
2
Supply chain infrastructure 
dispersion
Cavinato (2004) 1
Lack of communication in 
the ordering process
Geary et al (2002) 1
Inconsistent demand 
forecasting by different 
supply chain members
Mason-Jones & Towill (1999) 1
Marketing
Inappropriate Product Life 
Cycle Management
Vickery et al (1999), Van der Vorst & Beulens 
(2002), G eary et al (2002), Childerhouse & 
Towill (2003), Christopher & Lee (2004), 
Vickery et al (1999), Lockamy III (2008)
7
Lack of integration between 
Marketing and Production
Giunipero & Eltantawy (2004),Vickery et al 
(1999)
2
Packaging Uncertainty B eier(1989 ) 1
Promotion Uncertainty Beier (1989) 1
Manufacturing
Operational Problems Childerhouse & Towill (2003), Cavinato (2004), 
Giunipero & Eltantawy (2004), Mason-Jones & 
Towill (1999), Geary et al (2002), McKinnon & 
Ge (2004), Van der Vorst & Beulens (2002), 
G eary et al (2002), Rossi (2009), McKinnon et 
al (2009), Song (2009)
10
Problems in Quality Control Childerhouse & Towill (2003), Mason-Jones & 
Towill (1999), Van der Vorst & Beulens (2002), 
G eary et al (2002), Vlaiic et al. (2009)
5
Ineffective Scheduling Van der Vorst & Beulens (2002), Childerhouse 
& Towill (2003), McKinnon & Ge (2004)
3
Inventory and 
OTder 
Management
Inventory and order 
management uncertainty
Lalwani et al (2006), Schwarz & W ang (1999), 
Christopher & Lee (2004), Morash & Clinton 
(1997), Childerhouse & Towill (2003), Mason- 
Jones & Towill (1999), Galasso et al. (2009), 
Kaipia (2009)
8
Transport, 
Shipping and 
Storage
Shipping uncertainty Morash & Clinton (1997), Fowkes et al (2004), 
Department for Transport (2007)
3
Storage uncertainty Van der Vorst & Beulens (2002) 1
Transport management 
issues
Fowkes et al (2004), Geary et al (2002) 2
Table 4.1 Sources of uncertainty related to suppliers
The amount of literature also reflects the fact that it has been very common for 
manufacturers to assume responsibility for outbound transport operations. If the 
supplier of the goods is responsible for outbound distribution activities such as
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organization of the downstream transport and warehousing, further important 
sources of uncertainty are generated. Issues will arise if transport is managed 
inefficiently, or if transport and distribution networks are not adequately attuned to 
the needs of the product during marketing and promotional initiatives (which may 
change pack size and packaging requirements) or to the differing needs at different 
stages of the product life cycle. If, on the other hand, major customers (such as large 
multiple retailers) opt to manage the transport function and collect products ‘ex- 
works’, uncertainties due to these latter elements are not the responsibility of the 
supplier, and hence are more appropriately categorized as being related to the 
customer. ,
4.3.2 Uncertainty related to customers
In contrast to the previous section, the focus of this section is on the sources of 
uncertainty which can be related to inappropriate management at the destination of 
the goods to be transported. Table 4.2 summarises the findings from the literature 
search of the main causes of transport uncertainty relating to the customer. Rather 
less literature was identified than for suppliers, but nevertheless it is possible to 
identify some key themes.
Boughton (2003), Morash and Clinton (1997) and Fowkes et al. (2004) all identify 
inefficient unloading processes, reflected in differences between the agreed and 
actual unloading times and in excessive waiting or queuing times as a significant 
source of uncertainty. This is confirmed by a freight best practice report published by 
the Department for Transport (2007) for the UK food sector where 26% of the delays 
within the delivery process are generated in unloading bays. This can generate the 
need for the deployment of more resources and can also potentially create the need 
for unnecessary transport movements. Practices such as ‘factory gate pricing’, 
where the recipient of the goods assumes responsibility for inbound transport, can 
offer one way to mitigate such uncertainties. Other literature (Cavinato, 2004; Van 
der Vorst and Beulens, 2002) points to further potential transport uncertainties 
caused by poor management of distribution centres or retail outlets. Despatch of 
inaccurate quantities to retail outlets can lead to stockouts and loss of sales (Vickery 
et al, 1999), and may call for emergency deliveries or returns which will impact on
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overall transport efficiency. This can have both a significant economic and 
environmental impact on transport performance.
A rea Cause o f Uncertainty A uthors Papers
Supply
Chain
Management
Lack of integration of all 
strategic areas within supply 
chains
Milligan (1999), Geary et al (2002), Naim et 
al (2006)
3
Transport not included in 
purchasing costs
Milligam (1999) 1
Rigidities in the distribution 
network, static nodes, the same 
links
Naim et al (2006) 1
Wrong location of retail outlets, 
excessive stock and loss of 
sales
Vickery et al (1999) 1
Ordering and
Inventory
Management
Difficult and nonstandard 
orders, excessive 
customisation creating 
excessive variations in the 
demand for transport
Boughton (2003), Fowkes et al (2004) 
Vickery et al (1999)
3
Suboptimal order consolidation Milligan (1999) 1
Wrong weekly forecast from 
customers
Mason-Jones & Towill (1999), Van der 
Vorst & Beulens (2002), Rojas & Frein 
(2008), McKinnon et al (2009), Ustundag 
&Tanyas (2009), Bichescu & Fry (2009)
6
Wrong operational planning of 
transport and inventory
Morash & Clinton (1997), Crnkonic et al 
2008)
2
Higher customer expectation, 
impacting on delivery frequency
Lalwani et (2006), McKinnon et al (2009) 2
Lack of visibility to the shipper 
of consolidations and carrier 
optimisation plans
Esper & Williams (2003) 1
Unloading
processes
Unloading time uncertainty, 
waiting or queue times between 
delivery appointment and 
unloading
Boughton (2003), Esper & Williams (2003), 
McKinnon & G e (2004), McKinnon et al 
(2009), Department for Transport (2007)
5
Unsynchronised transport- 
congestion, confusion and poor 
delivery sequencing at the 
customer receiving docks
Morash & Clinton (1997), McKinnon et al 
(2009)
2
Rigid delivery window in 
customer unloading facilities, 
more significant in operations 
more likely to incur late arrivals
Fowkes et al (2004) 1
Store and 
depot
management
Special promotions Morash & Clinton (1997) 1
Excessive time-to-market Cavinato (2004) 1
Costs and loss opportunities 
due to wrong innovation
Cavinato (2004) 1
Inefficiencies in labelling Van der Vorst & Beulens (2002) 1
Wrong store layout and shelf 
capacity too small
Van der Vorst & Beulens (2002) 1
Table 4.2 Sources of uncertainty related to the customer
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As with supplier uncertainty, a failure by customers to engage in effective supply 
chain management with supply chain partners and ineffective order management 
and inventory management systems are both further contributors to transport-related 
uncertainty. Poor order and inventory management by customers can put pressure 
on suppliers and carriers, for example by causing unnecessary variations on freight 
transport demand (Fowkes et al., 2004), and as a result, unnecessary transport 
movements can be generated. Inaccurate weekly forecasts from customers can 
affect transport demand considerably (Van der Vorst and Beulens, 2001) by causing 
stock-outs, requiring emergency deliveries or by obsolescence, possibly leading to 
excessive product returns. Esper and Williams (2003) give importance to problems in 
the effectiveness of the consolidation of consignments, which are generated due 
poor visibility of information.
If the customers for manufactured products (such as major multiple retailers) choose 
to take control of the supply chain operations including transport and warehousing, 
then shortcomings in supply chain management on their part can result in very 
considerable logistics uncertainty. This may result from poor supply chain planning at 
a tactical level or rigidities regarding supply chain infrastructure. Lack of integration 
of all strategic areas, purchasing, sales, and transport, within the logistics triad can 
cause problems of information visibility, and as a result amplify the demand for 
products and transport (Naim et al., 2006). If there is not sufficient information 
visibility, the carrier does not have enough time to generate the most optimal 
transport plan.
i
4.3.3 Uncertainty related to carriers
Table 4.3 summarises the main causes of transport uncertainty relating to the 
carrier. The carrier can internally create uncertainty to the members of the logistics 
triad, largely due to communication and operational problems regarding information 
and physical processes of transport.
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Area Cause o f U ncertainty A uthors Papers
Transport Fleet 
Management
Empty miles between 
destination of inbound 
shipments and origin of 
outbound shipments
Esper & Williams (2003) 1
Disruption of operations due 
to insufficient fleet capacity or 
unreliable carrier service
Fowkes et al (2004), Swan & 
Tyworth (2001), Closs et al (2003), 
Ahlert et al (2009), Colicchia & 
Dallari (2009), McKinnon et al 
(2009)
5
Single vehicle configuration Naim et al (2006) 1
Lack of flexibility in terms of 
time, location, item or delivery 
frequency
Morash & Clinton (1997) 1
T  ransport Process 
(Physical and 
Information Flows)
Transport delays due to 
internal reasons, e.g. 
defective vehicle and lack of 
driver
Mason et al (2003), McKinnon & 
G e (2004), Vlajic et al. (2009), 
McKinnon et al (2009), 
Department for Transport (2007)
5
Narrow scope to change to 
other distribution channel, 
different goods
Naim et al (2006) 1
Insufficient information 
visibility regarding location of 
trucks and drivers
Mason et al (2003), Rossi (2009) 2
Transport network 
management
Lack of communication 
between different carriers and 
different transport modes
Choy et al (2007), Naim et al 
(2006), McKinnon et al (2009)
3
Collaboration between two 
hauliers or two transport 
operations, let arrivals impact 
in the whole system, in series
Fowkes et al (2004) 1
Demand for transport is not 
managed in a holistic and 
collaborative way
Naim et al (2006) 1
Scheduling and 
routing
i
Unpredictability in arrival 
times, reduction of efficiency 
of transport hubs
Fowkes et al (2004) 1
Lack of flexibility of transport 
shipment and scheduling
Christopher & Lee (2004), Rossi 
(2009)
2
Rigid plan of routing Naim et al (2006) 1
Logistics providers safety 
slacks, extra lead times to 
build in safety times, extra 
unnecessary capacity
Christopher & Lee (2004) 1
Delays leading to implications 
with respect to drivers' hours 
regulations
Fowkes et al (2004) 1
Cost and profitability Low margins Hoffman (2006) 1
Table 4.3 Sources of uncertainty from the carrier
A UK study by Fowkes et al (2004) identified various sources of delay to freight 
transport resulting in variability in journey times. Three kinds of delay to freight 
transport were identified:
(1) Delay resulting from an increased journey time, with fixed departure time;
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(2) An increase in the spread (or range) of arrival times for a fixed departure
time;
(3) Schedule delay, where the departure time is effectively put back.
The authors argued that a high level of certainty and reliability of journey times is an 
essential requirement for an effective operation. Reasons for such a requirement 
are: (1) demand considerations (JIT and Quick Response strategies; port deadlines; 
‘hub and spoke’ operations) and (2) supply-side issues (two-way loading; 
consolidation of deliveries; implications on driving hours; scope for round-the-clock 
operation; order management and warehousing regimes). Journey time reliability is 
also important in the context of rising operating costs, narrow profit margins and 
attempts to improve the efficiency of transport operations. When a vehicle is late, 
that vehicle can miss the next load scheduled for it, and as a result, an additional 
and unnecessary trip can be generated, which has a significant impact on the 
environmental performance of road transport operations.
Insufficient fleet capacity can be a cause of disruption of transport operations, 
delaying the delivery process to customers (Fowkes et al 2004). Uncertainty can also 
be originated because of lack of carrier flexibility in terms of time, location, delivery 
frequency or vehicle configuration (Naim et al., 2006). This can limit the opportunities 
to perform load consolidation within the distribution network. Inefficient fleet 
management, reflected in poor vehicle utilisation or excess empty running, can 
negatively impact on transport operations (Esper and Williams, 2003) in terms of 
extra and unnecessary cost and CO2 emissions. If demand for transport is not 
managed in a holistic and collaborative way, issues such as empty running, delivery 
delays, and low transport capacity utilisation are likely to arise (Naim et al 2006).
Uncertainty can result from transport delays due to internal reasons such as 
defective vehicles or lack of drivers (Mason et al., 2003; McKinnon and Ge, 2004). In 
the UK food sector, 26% of the delays within delivery process are generated due to 
internal inefficiency problems (Department for Transport, 2007). Uncertainty in the 
form of a lack of information about the location of trucks and drivers can lessen 
visibility on the customer side and delay the delivery process (Mason et al, 2003). 
This can generate the need for sourcing a vehicle from a more remote location than
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the vehicle that was initially scheduled in the transport plan. Meanwhile, transport 
network management can be another significant source of carrier uncertainty. There 
can be integration and collaboration issues because of lack of communication 
between different carriers, possibly involving different transport modes (Choy et al, 
2007). When hauliers attempt to integrate their transport work for different clients in 
sequence, major delays can be compounded, leading to significant impact on clients 
towards the end of the work schedule (Fowkes et al, 2004). The way that transport 
demand is managed can affect the flow and utilisation of the transport network.
Carrier uncertainty can also originate in the scheduling and routing processes. Lack 
of flexibility of shipment and transport schedules (Christopher and Lee, 2004) can 
cause operational problems at customer facilities and result in delays in the delivery 
process. Inefficient transport scheduling can make arrival times more unpredictable, 
hence having a detrimental impact on the efficiency of hubs (Fowkes et al, 2004). 
Very rigid routing plans can require extra unnecessary capacity (Christopher and 
Lee, 2004), and it may be difficult to source the most suitable vehicles for the work, 
particularly in highly specialised conditions (Naim et al 2006).
The typically low margins in much of the freight transport industry (Hoffman, 2006) 
can result in uncertainties as operators struggle to balance costs against their labour 
resource pressures and legal obligations. Financial exigency may dictate that 
hauliers bid for work at low rates, and then struggle to meet the required level of 
performance. Delayed journeys can be highly problematic due to constraints 
regarding the legal maximum working time of a driver (Fowkes et al, 2004), as 
vehicles may need to wait for a replacement driver in the middle of the delivery 
process.
4.3.4 Uncertainties relating to control systems
Uncertainties relating to control systems can be classified into information 
management uncertainties, ICT systems uncertainties and physical systems 
uncertainties (Table 4.4). Information uncertainty can result from inaccurate 
information on inventories, demand (actual and forecast), production plans, capacity, 
and order status within the supply chain (Christopher and Lee, 2004). This is usually
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a consequence of the lack of a systematic means of handling information (Choy et al 
2007), preventing the information available in ICT systems from being updated 
quickly. Any such information uncertainty caused by demand forecast inaccuracy 
can lead to increased demand amplification backing up the supply chain from 
customer to suppliers (Mason et al., 2003). Therefore, unnecessary inventory is 
potentially moved within the supply chain and carriers may be required to perform 
emergency deliveries, possibly involving poor vehicle utilisation. This can add 
unnecessary miles to distribution networks, and as a result, extra cost and CO2 
emissions.
A rea Cause of Uncertainty A uthors Papers
Information
Management
Inaccurate information of 
inventories, actual demand and 
forecast, production plans, capacity, 
and order status within the chain
Christopher & Lee (2004), 
Boughton (2003), Carter & Ferrin 
(1996), Christopher & Lee (2004) 
Mason-Jones & Towill (1999), 
Mason et al (2003)
6
Insufficient information due to lack 
of systematic means of handling 
information
Choy et al (2007) 1
Forecast inaccuracy throughout the 
chain, demand amplification
Mason et al (2003), Christopher & 
Lee (2004)
2
ICT Systems 
Management
Information flow rigidity, not 
adapting while the journey happens
Corry & Kozan (2006), Carter & 
Ferrin (1996)
2
Inventory control systems, that does 
not allow horizontal collaboration 
between carriers
Tyan et al (2003) 1
Transport is not included in the 
inventory control systems
Mason et al (2003) 1
Incorrect information input on ITC  
systems
Geary et al (2002), Christopher & 
Lee (2004)
2
Physical
Systems
Management
Poor stock auditing Geary et al (2002), Van der Vorst & 
Beulens (2002)
2
No synchronisation and poor 
visibility among adjacent processes
Geary et al (2002) 1
Wrong location at DCs Van der Vorst & Beulens (2002) 1
Table 4.4 Sources of control systems uncertainty
Regarding ICT, rigidity in the information flow, such as the lack of real updated data 
during a journey (Corry and Kozan, 2006), can create a significant degree of 
uncertainty in the delivery process. In many cases, inventory control systems do not 
allow horizontal collaboration between 3PLs (Tyan et al, 2003), so transport 
management is fragmented and transport movements from carriers cannot be 
optimised. This produces duplications between carriers with distribution networks.
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This can be an outcome of the use of suboptimal inventory systems that do not 
include transport (Mason et al, 2003). Moreover, there could be problems in the set­
up and operation of key ICT systems (e.g. MRP, EDI) (Christopher and Lee, 2004). 
This issue can generate considerable information distortion within the logistics triad, 
so the wrong product mix may be delivered to the customer and consequently the 
customer may return part of the load. In turn, this can produce the need for 
unnecessary trips and increase the overall cost and carbon footprint of the transport 
function of supply chain. However, information control is not the only source of 
control uncertainty in transport operations. Physical control systems can be another 
significant source of uncertainty for the logistics triad. Poor stock auditing and poor 
quality control systems can equally produce confusion (Geary et al., 2002).
4.3.5 External uncertainty
In this section, the impact of uncertainties emanating from external sources that are 
not under the control of the logistics triad will be discussed, such as variations in key 
transport macroeconomics, demand unpredictability and congestion (Table 4.5). 
Uncertainty in transport macroeconomics has been highlighted as a significant issue 
that affects transport operations; a number of authors (including practitioners, 
Boughton, 2003) have highlighted variations in fuel prices and HGV driver shortages 
as important macroeconomic issues that have recently affected freight transport 
operations in the UK.
In recent years, there has been considerable uncertainty over the price and 
availability of fuel, both in the short term and in terms of the future resource cost of 
fuel, (particularly conventional diesel) and the future availability of such fuel. In the 
short term, the UK fuel crisis of Autumn 2000 caused severe short term shortages, 
resulting in major uncertainties for many road hauliers (Whiteing et al, 2002). Prices 
have been quite volatile in recent years and whilst larger users, such as major rail 
freight companies, can minimize the impact of short term volatility through forward 
buying and hedging, small operators are not able to do this. Further uncertainty is
caused by lack of knowledge of future changes in fuel taxation. In the face of rising
/
oil commodity prices on world markets, some previously announced increases in UK 
fuel duty have been postponed or cancelled, but others have not.
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These uncertainties related to the price of fuel (including the effects of future 
changes to fuel taxation) are not likely to have a significant physical impact on 
companies in the triad in the short term, although there is some danger of disruption 
if a carrier is made bankrupt as a result and ceases operations at short notice.
A rea Uncertainty Cause A uthors Papers
Transport
Macroeconomics
Variations in fuel prices Schulz (2002), Boughton (2003), Hoffman (2006), Screeton (2009)
4
Driver shortages and the cost of 
provision of training and skills 
development in the logistics 
sector
Boughton (2003), Hoffman (2006), 
Skills for Logistics (2005a), Skills for 
Logistics (2005b), McKinnon et al 
(2009)
5
Market Product and transport demand fluctuations
Mason et al (2003), Bailey (2009), 
Galasso et al. (2009),
McKinnon et al (2009)
4
Road conditions
Traffic congestion
Boughton (2003), Fowkes et al 
(2004), McKinnon and Ge (2004) 
McKinnon et al (2009), Department 
for Transport (2007)
5
Preferred route unavailable Fowkes et al (2004) 1
Delays and unreliable travel 
times
Van Schijndel & Dinwoodie (2000), 
Golob and Regan (2001)
2
Severe or sudden
external
disruptions
External events that disrupt the 
SC
Christopher & Lee (2004), 
Giunipero & Eltantawy (2004), 
W atanabe (2006), Garger (2002), 
LaGrange (2006), McKinnon 
(2006), Saldanha et al (2006)
7
Table 4.5 External sources of uncertainty
Another group of external uncertainties relates to labour shortages and the cost of 
provision of training and skills development in the logistics sector. Skills for Logistics, 
the official UK Sector-specific Skills Council for the freight transport industry, 
recogdises the shortage of large goods vehicle (LGV) drivers as a problem which is 
having wider cost implications for the logistics industry. Lack of time and facilities for 
training, the substantial costs involved in sending a trainee to a driving school, 
recruitment costs in excess of £1,000 and difficulties in retaining staff are quoted as 
factors contributing to this shortage (Skills for Logistics, 2005a). Labour shortages 
cause delays in the delivery process and result in the provision of inferior customer 
service. Whether or not the sector will be successful in meeting its future training and 
skills needs will depend largely on its rapport with government (Skills for Logistics, 
2005b).
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Road congestion is increasingly affecting transport operations (McKinnon and Ge, 
2004). In the UK food sector, 19% of the delays within delivery process are 
generated due to traffic congestion (Department for Transport 2007). If congestion 
levels are predictable* then this can be planned for, but in many cases congestion 
results in variable and less predictable travel times and hence a less reliable service 
(Van Schijndel and Dinwoodie, 2000; Golob and Regan, 2001). Delays can lead to 
delivery refusals at depots. Preferred transport routes may not always be available. 
Serious accidents or the need for unplanned repairs can lead to lengthy and 
unannounced road and rail closures, resulting in long detours away from preferred 
routes (Fowkes et al 2004). Congestion and delays may also have a detrimental 
effect on staff morale (and consequently retention of staff in the transport sector) 
compounding the driver shortages discussed above (Golob and Regan, 2001).
Other external causes of uncertainty affecting transport operations cannot be 
predicted in any way. These can be categorised as chaotic uncertainty since they 
tend to happen in a totally random and sudden manner, and can cause unavoidable 
disruption to supply chain operations. (Christopher and Lee, 2004; Giunipero and 
Eltantawy, 2004). Natural disasters are one example. The Kobe earthquake, for 
instance, caused damage to the transport infrastructure which very quickly disrupted 
the just-in-time supply of materials to Japanese factories (Watanabe, 2006). Bad 
weather can be disruptive, for example causing unreliability in ocean shipping transit 
times, although vessel routing may mitigate this (Saldana et al, 2006). More severe 
weather events, such as hurricanes, can be extremely disruptive (LaGrange, 2006). 
McKinpon (2006) presents a macroeconomic assessment of the potential impact of 
massive disruption to road freight transport due to catastrophic failure of a country's 
road transport system. In similar vein, although perhaps less random and sudden, it 
is difficult to predict the likelihood or the potential severity of industrial action, or to 
take effective action to ameliorate its effects. A good example of this is the 
uncertainty which resulted from port congestion on the US west coast in 2002, 
sparked by industrial action. Some supply chains had to make recourse to the 
emergency use of air freight (Garger, 2002).
Demand for products (and hence the requirement for transport) fluctuates (Mason et 
al., 2003) although demand variability varies from sector to sector. In general,
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members of the triad should be able to mitigate the impact of demand volatility 
through the use of better demand forecasting techniques or by improving the visibility 
of information within the supply chain. Some demand fluctuation will always remain, 
however, due to inherent randomness or the impact of unpredictable factors, such as 
the weather.
4.4 Discussion and Conclusions
This chapter presents research which has investigated supply chain uncertainty from 
a transport perspective. The chapter intends to categorise the literature to develop a 
conceptual foundation for the rest of the thesis and has developed definitions and 
classifications of different types of uncertainty. In doing so, a wide and diverse 
literature on uncertainty in supply chains has been synthesised with many causes of 
uncertainty that affect transport derived from this. No previous literature has 
attempted to codify this in a systematic manner or to explicitly examine transport 
uncertainty within the context of supply chain uncertainty. The findings are 
summarised in Figure 4.3, which identifies the five main areas for transport 
uncertainty and also some of the main themes that emerge from the literature.
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Figure 4.3 Transport-focused uncertainty model -  location of key uncertainties
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The model developed acts as a template by which organisations may develop a 
supply chain strategy vis-a-vis their uncertainties. By categorising uncertainty into 
the five types described, organisations may determine where the greatest 
uncertainties lie and hence develop a prioritised plan for supply chain re-engineering 
by initially targeting those uncertainties that result in the greatest risks to the 
successful operation of the supply chain. The model will also determine to what 
extent the uncertainties can be tackled by a single organisation alone, or in 
collaboration with other partners in the supply chain, the wider industry and 
government. Not only will this enable the performance of the transport operations to 
be improved, but the whole supply chain should perform better (Tracey, 2004).
One important outcome of this work is that, whilst many of the causes of uncertainty 
and their impacts can be linked primarily to one particular member of the logistics 
triad, in other cases the location of uncertainty depends on which triad member is 
responsible for planning, organising, procuring and managing the freight transport 
operation. In principle, the impact of any uncertainty can be reduced through the 
creation of excellent supply chain control mechanisms and by complete sharing of all 
information relevant to the supply chain. Such information sharing will not always be 
possible, however, and there will be circumstances when triad members will be 
reluctant to share all information. In such circumstances, the continued existence of 
information asymmetries implies that supply chain efficiency and performance will 
depend on which organisation assumes responsibility for transport. This may be one 
reason for the growing use of ‘factory gate pricing’ initiatives, for example.
The results of this chapter will inform the opinion-based and empirical research 
undertaken for the following chapter in this thesis. The results of this chapter can 
also inform further empirical research undertaken into the area of transport 
uncertainty and hence logistics flexibility as a means for accommodating such 
uncertainty. The research also highlights the root causes of inefficiency within 
transport. Even though the majority of examples cited and discussed in this chapter 
refer to road freight transport, the model is intended to be generic and applicable to 
all modes, although further work will be required to test and validate whether this will 
be possible. Transport inefficiency -  and most especially inefficiency in the use of
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road transport -  is closely related to environmental performance, but this relationship 
has not been tested in this chapter, and much research is needed to investigate the 
impact of transport uncertainty on supply chain environmental performance. This will 
be addressed in the case study chapters of this thesis.
4.5 Contribution
To methodology in logistics research
The categorisation undertaken to populate the logistics triad uncertainty model can 
be used as a guide in future developments of a conceptual model in logistics, 
particularly when researchers are interested in categorising a topic into clusters. In 
this case, the researcher counted the number of times each uncertainty cause was 
highlighted in the literature. Other dimensions could be included in the 
categorisation, e.g. frequency and impact, quantity, quality and time, but there was 
insufficient empirical evidence to do that.
To the PhD
The chapter has achieved the first objective derived from the literature review. The 
different uncertainties found in the literature were categorised into five uncertainty 
sources. This will guide the research in the following two chapters. However, the 
model still needs to be refined in terms of scope and also the second objective of this 
PhD still needs to be achieved.
To the topic
In this*chapter, the logistics triad uncertainty model has been developed. This model 
can be used to guide future research on uncertainty impacting on freight transport 
operation. Also, this model can be used as a diagnostic tool in industry.
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5.0 Evaluating the causes of uncertainty in logistics operations
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, a model of transport uncertainty was developed from 
published literature. This model categorised the sources and causes of supply chain 
uncertainty in transport operations. However, the model needed to be refined by 
logistics practitioners before its validity could be tested by an industry survey. In 
order to achieve this, focus groups were chosen over other methods for two main 
reasons. Firstly, they provide an efficient way to gather data from a large number of 
participants in a shorter time than would be possible with individual interviews. 
Secondly, it allowed different perspectives on the subject to be assembled and 
compared during an interactive session.
The transport-focused uncertainty model (see Figure 4.2 in Chapter 4) was 
developed in the previous chapter. This model needed to be refined by practitioners 
by applying an exploratory research method. Therefore, focus groups were selected 
to achieve that goal. The objectives of the focus groups were first to identify the main 
causes of supply chain uncertainty within current UK logistics operations and, 
secondly, to identify the root causes of these uncertainties. The aim of this chapter is 
to evaluate the impact of uncertainty on the performance of transport operations. At 
this stage, uncertainty causes will be evaluated in a qualitative manner.
The chapter proceeds by discussing the method applied in the data collection. 
Before presenting the findings, a framework to guide the application of the focus 
group method in logistics research is discussed. After that, an analysis of the 
findings is presented based on both the supply chain role and industrial sector of the 
focus group participants. Subsequently, the four uncertainty clusters found in the 
data collections are drawn into the conceptual model developed in the previous 
chapter. Then, a discussion based on the lessons learnt through the application of 
the focus group method is presented. Furthermore, the managerial implications, 
research implications and limitations of the findings are presented in the following
82
two sections. In addition, the contributions of the findings, to logistics methodology, 
to the PhD and to the topic are highlighted in the final section of this chapter.
5.2 Method
In the planning stage, seven potential venues were chosen, taking into account 
major logistics flows and business locations within the UK. As mentioned in Chapter 
3, venue location is not considered to be a key issue in the generic literature of focus 
groups (see Figure 3.3). By taking account of the geographical location of potential 
participants, their journey time and inconvenience can be reduced, and as a result, 
their attendance can be increased. A similar approach is adopted by New and Payne 
(1995), Dainty et al. (2001), Guinipero et al. (2003) and Evangelista and Sweeney
(2006). Locations were selected as a pilot session in Birmingham, two sessions in 
London, two in Nottingham, and one each in Cardiff and Edinburgh. When selecting 
the sample for the focus groups, in order to ensure a high attendance rate and the 
required participants’ profile, it was necessary to have participants with previous 
research involvement with the academic partners in the Green Logistics project. 
Therefore, as recommended by Saunders et al. (2007), a purposive sampling 
strategy was applied to identify the potential focus group participants, since it was 
important to ensure that the participants’ profile fitted with the research. Postal 
invitations were sent to 156 potential participants from logistic-related companies 
(manufacturers, retailers, 3PLs, and technology providers), trade associations, 
government bodies and logistics consultancy companies. The postal invitations 
included information about the Green Logistics projects, a personal invitation letter 
and a response form to confirm attendance. Participants were allocated to a focus 
group depending on their workplace location. In order to encourage attendance at 
the focus groups, as recommended ih the generic focus group literature (see Figure 
3.3), participants were offered a written feedback report and a potential invitation to a 
dissemination workshop. Evangelista and Sweeney (2006) also offered an incentive 
to attendees, but in the form of a free magazine subscription.
From the initial mailing, 26 positive responses were received. A follow-up process 
was undertaken combined with the addition of 21 more invitees. This involved e-mail 
and telephone contact with the invitees to encourage them to attend. As a result, the
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final number of participants was 58, giving an attendance rate from 171 invitees of 
34%. As shown in Figure 3.3 in Chapter 3, group size is one of the key factors to be 
considered when designing focus groups. The aim was to have 8 participants per 
focus group, as this represents the optimum size according to Krueger (1998). In 
reality, the size of focus group varied between 5 and 12 (Morgan, 1998).
The size and composition of the seven focus groups varied widely (Table 5.1). First, 
regarding group size, there were three focus groups that did not have the between 6 
and 10 participants recommended by Krueger (1998a). Two had more than 10 
participants. In the first of these (London 1), the group was divided in two for 
discussions. However, this reduced the quality of data recorded. In some groups the 
diversity of sectors represented also impaired the quality of discussion. The Cardiff 
focus group had only five participants, but they were from large enterprises and had 
a wide knowledge in the topic area. Morgan (1998) suggests a minimum of 4 for 
such a group, and depth in the discussions was possible. Golicic et al. (2003) and 
Cullen and Webster (2007) both had similar sized groups. The most important point 
regarding size and composition is that all the focus groups followed the 
recommendations found in the literature shown in Figure 3.3 in Chapter 3, and in 
those instances where these two factors were slightly out of range, the facilitator 
adapted the discussion to mitigate this problem.
Focus
group
session
Group
size
Type of organisation represented No. of 
industrial 
sectorsShipper Carrier Customer Enabler TradeAssociation
Policy
Maker
Birmingham 6 1 2 1 1 1 0 5
London 1 11 2 2 1 2 2 2 7
London 2 7 1 2 2 2 0 5
Nottingham
1 9 3
V
2 1 1 1 1 7
Nottingham
2 7 1 2 1 2 1 0 5
Cardiff 5 2 0 1 0 1 1 4
Edinburgh 13 6 1 0 1 4 1 7 ,
Total 58 16 11 5 9 12 5
Table 5.1 Group size and composition of the 7 sessions
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The focus groups were designed to last for half a day for their session. Each 
session lasted around 120 minutes and had a refreshment break in the middle. 
However, there was a short initial presentation that gave some background to the 
overall research project.
In each focus group, the question posed was:
‘Which are the most important causes of uncertainty that inhibit effectiveness of your 
transport operations?’
When this question was asked, each participant wrote their suggestions on Post-It 
notes, one comment per note. After that, each participant presented and discussed 
their notes individually, while the other group members were encouraged to 
intervene in the discussion so ideas might be developed further. In this discussion, 
participants stated why their selected uncertainty causes have a significant impact 
on their operations. The group as a whole then categorised the individual Post-It 
notes into clusters. The researcher advised the participants that, given the phrasing 
of the question posed, it was assumed that the number of Post-It notes reflected 
each issue’s relative importance. Although no one objected to this assumption, the 
facilitator ran a discussion asking participants to confirm that the largest cluster 
represents the biggest challenge for their operations and/or industrial sectors. The 
session ended with a cause-and-effect exercise to determine the main root causes 
of these clusters. The clusters form the main unit of analysis of this paper. Notes 
were taken by the research team and complemented by audio recordings, to which 
all paijticipants agreed prior to the focus group commencing.
After the focus groups, scripts for each session were produced from the notes and 
recordings. The Post-It notes recorded by participants were triangulated with the 
scripts and the cause-and-effect exercises. The data was synthesised using two-way 
tables to compare individual issues with top-level clusters, uncertainty types and 
sectors. Also, clusters were compared with the type of participants to see to what 
extent the participants’ background may influence their perceptions. The
classification is based on that developed by the European Logistics Users, Providers
/
and Enablers Group (ELUPEG). However, to avoid clusters becoming too large, as 
Table 5.2 shows, this categorisation was disaggregated into the following:
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• Shipper -  an organisation which ships products to a wide range of external 
customers
• Customer -  a business that receives products from a wide range of shippers. 
They may also have a distribution network internal to the company
• Provider -  companies where the main business is the provision of transport 
and logistics services
• Enabler -  a company that provides technology or consultancy to facilitate the 
movements of goods
• Trade Body -  an organisation that represents a number of businesses from a 
particular sector
• Policy maker/influencer -  government and other bodies that affect the 
external environment within which transport operates.
Supply Chain Role N um ber o f partic ipants Percentage o f  
participants
Shipper 16 27
Customer 5 9
Provider 11 19
Enabler 9 15
Trade body 12 21
Policy maker/influencer 5 9
Total 58 100
Table 5.2 Breakdown of focus group participants
As staited in Figure 3.3 in Chapter 3, theory saturation is one of the main factors to 
be considered in the process of analysing the data gathered in a series of focus 
groups. Generally, when the focus group method is applied, theory saturation is 
reached after the fifth session (Morgan and Krueger, 1997). To confirm theory 
saturation, the Post-It exercise was analysed. Figure 5.1.a shows that the number of 
new issues raised (on individual Post-It notes) per participant does appear to tail off. 
However, when looking at clusters (Figure 5.1.b), there are no new clusters between 
the fourth and sixth focus groups. Nevertheless, the seventh focus group represents 
a slight exception as new sectors were involved that had not previously contributed 
to the focus groups from the drink industry. They identified issues unique to their
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sectors. Overall, however, there is sufficient confidence as to the reliability of the 
findings. Focus groups are conducted in series, so when a point of theory saturation 
is reached the researcher can stop the data collection (Krueger, 1998b), since the 
researcher does not obtain new input from additional participants, there is no need to 
deploy further resources in conducting any additional focus group.
a) New Issues by Focus Group b) New Clusters by Focus Group
Focus group
CM CO T t  1 0
Focus group
CO
Figure 5.1 Theory saturation of the focus group sessions
5.3 Uncertainty within logistics triads
The first part of the analysis considers the results as a whole. Table 5.3 shows the 
relative importance of the 5 sources of uncertainty, which are depicted in Figure 4.2 
shown in Chapter 4, within transport operations. The scores are based on the total 
number of Post-It notes for each generic source of uncertainty. Post-Its are counted 
multiple times if the type of uncertainty can arise from more than one cause. Overall, 
most sources of uncertainty are equally represented, with the exception of control 
systems. The bias of attendees towards shippers accounts for this source receiving 
a slightly lower number of Post-it notes. The rating of control systems may reflect 
the level of usage of technology within freight transport, which can often be quite low 
(for example, see Davies et al., 2007). Alternatively, it may be that the perception of 
attendees reflects more general views on freight transport that it is there to react to 
the demands of the supply chain (Potter and Lalwani, 2007), and that the information 
systems that generate these requirements are beyond the scope of the logistics 
triad.
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Source of uncertainty Number of Post-It notes
Shipper 50
Carrier 73
Customer 74
Control System 22
External 65
Table 5.3 The original sources of transport uncertainty
Rather than looking at the individual Post-It notes, the clusters form the basic unit of 
analysis with the number of Post-Its within them being used to determine the relative 
importance of each. It is assumed that more Post-its equates to a cluster being a 
larger cluster of uncertainty. The relative importance of the clusters is depicted in 
Figure 5.2. It can be seen that four main themes emerge - delays, variable demand 
and/or inaccurate forecast, delivery constraints, and supply chain integration and 
coordination - and represent about 65% of total Post-It notes gathered in the focus 
groups. Participants commented that the lack of supply-chain integration within the 
logistics triad can cause serious issues with coordination and communication 
between partners, ultimately impacting upon delays. The terminology for the clusters 
is based on the views of the focus group participants.
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Figure 5.2 Issues causing uncertainty in transport operations
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Definition of these terms can be found in Table 5.4. The individual issues behind 
these main clusters will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter.
Cluster Definition
Delays
Delays occur when a delivery process takes place later than scheduled. Delays are mostly 
caused by three factors: road network congestion, supply disruptions, and operational 
problems in unloading and loading.
Variable 
demand and/or 
inaccurate 
forecast
The demand from customers may be highly volatile and sudden changes may occur due to 
seasonality and unexpected promotions. The main causes of this include demand volatility; 
poor demand forecast accuracy and lack of information visibility.
Delivery
constraints
Delivery constraints are restrictions in the delivery process that can limit normal transport 
operations. Delivery constraints are a result of three main factors: delivery curfews at the 
customer facilities, restricted delivery windows imposed by the customer, and limited 
storage capacity at the customer depots.
Lack of 
coordination
Uncertainty occurs when the logistics triad processes are not properly synchronised, the 
communication and information flow is not effective. The main factors that cause a lack of 
coordination within the triad are high customer demand for transport flexibility, 
disconnections between sales and logistics departments at the company level and lack of 
integration between carriers and customers.
Rigid
infrastructure
The infrastructure of the road and rail network is not flexible in the short term and so inhibits 
the performance of transport. Rigid infrastructure can occur at company, supply-chain and 
macro-level.
Supply chain 
integration
Integration within the logistics triad allows a holistic planning and execution of all the 
logistics triad activities in the transfer of information and materials flow. Insufficient supply 
chain integration lessens the visibility and transparency of information within the triad.
Cost Cost uncertainty relates to staff and asset utilisation. Macro problems like driver shortages, volatility of fuel prices and congestion charges can considerably affect cost. Internally, 
companies have operational issues that negatively impact on cost as well.
Technology The logistics triad members can have different levels of technology capability causing unavoidable operational distortions in the information and communication flow and problems 
in the delivery process.
Legislation
Legislation determines the basic rules of the transport sector in the UK. It must be 
sufficiently flexible so companies do not have constraints in terms of staff and assets. 
However, legislation can impose restrictions on logistics companies that can affect as usual 
trends.
Complexity Complexity can increase if there are many variables involved in the delivery process, leading to uncertainty. Causes include different and diverse requirements from customers 
and drop deliveries to diverse portfolio of customers.
Inventory
management
issues
i
An ineffective and fragmented inventory management approach can cause operational 
problems in transport originating from a lack of stock available within the supply chain, and 
sub-optimal inventory policies imposed by the customers.
Lack of 
communication
Poor communication within the logistics triad at all levels leads to information uncertainty 
within the logistics triad. Serious operational problems can originate through:
- Lack of communication regarding delivery failure from carrier to customer.
- Insufficient driver-carrier communication.
- Communication errors between shipper and customer that cause delivery refusals.
Returns Any operational issues originating from the reverse supply chain, including processes like 
recycling, return of defective products and logistics equipment, and remanufacturing.
Global-sourcing Global sourcing imposes a challenge to the logistics triad, since the high dispersion of raw materials increase the length of the supply chain. Causes of uncertainty include operational 
problems of information visibility, insufficient stock and quality of products.
Inter-modal
operations
A lack of fit between different transport modes, e.g. rail and road, can cause operational 
problems in inter-modal operations. Also, operational issues originating by rigid inter-modal 
facilities can cause problems in the delivery process.
Table 5.4 Definitions of clusters according to focus groups
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Of the other clusters, rigid infrastructure, cost and technology together represent 
around 16% of the total number of issues. The lack of flexibility of both road and rail 
infrastructure is considered a major barrier in achieving journey time reliability. 
Meanwhile, the transport costs of the supply chain are primarily affected by labour 
and asset utilisation and how close are the actual volumes to the transport plan. 
Most participants stated that there is an evident gap between the technological 
capabilities within the logistics triad. This can be expected because carriers cannot 
possibly keep the same pace of technological changes as their partners, since they 
often have financial pressures impeding new technology acquisitions.
The other clusters found have fewer than 10 occurrences. Legislation is considered 
a source of external uncertainty for the logistics triad, but participants usually focus 
on the issues that can be changed internally instead. On the other hand, the issues 
under complexity, inventory management and communication were implicitly related 
with the other themes that have more occurrences. Complexity increases if the level 
of supply chain coordination is low, and if there are significant constraints in the 
delivery process. Furthermore, a fragmented inventory management policy can have 
a negative impact on the demand and information processes. However, a lack of 
communication and supply chain integration can negatively influence the logistics 
triad coordination.
5.3.1 Uncertainty clusters per supply chain role
As well as considering the population as a whole, the results are also classified 
according to the role of the participant within the supply chain. The results from this 
can be found in Table 5.5. Considering the core members of the logistics triad first, it 
can be seen that all three members place a strong emphasis on delays as a cause of 
uncertainty. This reflects the direct impact that these have on transport operations. 
Both shippers and customers identify variable demand and/or inaccurate forecast as 
important. These are the members of the triad that would be affected more by these 
types of issues. By contrast, shippers and carriers also identify delivery constraints 
as another important factor. It may be that, because the constraints are often 
imposed by the customer, they do not perceive them to impact upon their operations.
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Shipper 19 2 2 9 14 2 5 2 3 3 4 3 1 2 3 3 95
Customer 8 10 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 29
Provider 8 2 6 7 1 1 4 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 33
Enabler 4 2 18 4 2 2 1 0 2 0 2 4 1 0 0 42
Trade body 15 3 2 5 10 2 1 3 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 47
Policy maker/ 
influencer 3 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
Total number 
of Post-It 
notes
57 40 38 32 17 13 1 0 9 9 7 7 6 4 4 3 256
Table 5.5 Comparison of clusters based on supply chain role
From the remaining classifications, enablers particularly identify coordination as an 
issue. This reflects the fact that many of the companies within this cluster provide 
software and other services linked to the coordination of supply chains. Therefore, 
they are perhaps more likely to identify issues in this area. However, it could also be 
that, because they sit outside the supply chain but have a view of all operations, they 
can identify issues that those more involved in the operations cannot see. Many of 
the trade bodies represent the freight transport industry, and therefore identify delays 
as a significant cause of uncertainty. As with enablers, they can also take a broader 
view of transport operations and therefore see infrastructure issues that do not affect 
individual supply chains but do impact on the freight transport system as a whole. 
Finally, policy makers show a slight bias towards delays but there is insufficient data 
to draw meaningful conclusions.
5.3.2 Uncertainty Clusters per Industrial Sector
The final part of the analysis sought to compare between the findings based on 
industrial sectors of the participants. This reflects the fact that different sectors are
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subject to different pressures, which may then have an impact on transport 
uncertainty. Companies were clustered according to their main business areas, and 
the smaller sectors (with 3 or fewer representatives) were then grouped to form an 
“Other” category. The results can be found in Table 5.6.
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3PL 11 4 3 5 3 3 2 3 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 39
IT provider 3 5 7 4 2 0 2 1 0 0 2 1 2 1 0 30
Grocery 7 7 3 5 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 27
Drinks 4 13 2 4 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 2 30
Primary 2 2 5 2 0 0 2 1 4 0 0 1 0 0 1 20
Rail and Inter- 
modal 4 0 1 3 5 3 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 18
Transport 
Trade Bodies 5 2 4 1 1 1 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 18
Policy Makers 
and
Influencers 5 1 2 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 12
Retailer 9 2 2 1 1 0 2 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 20
Consultant 2 0 6 2 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 14
Waste and
Reverse
Logistics 3 0 0 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 10
Construction 2 1 1 1 1 3 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12
Health { 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 6
Total number 
of Post-It 57 40 38 32 17 13 10 9 9 7 7 6 4 4 3 256
notes
Table 5.6 Comparison of clusters based on industrial sectors
Most of the sectors that took part in the focus groups have a similar distribution of 
occurrences within the themes discussed as the overall findings. However, a few 
sectors do not follow this pattern. Third party logistics providers, policy makers and 
retailers all have a larger share of Post-It notes from delays. Transport operatorsi
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often have to deal with the impact of uncertainty from delays. This can reduce their 
efficiency. Policy makers see the wider economic impact of late deliveries on the 
economy of a region or country. Retailers are affected by diverse delays issues, 
such as supplier delays, road network congestion and loading and unloading delays. 
Delays can stop the operation of retailers, which in turn can have an immediate 
knock-on effect on their service and cost performance.
Another sector that has a different distribution in comparison to the overall trend is
that of drinks. This industry has 13 occurrences out of 30 on issues regarding 
variable demand and/or inaccurate forecast, such as insufficient demand forecast, 
short notice changes in the customer orders and sub-scale procurement and orders. 
These then cause uncertainty for transport operations. The participants from the 
drinks sector have global operations (also reflected in the global sourcing cluster), so 
their supply chains are usually lengthier than in other sectors. Therefore, this sector 
can be greatly affected by variable demand and/or inaccurate forecast.
Finally, it is interesting to note the distribution of issues relating to inter-modal 
transport. These only emerged for the drinks and primary industry companies, 
despite there being a cluster of inter-modal transport providers. The nature of 
operations in the drinks and primary industry sectors makes them well suited to the 
use of other modes. However, operators are more focussed on operational issues, 
and particularly the infrastructure with issues such as the lack of flexibility in rail
freight operations featuring in 50% of the Post-It notes in this cluster.
5.4 Causes of transport uncertainty
The following analysis reflects the clusters identified as the most important during the 
focus groups. What is evident is that the sources of uncertainty emerge from 
throughout the transport uncertainty model. The top three issues from the four 
largest clusters are mapped onto the model to illustrate the impact of transport 
uncertainty. This is shown in Figure 5.3, which provides greater depth to the 
analysis.
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Figure 5.3 Main uncertainty causes, clusters and sources
Overall, the results suggest that suppliers, customers and carriers should work 
together more closely to identify these sources of uncertainty within their particular 
supply chain and develop a plan together to address them. However, the largest 
overall contribution to uncertainty is congestion on the road network, which is beyond 
the scope of the logistics triad. Now, the analysis will be expanded to further details 
for these four clusters, using the focus group discussions to provide depth to the 
commentary. Furthermore, the results from the cause-and-effect exercises 
undertaken in the focus groups are shown in Figure 5.4. They have been included in 
the analysis of the four main uncertainty clusters.
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Figure 5.4 Findings from the cause-and-effect exercise 
5.4.1 Delays
Delays appear to be particularly important for shippers, customers and providers, 
and therefore affect all the triad members and most of the sectors that were 
represented in the focus groups. Delays in the delivery process are caused by 
disruptions in the different supply-chain processes, production, storage, shipping, 
and transportation and unloading. Delays are considered the principal barrier in 
achieving a high level of delivery performance, since disruptions in the supply chain 
processes have a knock-on effect on transport reliability. Delays can be linked to 
most of the CO2 emissions ratios of the McKinnon’s (2007) framework. Delays can 
cause vehicles to miss the next scheduled load available for them, necessitating a 
second vehicle to replace the delayed vehicle, so the average empty running can 
increase. Also, delays can cause a load that was originally planned for one trip to be 
run in two trips, so the average length of haul can rise. Furthermore, the capacity
utilisation of the two trips is lower than the capacity utilisation of the originally 
planned trip, therefore the average load on laden trips can be reduced.
According to the focus group participants, delays are mainly caused by three factors: 
road network congestion, supply disruptions, and operational problems in unloading 
and loading. Road network congestion is an external uncertainty source (Figure 5.3) 
and participants commented that it can be predictable in some cases but totally 
random and unexpected in others. According to the findings from the cause-and- 
effect exercise depicted in Figure 5.4, road congestion is not properly embedded in 
the transport plan due to the fact that when a new contract is signed and agreed, the 
targets and responsibilities that the carrier has are decided without having a clear 
framework in terms of KPIs to monitor and control the delivery process. Thus, road 
transport congestion is not properly considered when defining the total delivery time. 
This happens because new contracts are signed and agreed without any awareness 
at the sales department of the transport process.
Road congestion can be mitigated by applying routeing algorithms, so the carrier can 
possibly predict the expected congestion within the road transport network and the 
fastest possible route can be estimated. However, events such as accidents are not 
predictable at all, although it was commented that their occurrence can be mitigated 
by the application of GPS systems combined with the development of alternative 
plans regarding routeing.
Supply disruption in the production and shipping process can also have a negative 
impact on the delivery process. This type of disruption mostly occurs at the shipper. 
This is more evident when the supplier is located overseas, so there is less control 
over quality measures and delivery of overseas operations. Therefore, supply 
disruption can be mitigated by developing a tight relationship with the shipper. On 
the other hand, delays can originate in the unloading and loading process at both the 
shipper and customer. Problems at unloading and loading facilities within the 
logistics triad can be initiated by, for example, the unavailability of staff or unsuitable 
facilities for loading and unloading. Furthermore, as shown in Figure 5.4, the root 
cause of delays at loading and/or unloading facilities is that the carrier does not
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or last minute cancellations of previously agreed loads. Meanwhile, insufficient 
information visibility can reduce the accuracy of demand, increasing the levels of 
safety stocks at the shipper and the number of unnecessary transport movements. 
Insufficient demand accuracy can have a knock-on effect on the demand volatility of 
transport regarding volume. This is also due to, as depicted in Figure 5.4, the fact 
that there is not a clear framework in terms of transport KPIs, so customers and 
shippers are not charged for their volume variability, primarily due to insufficient 
coordination and communication in the process of volume demand forecast within 
the logistics triad. However, participants agree that this type of problem occurs due 
to the fact that customers and shippers are not properly penalised or charged for the 
volume forecast inaccuracy and/or late-notification of extra volumes.
In addition, a sub-optimal inventory policy designed by the customer without 
including transport operations in the equation can increase the frequency of 
deliveries. Therefore, the demand for transport artificially rises, adding an extra 
variable to the complexity involved in the delivery process. This can have a negative 
impact on transport utilisation and increase costs. This occurs due to the transport 
KPIs within the logistics triad not being sufficiently clear, so as mentioned before, 
customers and shippers are not properly charged for the demand that they generate 
artificially. Although one participant particularly identified just-in-time as a cause of 
this, a more general view was that transport is often ignored in inventory 
management. However, participants commented that this uncertainty can potentially 
be mitigated by the implementation of horizontal integration initiatives, such as
inventory and transport consolidation either by the shippers or the carriers.
\
5.4.3 Delivery constraints
Delivery constraints are restrictions in the delivery process that can limit normal 
transport operations. They usually occur at the customer facilities, but sometimes 
happen at the shipper’s facilities. Delivery constraints are considered by participants 
to be the third most significant barrier in transport operations, since they can restrict 
the unloading processes, causing queues that potentially delay the return of vehicles 
to other loading points. This uncertainty cluster can be linked to one of McKinnon’s
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usually have an adequate pricing model to charge the customer and the shipper for 
inefficiencies, e.g. delays at their facilities.
5.4.2 Variable demand and/or inaccurate forecast
This theme was considered the second most important barrier to achieving a high 
level of logistics performance. Most group participants affected by this theme are 
from shippers and customers, with 22 and 10 occurrences respectively (Table 5.5). 
These numbers are disproportionate to the number of attendees from these triad 
members in the focus groups. For many of the suppliers that took part in the focus 
groups, the demand from customers is highly volatile and suddenly changes due to 
seasonality factors and unexpected promotions. Also, sub-optimal inventory policies 
that do not include transport can dramatically increase the delivery frequency, and 
consequently the likelihood of failure within the delivery process. Moreover, 
participants from the drinks and grocery sectors seem to place more emphasis on 
this uncertainty cluster. This could be due to the demand volatility in these two 
sectors.
Variable demand and/or inaccurate forecast impact on three of the factors included 
in the McKinnon’s (2007) framework the average length of haul, the average load on 
laden trips and the average empty running. This uncertainty cluster causes the 
carrier to re-plan deliveries and/or collections with a lower capacity utilisation than 
originally planned and the carrier tends not to find a backload for these trips, so the 
average load on laden trips decreases and the average empty running rises. Also, 
sometimes increases in volume come from remote geographical locations where the 
carrier cannot find the most economical subcontractor to run the extra trip. 
Therefore, the average length of haul can also rise.
Variable demand and/or inaccurate forecast originate from volatility of customer 
demand, insufficient demand forecast accuracy, lack of information visibility and sub- 
optimal inventory policies imposed by the customer (Figure 5.3). Seasonality factors, 
such as the weather, can have a considerable impact on demand volatility, but 
unnecessary promotions set by th§ customer can also produce sudden changes in 
the demand trend. This can cause unexpected short-notice extra transport deliveries
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5.4.4 Insufficient supply chain integration and coordination
A lack of coordination within the logistics triad and at the individual-company level 
can cause disruptions in the delivery process. However, if there is a high level of 
coordination within the triad, it can represent the principal enabler in reducing 
uncertainty. Lack of coordination as a theme represents just over 10 per cent of the 
total frequency from participants and particularly from enablers.
The main factors that cause a lack of coordination within the triad are high customer 
demand for transport flexibility, functional barriers between sales and logistics 
departments at the company level and lack of integration between carriers and 
customers (Figure 5.3). In many of the industrial sectors represented, customers 
require a high level of transport flexibility. This adds one more variable to the already 
complex transport process, so tighter coordination is needed to mitigate the 
complexity. Moreover, some participants felt that transport is not integrated in 
strategic processes, and the level of communication within the triad is restricted 
because the carrier is usually a servant rather than truly a partner. This occurs 
because within the carrier the sales department is often disconnected from the 
logistics function, and sales negotiate new contracts without taking account of the 
logistics consequences. This was confirmed in the cause-and-effect exercise, shown 
in Figure 5.4. The absence of an appropriate pricing model does not allow more 
coordination and communication within the logistics triad, since the supply chain 
relationships between carriers, customers and shippers are not at the necessary 
level of maturity and trust. An example was given where the sales department 
agrees loose and unachievable contracts with the customer and raises the 
customer’s expectations regarding the level of transport service, and then the 
logistics function fails to fulfil expectations. However, a tight contract from the 
beginning of the partnership can enable high levels of integration and coordination 
within the logistics triad.
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(2007) C02 emissions ratios. This uncertainty cluster can generate additional 
distance onto the planned distance of trips, so the average length of haul rises.
Delivery constraints are a result of three main factors: delivery curfews at the 
customer facilities, tight delivery windows imposed by the customer and limited 
storage capacity at the customer depots (Figure 5.3). As with road network 
congestion, delivery curfews are an external uncertainty source. Examples of the 
reasons for delivery curfews include security issues with inventory and delivery 
drivers (particularly with early morning and late night deliveries), or local restrictions 
imposed to improve the quality of life for local residents. According to the results of 
the cause-and-effect exercise presented in Figure 5.4, delivery constraints are not 
mitigated appropriately since generally customers do not undertake a proper review 
of locality to assess the existent delivery constraints at loading bays located in 
restricted areas.
Limited storage capacity at the customer distribution centres and stores restricts the 
volume of the delivery and increases the delivery frequency, and as a consequence, 
the number of vehicles arriving to storage points. This can encourage increasingly 
tighter delivery windows. Six participants agreed that the tight delivery windows that 
the customer imposes on earners and shippers have a negative effect on the overall 
transport costs. The only response that customers have to mitigate delivery 
constraints are very tight delivery windows that cause excessive queues and delays 
at distribution centres. As shown in Figure 5.4, the focus group participants agreed 
that this occurs because the supply chain relationships between the customers and 
their partners, the carrier and the shipper, are not very good. Tight delivery windows 
increase the transport costs due to the idle time generated when vehicles and drivers 
are waiting for unloading. Delivery windows can also have a knOck-on effect on 
transport performance, since transport journeys usually occur in series. However, 
participants felt that the negative effect of delivery windows can be mitigated by 
tighter coordination from the customer side to increase synchronisation between 
carriers, and greater levels of feedback information from the carrier to the customer.
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5.5 Methodological lessons learnt: Factors that influence the effectiveness of 
focus groups
|
| In the literature and also throughout the application of focus groups presented in this
!
chapter, it was possible to identify a number of key factors influencing the 
effectiveness of the focus group, particularly in terms of data quality (Figure 5.5). The 
aim of this section is to reflect on the lessons learnt during the application of the 
focus group method.
is a
function of
is influenced by is influenced by
help to manage
Focus group 
effectiveness
Uncontrollable Factors Controllable Factors
• Size
• Composition
• Interest
Participants’ knowledge 
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2.1.1.1.1 Conducting 
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Figure 5.5 Factors influencing focus group effectiveness
In the focus group literature, much emphasis is placed on group size and 
composition. However, it is also important that the participants are interested in the 
content of the discussion. The type of company and industrial sector influenced the 
level of participation in each focus group session. There are also a number of other
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factors that need to be considered. They have been categorised as uncontrollable 
and controllable.
Uncontrollable factors relate specifically to the group participants. There are four 
attributes that appear to affect the size, composition and interest of the focus groups, 
namely participants’ knowledge, expectations, availability and personality. People 
are only likely to attend if they feel that they have something to contribute to the 
topic(s) being discussed within the focus groups. However, it is also important that 
participants have appropriate expectations as to what the focus group will achieve 
and the related benefit for them and their organisations. Finally, the personality of 
participants affects their contribution to the discussion.
Given these uncontrollable factors, it is important to consider the controllable factors 
that the researcher can influence. The design stage is the point when it is possible to 
ensure that the appropriate people are selected for the focus group. For example, 
Mangan and Christopher (2005) targeted executive education students to identify the 
skills requirements required for supply chain managers. The method of inviting 
participants is also critical. Personal contact with potential participants is important in 
generating interest. In the case of this PhD, this happened during the follow up 
process but it could form part of the initial invitation. Another important aspect is the 
location of the focus groups. By holding sessions around the UK, participants’ 
travelling time could be minimised.
The nature of the facilitation is important for both stimulating discussion and ensuring 
that everyone participates. With a group of diverse personalities, there is a danger 
that those who are more confident dominate the discussion and distort the findings. 
In the application of focus groups in this thesis, the Post-It note exercise proves an 
effective means of encouraging contributions from all participants. By asking 
participants to record their opinions before the discussion starts, it helps the 
facilitator to bring their opinions into the discussion. Conversely, making the 
discussion too structured could reduce the level of discussion, and interest in the 
topic might wane. The most important element, however, is for the researcher to 
reflect upon each focus group and, if necessary, adjust the facilitation approach to 
improve the quality of data collected.
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In the analysis stage, there is the need to reflect upon any bias in the findings. 
Testing for theory saturation can help to detect bias and assess the thoroughness 
with which the subject has been discussed. Previous applications of the focus group 
method in the field, an exception being Cullen and Webster (2007), appear not have 
measured the degree of theory saturation.
Finally, a significant number of participants expressed a desire to take back relevant 
information and insights to their organisations. Maintaining good relations with 
delegates after the focus group also increases the probability of them participating in 
future research.
5.6 Managerial Implications
Although the participants in the focus groups were predominantly from the UK, the 
research has identified a number of issues in relation to uncertainty within transport 
operations. From this, it is possible to identify some generic managerial implications. 
Section 5.4 has highlighted the importance of looking at the whole of the logistics 
triad when dealing with uncertainty, as often there are multiple sources involving the 
shipper, carrier and customer. Equally, section 5.4 has highlighted the importance of 
external factors and managers need to consider how to deal with these issues. 
While the easiest approach is to accommodate them within operational plans, there 
is scope for engaging with policy makers to identify ways forward. Indeed, the policy 
makers who did participate in the focus groups commented that they found it 
beneficial to learn more about the challenges facing the logistics industry.
i
Another issue that is becoming important for managers today is the issue of the 
environment. In this chapter, the links between transport efficiency and 
environmental impact have been drawn by connecting CO2 emissions ratios from 
McKinnon’s (2007) green logistics framework with the four main uncertainty clusters 
found in the focus groups. By focussing on the sources of uncertainty within the 
logistics triad, companies can address the root causes of issues, rather than trying to 
optimise their response based upon current constraints.
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In enabling the above actions, the refined transport-focused uncertainty model is a 
tool that can be applied to identify issues leading to uncertainty and their sources. 
As demonstrated through Figure 5.3, issues can be mapped against their original 
sources and from this an improvement plan targeting the appropriate areas can be 
developed. Therefore, it can help senior managers and policy makers to identify the 
main root causes of the barriers that impede economic and environmental 
sustainability in logistics.
5.7 Concluding remarks
So far, four main clusters of uncertainty in transport operations have been found- 
delays, variable demand and/or inaccurate forecast, delivery constraints and a lack 
of coordination. According to the findings, delays are the most important cluster of 
uncertainty for transport operations, which might be considered an intuitive result, 
but this research shows its frequency relative to other issues. The consequence of 
these is to reduce the efficiency of transport operations. Also, in the overall focus 
group data, road congestion represents the largest individual issue leading to 
uncertainty While congestion due to road works and peak traffic flows can be 
incorporated into transport planning, unplanned road congestion (for example, due to 
an accident) leads to greater disruption. The challenge for transport providers is to 
mitigate the impact of this unplanned road congestion without impacting significantly 
on the efficiency of their operations.
In terms of the sources of uncertainty, most issues arise from the shipper, carrier, 
customer or external environment. Only a limited number of issues relating to control 
systems were raised. This is surprising given that control systems are likely to have 
a major influence in determining the level of transport demand, and perhaps reflects 
the lack of integration of transport operations with the rest of the supply chain. In 
looking at individual roles within the supply chain, enablers particularly identify lack 
of coordination as a major issue, whereas members of the logistics triad were more 
concerned with operational issues. However, integration within the triad may enable 
businesses to address these more effectively.
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developed, guiding the PhD candidate and future focus group applications in 
logistics on the relevant factors that influence the effectiveness of a focus group.
To the PhD
The chapter also contributes to the overall methodological path of the PhD by 
refining the conceptual model developed in the previous chapter. Different causes 
and clusters of supply chain uncertainty that impact on transport operations has 
been evaluated. The four most important uncertainty clusters found are: delays, 
variable demand and/or inaccurate forecast, insufficient supply chain integration, and 
coordination and delivery constraints.
To the topic
This chapter contributes to the topic of supply chain uncertainty and transport by 
guiding future research as to which uncertainties impact more on transport 
operations. As stated in the previous chapter, most of the literature on uncertainty 
focuses on supply chain and manufacturing, while transport is implicitly and 
marginally considered. Also, the findings from this chapter can help researchers and 
practitioners to prioritise between different uncertainties in terms of their relative 
impact on transport performance. However, these findings need to be verified with 
more empirical evidence.
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The model has been refined based only on participants’ perceptions. Further 
empirical-based research is needed to quantitatively validate it, for each cluster 
identifying the frequency with which it occurs and the impact on economic and 
environmental performance. This will further strengthen the understanding of the 
main uncertainty causes within supply chains in the UK. Those internal to the 
logistics triad can be addressed while external issues need to be accommodated, so, 
methods for achieving both of these need to be identified through the research. 
Furthermore, given the importance industry has attached to road congestion, new 
and novel approaches enabling transport planning to respond to unpredictable 
congestion needs to be developed, with minimal impact on both environmental and 
economic performance.
At this stage of the research, the model has been refined through the application of 
the focus group method. The main objective of this stage of the research was to 
explore which are the main causes of supply chain uncertainty that impact on 
transport operations, rather than provide a comprehensive list of all uncertainties. 
The model needs to be verified through the application of the survey method, so 
potential participating companies can give frequency and impact scores to each 
uncertainty cause found in the focus groups. This will be achieved in the following 
chapter. The model should also be tested through the investigation of real-world 
situations, measuring the marginal impact, in terms of unnecessary miles, and 
probability of the supply chain uncertainty causes derived from the focus groups. 
This will be addressed in the case study chapters. Moreover, the transport 
uncertainty model needs to be incorporated within a wider business process re­
engineering approach to proactively develop and evaluate solutions to reduce 
transport uncertainty within supply chains.
5.8 Contribution
To Methodology in logistics research
This chapter has presented an innovative way of applying focus groups to the wider 
methodology in logistics. Focus groups have been applied as a complementary
t
method within the overall methodological path of this PhD. A framework has been
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6.0 The main uncertainty causes impacting on the economic and 
environmental performance of road transport operations in the UK
6.1 Introduction
At this point in the thesis, the transport-focused uncertainty model has been 
developed and refined in the two previous chapters. In this chapter, the relative 
importance of these causes of supply chain uncertainty needs to be determined by 
measuring the level of risk that they represent for transport operations. The aim of 
the chapter is to verify the model taking a supply-chain perspective, and assess the 
risk that different causes and sources of supply chain uncertainty have in terms of 
the economic and environmental performance of road transport operations in a UK 
context.
To do this, the chapter proceeds by recapping on what has been completed so far 
and drawing a link between the conceptual model developed in Chapter 4 and Green 
Logistics. After that, the method applied to undertake the research is explained. 
Subsequently, the overall results of the study are presented and analysed. Following 
that, the findings are analysed at supply chain member level and also at industrial 
sector level. In the final section of the paper, the main research findings are 
highlighted together with further research opportunities.
6.2 Refined transport-focused uncertainty model
i
So far, the transport-focused uncertainty model has been developed and refined. In 
the previous chapter, four uncertainty clusters and their causes were derived from 
the application of seven focus groups. According to the focus group participants, the 
main uncertainty clusters impacting on the performance of UK transport operations 
are: delays, variable demand and/or inaccurate forecast, delivery constraints and 
insufficient supply chain integration and coordination.
This findings need to be verified by interrogating other randomly sampled 
participants from companies that operate in the sector with a higher participation in
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the focus groups. The aim of this chapter is to verify the findings from the focus 
groups by undertaking a ranking and risk assessment exercise of all the uncertainty 
clusters found in the previous chapter to verify whether or not the four main clusters 
found in the focus groups are repeatedly the most important ones in a different 
sample. This will be achieved by undertaking a questionnaire-based survey 
interrogating participants from shippers, carriers and customers from the UK road 
freight transport sector.
6.3 Method
A wider scale survey was undertaken to assess the impact that the uncertainty 
clusters, derived from the focus groups phase, have on the sustainability of road 
transport operations. In order to achieve an appropriate balance between research 
rigour and industrial relevance, a methodology triangulation research strategy was 
applied as recommended by Easterby-Smith et al (1991), New and Payne (1995), 
Arlbjorn & Halldorsson (2002), Mangan et al (2004). The findings from the focus 
groups needed verification, since the sampling strategy was purposive sampling. 
Also, the opinions of each participant of the focus groups could be influenced by 
other dominant participant(s). Therefore, it was necessary to triangulate the focus 
group findings with the application of a more quantitative method. This selected 
method was the survey method.
In the planning stage, an online questionnaire was designed based on the clusters or 
sourcqs of transport uncertainty derived from the focus groups. An online 
questionnaire was preferred over a mail questionnaire, since the sample targeted 
had access to internet and for participants it could be faster to complete an online 
questionnaire rather than a postal questionnaire. In addition, the cost of the online 
questionnaire was 60% of the cost of the postal questionnaire. Appendix 2 shows a 
copy of the questionnaire. In the questionnaire, practitioners were asked to:
• Provide background information about their companies: annual turnover in 
pounds, percentage of that transport cost represented from the annual 
turnover, industrial sector and supply chain role (shipper, carrier or customer)
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For the full survey, a total of 5000 companies were identified by using the Financial 
Analysis Made Easy (FAME) database, from all industrial sectors where the 
companies would be expected to either move goods or be directly involved in the 
movement of goods. The only constraint imposed was a minimum company size of 
250 employees. The initial invitation letter was directed to a person from the 
company board identified in the FAME database, since company’s logistics manager 
and/or director names and contact details are not available in FAME. However, it 
was requested that the details be passed to a person responsible for leading the 
logistics department of the company. The survey was available between December 
2007 and February 2008.
After four weeks of low response rate (12 responses), a random sample of 25% of 
the total population within the sectors that were responding, automotive, grocery, 
retail and road freight transport was selected. Two emails reminders were sent to the 
sampled companies as well as contacting them by telephone. As part of this 
process, the names and contact details of the person in charge of the logistics 
function of the company was obtained for at least 30% of the companies, and 
communication was directed to these people instead. In parallel to this, the Charter 
Institute of Logistics and Transport (CILT) sent an email inviting all their members 
from these sampled companies to participate in the survey. As a result of the follow- 
up process including the support of the CILT, 20 further responses were achieved. 
Also, they sent two reminder emails to the non-respondents from the sample 
selected, the first one after three weeks and the second one after six weeks of the 
initial piLT invitation. The overall increase in responses achieved during the follow- 
up stage was from 12 to 56 responses.
By February 2008, 56 practitioners had completed the survey. As Table 6.1 shows, 
responses were only received from a limited range of industrial sectors, with four 
sectors particularly well represented. Based on the sectors that responded, the 
overall response rate of these sectors was just 3.6 per cent. While this is low, the 
focus group data added depth to the analysis. Other supply chain researchers also 
combined focus groups and survey findings where a low response rate had been 
obtained (for example, New and Payne, 1995). Table 6.1 indicates the four sectors 
that have used focus group data for extra depth.
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• Select and rank the top four clusters of uncertainty that impact more on their 
businesses, based on the 15 uncertainty clusters found in the focus groups
• Assess the economic and environmental impact that their top four uncertainty 
clusters selected have on their company’s transport operations using a 5 
point-Likert scale (1- very low, 2- low, 3- medium, 4- high 5- very high)
• Evaluate the frequency of occurrence for their top four uncertainty clusters. A 
five-item frequency scale was given -  daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly and 
annually
• List up to five analysis and design tools that their company uses to improve 
the efficiency of logistics operations. This was not exclusively limited to ICT 
solutions.
In the third question of the questionnaire, where respondents were asked to assess 
the economic and environmental impact of the uncertainty clusters they were asked 
to select in question 2, labels were used to describe the alternatives answers for 
impact, since generally it can be easy for respondents to relate to labels such as low 
and high rather than numbers such as 2 or 4. Also, a 5-point Likert scale is used 
instead of a 3-point Likert scale, since as Matell and Jacoby (1972) demonstrated, as 
the number of scale steps increases the likelihood that respondents use the mid­
point category decreases. However, the pilot participants perceived a 7-point Likert 
scale to be rather confusing. Furthermore, in the case of the fourth question, 
generally the pilot participants felt that the frequency labels reflecting how industry 
works were daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly and annually.
x
Additionally, a definition of each uncertainty cluster was available in the electronic 
survey, again based on the focus group findings. These definitions were developed 
as an outcome of the focus groups (see chapter 5).
Fifteen practitioners were selected from focus group participants to pilot the online 
survey first. Postal invitation letters were sent, and 8 pilot participants responded to 
the online pilot questionnaire. As a result of the pilot, a number of changes were 
made to improve the readability, relevance and practicality of the survey.
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Uncertainty
cluster
No o f 
Response  
s
Spearm an's C orrelation  
test t-test
T Criticalvalue
N on- 
respons  
e bias
sg Criticalvalue
Non-response
bias
Delays 34 0.377 2 No 0.775 0.05 No
Demand and 
information issues 29 0.692 2 No 0.562 0.05 No
Delivery
constraints 23 0.131 2 No 0.119 0.05 No
Rigid infrastructure 6 0.669 2 No 0.725 0.05 No
Supply chain 
integration 21 0.511 2 No 0.876 0.05 No
Cost 18 0.177 2 No 0.058 0.05 No
Technology 6 0.566 2 No 0.804 0.05 No
Legislation 14 0.06 2 No 0.015 0.05 Yes, due to statistical noise
Complexity 19 0.111 2 No 0.053 0.05 No
Inventory
management
issues
10 0.662 2 No 0.374 0.05 No
Lack of 
communication 17 0.654 2 No 0.968 0.05 No
Lack of company 
vision about 
logistics
4 0.066 2 No 0.018 0.05 Yes, due to statistical noise
Returns 5 0.779 2 No 0.782 0.05 No
Global-sourcing 9 0.184 2 No 0.080 0.05 No
Inter-modal
operations 3 1 2 No 0.624 0.05 No
Table 6.2 Results of the two non-parametric tests to verify the absence of non­
response bias
x
Recently, it has been an emphasis on reducing common method bias in surveys in 
the field of Psychology (Podsakoff et al. 2003, Conway and Lance 2010). ‘Method 
variance can be defined as the variance linked to the measurement method rather 
than to the items being measured, which is attributable to the form of measurement 
at the levels of abstraction (the content of specific items, scale type, response 
format, and the general context) generating response bias such as halo effects, 
social desirability, acquiescence and leniency effects’ (Fiske, 1982). This is a trend 
that is expanding rapidly in all the disciplines of business and management. It is 
important to discuss which strategies were used to mitigate common method bias in
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Description
Focus group 
data Population Responses Response rate (%)
Grocery Manufacturing Yes 248 10 4.0
Retail Yes 153 11 7.2
Road freight transport Yes 291 20 6.9
Automotive No 161 9 5.6
Office Machinery No 35 1 2.9
Chemical No 212 2 0.9
Electrical No 110 1 0.9
Furniture No 161 1 0.6
Metal No 187 1 0.5
Total 1.558 56 3.6
T a b l e  6.1 Survey sample
Furthermore, as recommended by Armstrong and Overton (1977), in order to 
estimate the degree of non-response bias of the survey, two different non-parametric 
statistical tests have been run: the independent-samples t-test and Spearman’s 
correction. The results of these two statistical tests are shown in Table 6.2. The 
independent-samples t-test was used to compare the means between two data 
samples, the early respondents and the late respondents. The result of this test 
revealed insignificant differences between the means of the early- and late- 
respondents groups; hence this indicates an absence of non-response bias. 
Furthermore, the Spearman’s correlation was applied to test the relationship 
between the rankings of all the uncertainty clusters selected by the 56 participants 
and the number of days they took to respond to the online questionnaire. This test 
did not find a significant correction between the means of the rankings and the time 
participants took to respond to the survey, since the P values are less than the 
critical value, so the correction between these two variables is not significantly 
different from 0, and as a result, non-response bias was also not found.
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the survey. According to Podsakoff et al. (2003), in questionnaire-based surveys, 
there can be four clusters of common method bias:
• Common rater effects: ‘refer to any artifactual covariance between the 
predictor and. criterion variables generated by the fact that the survey 
respondent assigning scores to these variables is the same’. In the survey, 
this cluster of common method bias was mitigated by interrogating the opinion 
of two different samples in the focus groups and survey. Nevertheless, the 
potential bias of asking the survey respondents to select the clusters of 
uncertainty generated by their partners affecting them was not mitigated.
• Item characteristics effects: ‘refer to any artifactual covariance that is caused 
by the influence or interpretation that a respondent might ascribe to an item 
solely because of specific properties or characteristics the item possesses’. 
This source of common method bias was mitigated during the pilot. Through 
the pilot, the items were assessed to ensure they were neutral, avoiding any 
positive or negative content on them, and they did not stimulate respondents 
to score them in any particular way. Also, any overlaps between items or 
ambiguity on their definitions were corrected by applying the feedback from 
the pilot participants as well as the Likert scale of the potential responses was 
revised. According to Podsakoff et al. (2003), there are six possible causes of 
item characteristics effects:
1. Item social desirability originates since items may be constructed in 
such a way as to reflect more socially desirable attitudes, behaviours, 
or perceptions.
2. Item demand characteristics can be generated by hidden cues as to 
how to respond to items.
3. Item ambiguity can be generated by ambiguity in items that allow 
respondents to respond to them systematically using their own 
heuristic or respond to them randomly.
4. Common scale formats can be defined as the artifactual covariation 
generated by the use of the same scale format (e.g., Likert scales, 
semantic differential scales, “faces” scales) on a questionnaire. In 
particularly, the measurement of the items was achieved by different 
means of measurement. The respondents were asked to rank the
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items first and subsequently to score them in terms of their economic 
and environmental impacts and frequencies. Different scales were 
used throughout the questionnaire, as recommended by Frohlich 
(1998) and also the pilot participants.
5. Common scale anchors originates by the repeated use the same 
scaling points (e.g. extremely, always, sometimes) on a questionnaire. 
This cause of common method bias was mitigated in the same fashion 
as common scale formats. The questionnaire did not have repeated 
scale anchors.
6. Positive and negative item wording can be caused by the use of 
positively (negatively) worded items that may generate artifactual 
relationships on the questionnaire.
• Item context effects: ‘Refer to any influence or interpretation that a respondent 
may have on an item solely because of its relation to the other items making 
up an instrument’ (Wainer & Kiely, 1987). This source of common method bias 
is related to questionnaires that aim to correlate independent with dependent 
variables. In the specific case of this survey, the aim of the questionnaire was 
to identify which clusters of uncertainty were affecting more the respondent’s 
freight transport operations rather than correlating constructs. However, there 
could have been tradeoffs when participants chosen the four main clusters of 
uncertainty affecting their company road freight transport operations. This 
source of common method bias was mitigated during the pilot, particularly 
when the pilot practitioners refine the definitions of the 15 uncertainty clusters 
{developed in the focus groups. Also, the fact that these clusters were 
developed by a group of 58 UK logistics practitioners ensures that there were 
not any overlaps or ambiguity among them. Podsakoff et al. (2003) categorise 
this cluster of common method bias in the following five causes:
o Item priming effects are generated ‘when the positioning of the 
predictor (or criterion) variable on the questionnaire can make that 
variable more prominent to the respondent and induce a causal 
relationship with other variables’. In the survey, all the alternative items
(clusters of uncertainty) were show to the survey respondent at the
/
same time and were defined neutrally based on the inputs from the 
focus group and pilot participants.
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o Item embeddedness ‘originates by neutral items embedded in the 
context of either items worded positively or negatively that take on the 
assessment properties of those items’. As mention before, the fact that 
the focus group and pilot participants develop the items and pilot 
participants revised the survey questions ensures that there were not 
non-neutral items in the questionnaire, 
o Context-induce mood is produced ‘when the first question (or set of 
questions) encountered on the questionnaire influence a mood for 
responding to the rest of the questionnaire’, 
o Scale length effects are ‘generated if scales have fewer items, 
responses to previous items are more likely to be accessible in short­
term memory and to be recalled when responding to other items’. This 
was partially mitigated by using 5-item scales for the respondents to 
score the frequency and impacts of the four main clusters of 
uncertainty chosen and ranked in the first question. As it has already 
been mentioned, even though Matell and Jacoby (1972) recommend 
using 7-Likert scales to avoid this sort of bias, the pilot participant 
found 5-Likert scales rather clearer than 7-Likert scales, 
o Intermixing of items or constructs on the questionnaire is ‘caused by 
items from different constructs that are grouped jointly may decrease 
intra-construct correlations and rise inter-construct correlations’. As 
mention previously, this is not applicable to the particular case of this 
survey.
• Measurement context effects: ‘refer to any artifactual co-variation generated 
by the context in which the measures are gathered’. According to Podsakoff 
(2003), this source of common method bias can be generated by the fact that 
predictor and criterion variables are scored at the same point in time, and/or in 
the same location, and/or using the same scale. Firstly, as mentioned before 
the importance of the clusters of uncertainty were measured by respondents 
by selecting and ranking these clusters and their frequency and impacts were 
measured by using different scales. However, in the specific case of this 
survey the items were measured at the same point of time and in the same 
location, nevertheless the focus group participants measured them at a
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different point of time, in a different location and using a different scale to the 
one applied in the survey.
To analyse the data, the 56 responses were categorised depending on their 
company logistics cost and industrial sector. The total rankings of the 15 uncertainty 
clusters were calculated. After that, in order to assess the relative importance of the 
15 uncertainty clusters, the economic and environmental risk was calculated from 
the multiplication of frequency and impact (Pflug and Romisch, 2007). Also, the 
means and standard deviations of the risk scores were calculated for each of the 15 
uncertainty clusters. To calculate each individual risk score, the impact was 
multiplied by the frequency. The former was already based on a numerical Likert 
scale while, for the latter, the times were converted into a numerical scale where 
‘daily’ was given a score of 5 and ‘annually’ a score of 1. These findings were then 
analysed in more detail based on the sectors of the respondent companies, with a 
focus on those sectors having both better response rates in the survey (between 4% 
and 9%) and comprehensive focus group results to provide extra depth to the 
analysis. As seen in Table 6.1, these sectors are grocery manufacturing, retail and 
road freight transport. Frequency versus economic and environmental impact 
matrices were drawn, with the findings broken down by sector. Moreover, a 
categorisation of the tools that companies applied to mitigate uncertainty was 
undertaken and an analysis based on the links between the main four uncertainty 
clusters found and the mitigation tools categories has been carried out.
In the next two sections of the chapter, the overall findings and the results from the 
risk assessments based on the supply chain role and sector of the survey 
respondents will be presented.
6.4 Overall Results
In analysing the overall findings, the ranking of the uncertainty clusters is considered 
first. Figure 6.1 shows a comparison of the results from the focus groups and survey. 
The results shown in Figure 6.1 are based on the total number of post-it notes from 
the focus groups and the rank given by the survey participants. The two sets of 
results have been normalised (scaled to 100 based on the uncertainty cluster with
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more post-lt notes and total ranking score) to facilitate comparison between them. 
The uncertainty cluster with more Post-It notes and higher survey ranking was given 
a normalised frequency of 100; this cluster was delays, and the other 14 uncertainty 
clusters were calculated taking delays as a reference point.
■ Normalised survey rank 
1 Normalised focus group rank
Uncertainty cause
Figure 6.1 Normalised rankings from focus group and survey results
According to the focus group findings, the four main uncertainty clusters are delays, 
variable demand and/or inaccurate forecast, delivery constraints and insufficient 
supply chain integration and coordination. The survey confirms these as the main 
supply chain uncertainty clusters inhibiting the sustainable performance of transport 
operations in the UK. However, there are some slight differences between the focus 
group and survey results. In the focus groups, insufficient supply chain integration 
and coordination is the third most relevant uncertainty cluster, followed by delivery 
constraints whereas, in the survey, delivery constraints as an uncertainty cluster is 
the third most important and insufficient supply chain integration is the fourth. 
Moreover, according to the responses of the survey participants, cost, complexity, 
insufficient communication and legislation have more weight than in the focus 
groups.
The results for economic and environmental sustainability are shown in Table 6.3 
and are taken from the survey. The economic risk measures have the same pattern 
as the normalised rankings of the uncertainty clusters shown in Figure 6.1. However, 
the environmental risk scores are generally lower and their rank is also different.
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Delays as an uncertainty cluster have the highest economic and environmental 
mean scores, but also have the highest standard deviations in the two cases. This 
means that even if this uncertainty cluster has a high mean, there is more dispersion 
within its 34 responses. Therefore, there are a number of respondents who perceive 
delays representing lower economic and environmental risk for their transport 
operations than the average response. On the other hand, demand and information 
issues as an uncertainty cluster has lower economic and environmental mean risk 
scores and higher standard deviation than insufficient supply chain integration, 
delivery constraints and cost.
N
Econom ic risk
Environmental
risk
Uncertainty source Mean
Standard
Deviation Mean
Standard
Deviation
Delays 34 18.4 10.2 16.3 10
Variable demand and/or 
inaccurate forecast 28 15.4 8.8 12.6 8.1
Insufficient SC integration and 
coordination 25 16.6 7.4 16.1 7.3
Delivery constraints 22 16.3 9 16.1 9.1
Cost 18 17.1 8.8 13.8 7.7
Complexity 17 14.6 8 13.4 7.3
Lack of communication 15 14.4 8.1 12.6 7.3
Legislation 13 15.7 7.8 13.9 7
Inventory management issues 10 11 4.8 6.3 3
Global-sourcing 9 11.4 4.7 11.7 4.9
Technology 6 16.3 5.4 14.8 5.1
Returns 5 17.6 5.2 18.4 5.4
Rigid infrastructure 5 11.8 4.5 9.5 3.5
Lack of logistics vision 3 10.5 3.2 16.3 5
Inter-modal operations 3 8.3 2.3 10 2.5
Table 6.3 Mean and standard deviation of the economic and environmental risk 
scores
In terms of environmental sustainability, the risk scores are lower than the economic 
risk measures. Apart from that, there are other significant differences between the 
economic and environmental mean risk scores. Variable demand and/or inaccurate 
forecast as an uncertainty cluster have a lower mean and a higher standard 
deviation than delivery constraints, cost and complexity. Another relevant trend in the
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environmental mean risk score is that technology and returns have substantially high 
means and low standard deviations. However, these two uncertainty clusters have 
only 5 and 6 responses respectively. Moreover, global sourcing, rigid infrastructure 
and inter-modal operations have the lowest economic and environmental mean risk 
scores and the lowest standard deviations. These three uncertainty clusters do not 
seem to represent a considerable challenge for the vast majority of the sample.
6.5 Analysis of the findings based on the supply chain role of the survey 
participants
In this section of the chapter, a comparison of the findings will be undertaken based 
on the three supply chain roles, shipper, carrier and customer, which took part in 
both the focus groups and survey. In this section, the survey results of the supply 
chain roles will be used to evaluate the risk scores for each of the top four 
uncertainty clusters, while using the focus group findings to provide more depth of 
understanding to aid the analysis. Frequencies are ranked as high, medium and low, 
where ranks 4 and 5 are high, rank 3 medium and ranks 1 and 2 are low. As such, 
the risk analysis is more qualitative in nature.
6.5.1 Delays
Table 6.4 depicts the risk assessment for delays for the three supply chain roles. A 
high proportion of responses from the three supply chain roles perceive delays as a 
very frequent uncertainty cluster. When analysing the impact of delays, there are 
more differences between supply chain roles. In shippers and carriers, about 70 and 
80% of the responses perceive delays as having a high economic impact, whereas 
50% of customers think that delays have a highly negative effect on cost. On the 
other hand, the environmental risk assessment shows that a third of carriers 
perceive delays as having a high environmental impact, and the remainder think that 
this uncertainty cluster has either a medium or low environmental impact. These 
results show a lower proportion of carriers perceiving delays as having a high 
environmental rather than economic impact, a third of responses compared with a 
75% of responses in the case of economic impact.
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Frequency
Low Medium High
High
Carrier -  
7%
Shipper -  75% 
Carrier -  79% 
Customer -  50%
Economic
Impact Medium
Shipper-
6%
Shipper -  19% 
Carrier -  14% 
Customer -  50%
Low
Carrier -  
7%
Carrier -  7%
High
Shipper -  69% 
Carrier -  36% 
Customer -  50%
Environmental
Impact
Medium
Carrier -  
7%
Carrier -  29% 
Customer -  50%
Low
Shipper -  
6% 
Carrier -
7%
Shipper -  25% 
Carrier -  21%
Table 6.4 Economic and environmental impact and frequency of delays based on 
supply chain role
In the previous chapter, loading and unloading delays, unplanned road congestion 
and supplier delays were presented as the main causes of delays found in the focus 
groups. A similar trend is observed when analysing the causes of delays at the three 
supply chain roles. According to the three supply chain roles, road congestion is the 
main cause of delays. Also, participants from shippers and carriers perceive loading 
and unloading delays as a considerable cause of delays in the delivery process. 
However, customers only perceive loading delays as a major cause of delays.
\
6.5.2 Variable demand and/or inaccurate forecast
A greater number of respondents think that variable demand and/or inaccurate 
forecast have a high economic impact than the number of respondents perceiving 
this uncertainty cluster as having a high environmental effect on transport operations 
in the three supply chain roles assessed in Table 6.5. The differences are greater in 
the case of carriers, where 77% of respondents perceive this uncertainty cluster to 
have a high economic impact, whereas 46% of respondents think that this 
uncertainty cluster generates a highly negative impact on the environment. On the
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other hand, in the case of frequency, the three supply chain roles assessed have at 
least 80% of respondents who perceive that this uncertainty cluster occurs very 
frequently.
Frequency
Low Medium High
High
Carrier -  
8%  
Customer -  
20%
Shipper -  40%  
Carrier -  69%  
Customer -  80%
Economic
Impact Medium
Shipper -  30%  
Carrier -  15%
Low
Shipper -  
10%
Shipper -  20%  
Carrier -  8%
High
Shipper -  30%  
Carrier -  46%  
Customer -  40%
Environmental
Impact
Medium
Carrier -  
8%  
Customer -  
20%
Shipper -  20%  
Carrier -  8%  
Customer -  20%
Low
Shipper -  
10%
Shipper -  40%  
Carrier -  38%  
Custom er- 2 0 %
Table 6.5 Economic and environmental impact and frequency of delays based on 
supply chain role
According to the focus group findings, shippers and carriers think that this cluster is 
caused by insufficient demand forecast accuracy and volatility of customer demand, 
whereas customers believe that this uncertainty cluster is originated by the volatility 
of end customer demand only. This was expected, since shippers and carriers are
i
able to see the consequences of inaccurate demand forecast from customers, 
whereas, customers are only able to see the volatility in market demand'.
6.5.3 Delivery Constraints
According to the survey results, an equally large proportion of respondents perceive 
delivery constraints as having a high economic and environmental impact on the 
performance of transport operations. In the case of shippers and carriers, as Table
6.6 shows, between 60 and 75% of respondents think that this uncertainty cluster
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can have a very considerable economic and environmental effect on their distribution 
networks.
Frequency
Low M edium High
High
Carrier -  
10%
Carrier -  
20%
Shipper -  75%  
Carrier -  30%  
Customer -  100%
Economic
Impact Medium
Shipper -  25%  
Carrier -  20%
Low Carrier -  20%
High
Carrier -  
10%
Carrier -  
20%
Shipper -  67%  
Carrier -  50%  
Customer -1 0 0 %
Environm ental
Impact Medium
Shipper -  25%  
Carrier -  10%
Low Shipper -  8%  Carrier -  10%
Table 6.6 Economic and environmental impact and frequency of delays based on 
supply chain role
According to focus group participants from these two supply chain roles, delivery 
constraints are a consequence of tight delivery windows and limited storage 
capacity, but shippers also believe that this uncertainty cluster is generated by 
delivery curfews at unloading bays at their customer facilities. Only one survey 
respondent from a customer selected this uncertainty cluster as one of the four main 
uncertainty clusters. This is a trend that was also observed in the focus groups, and 
the reason for that could be that customers do not perceive delivery constraints as a 
major problem, since they do not have the opportunity to see the knock-on of this 
uncertainty cluster.
6.5.4 Insufficient supply chain integration and coordination
As Table 6.7 depicts, a very substantial proportion of the survey respondents from 
shippers and carriers perceive insufficient supply chain integration as having a 
considerably high economic impact and at the same time a similarly high
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environmental effect. Particularly, in the case of shippers, 90% of respondents stated 
that this uncertainty cluster has a high economic impact and 100% of respondents 
said that this has a high environmental effect. On the other hand, in the case of 
carriers, about 91% of respondents score this uncertainty cluster as having high 
economic impact and 73% of them say that it has a high environmental impact. 
Another relevant trend that can be seen in Table 6.7 is that across the three supply 
chain roles, a very high proportion of respondents perceive insufficient supply chain 
integration occurring very frequently, 100% of respondents in the case of shippers 
and customers and 73% of respondents in the case of carriers.
Frequency
Low M edium High
High
Carrier -  
18%
Carrier -  
9%
Shipper -  90%  
Carrier -  64%  
Customer -  50%
Economic
impact
Medium
Shipper -  10%  
Carrier -  9%  
Customer -  50%
Low
High
Carrier -  
9%
Shipper -1 0 0 %  
Carrier -  64%  
Customer -1 0 0 %
Environmental
Impact
Medium
Carrier -  
9%
Low
Carrier -  
9% Carrier -  9%
Table 6.7 Economic and environmental impact and frequency of delays based on 
supply chain role
Regarding the causes of insufficient supply chain integration found in the focus 
groups, carriers and shippers perceive that this uncertainty cluster is caused by 
disconnections between the sales department and logistics section within their 
companies. This is because contracts are usually arranged and signed between the 
sales department and the customer without considering the logistics consequences 
of them. Also, carriers perceived that their customers expect them to be prepared to 
cope with a high degree of volume demand.
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6.6 Analysis of the findings based on the sectors of the survey participants
As noted earlier, in this section, an analysis similar to the one undertaken in the 
previous section will be conducted, but this analysis will be undertaken at a sectoral 
level.
6.6.1 Delays
Table 6.8 shows the risk assessment for delays for the three sectors. Generally, 
delays occur daily or weekly and have a high economic impact. According to the 
survey participants, delays seem to have a higher economic than environmental 
impact on transport operations in the grocery and retail sectors. However, the only 
exception to this is the road freight sector, where delays are perceived as having an 
equally high economic and environmental impact. This can be explained by the fact 
that delayed vehicles missed the load allocated to them, initiating the need for extra 
trips, thereby increasing the total transport cost and CO2 emissions. A|so, delays 
occur very frequently in the grocery, retail and road freight sectors.
Frequency
Low M edium High
High
Grocery- 66%  
Retail- 71%  
Road freight - 69%
Econom ic
Impact Medium
Road freight - 
8%
G rocery-17%  
Retail- 29%  
Road freight - 15%
Low Road freight - 8% G rocery-17 %
High
v_
Grocery- 50%  
Retail- 57%  
Road freight - 69%
Environmental
Im pact
Medium
Grocery- 33%  
Retail- 43%
Low Road freight - 16%
G rocery-17%  
Road freight -1 5 %
Table 6.8 Economic and environmental impact and frequency of delays
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In the focus groups presented in the previous chapter, participants from these 
sectors provided the root causes of delays. Overall, participants from these three 
sectors consider road congestion to be the main cause of delays. However, they also 
see failures on the supplier side and disruptions in the loading and unloading 
processes as significant causes of delays. If a vehicle is held at loading and/or 
unloading points, this has a knock-on effect on the next delivery scheduled for that 
vehicle and can instigate the need for an extra trip.
6.6.2 Variable demand and/or inaccurate forecast
According to the survey participants, variable demand and/or inaccurate forecast 
have a higher economic than environmental effect on transport operations in the 
grocery, retail and road freight sectors (Table 6.9). This can be explained by the fact 
that product demand uncertainty can affect volume demand in grocery and retail, but 
through the application of transport consolidation this problem can be mitigated. 
Since, there is a high degree of variability in these two sectors, the movements of 
vehicles in the road freight sector are not affected by this. Also, demand uncertainty 
affects the inventory holding cost more than the transport cost. Moreover, variable 
demand and/or inaccurate forecast happen very frequently in all these three sectors. 
Most companies have continuous replenishment or Just-in-Time delivery as a supply 
chain strategy, while retailers offer very frequent promotions to the end consumers.
The root causes of variable demand and/or inaccurate forecast in transport 
operations are derived from the focus groups presented in the previous chapter. In 
the grbcery and road freight transport sectors, the factors influencing this uncertainty 
cluster more are daily volume changes to the customer requirements, because 
product promotions by the retailer are not properly communicated to the carrier and 
the grocery manufacturer. In addition, participants from these two sectors perceive 
demand forecast inaccuracy as one of the main causes of this uncertainty cluster. 
Furthermore, in the retail sector, this uncertainty cluster occurs since communication 
between the retailer and their partners is not usually the best.
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Frequency
Low M edium High
High
Grocery- 20%  
R eta il-14%
Grocery- 40%  
Retail- 44%  
Road freight - 56%
Economic
Impact
Medium
Grocery- 20%  
Retail- 28%  
Road freight - 22%
Low Grocery- 20% R eta il-14%  Road freight- 22%
High R e ta il-14%
Grocery- 40%  
Retail- 58%  
Road fre igh t-11 %
Environmental
Impact
Medium Grocery- 40%
R eta il-14%  
Road freight- 22%
Low
Grocery- 20%  
R eta il-14%  
Road freight- 67%
Table 6.9 Economic and environmental impact and frequency of demand and 
information issues
6.6.3 Delivery Constraints
Table 6.10 shows in more detail a risk assessment of delivery constraints for the 
three sectors studied. In the three sectors studied, delivery constraints occur daily or 
weekly and have a high economic impact. According to the survey participants, 
delivery constraints have an equally high economic and environmental effect on 
transport operations in these three sectors. Due to delays at unloading bays at
i
stores in these three sectors, vehicles cannot achieve their scheduled backloads, so 
extra trips are needed in consequence of this issue. This has a direct effect on cost 
and CO2 emissions.
Next, the root causes of delivery constraints are briefly explained. In the grocery and 
road freight transport sectors, the factors impacting more on this uncertainty cluster 
are delivery curfews at stores located in urban areas and limited storage capacity 
within secondary distribution channels. This instigates the need for increasingly 
tighter delivery windows that ultimately have a negative effect on subsequent
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scheduled trips. Furthermore, according to the focus group participants, the retailers 
impose delivery windows on their partners, but they do not have the opportunity to 
see the knock-on effect that delivery windows have on the overall performance of the 
logistics triad.
Frequency
Low M edium High
High Grocery- 25%
Grocery- 50%  
Retail- 50%  
Road freight- 88%
Econom ic
Impact Medium
Grocery- 25%  
Retail- 50%  
Road fre ight-12%
Low Grocery- 25%
High Grocery- 25% Grocery- 50%  Retail- 50%  
Road fre ight-100%
Environm ental
Im pact Medium Grocery- 25%  Retail- 25%
Low Retail- 25%
Table 6.10 Economic and environmental impact and frequency of delivery 
constraints
6.6.4 Insufficient supply chain integration and coordination
As can be seen in Table 6.11, most of the survey participants from the road freight 
sector perceive insufficient supply chain integration and coordination as having an 
equally very high economic and environmental effect on their transport operations. 
The grocery sector presents a different trend in the retail sector, with 87% of the 
respondents perceiving insufficient supply chain integration to have a high 
environmental impact, whereas 71% think that this uncertainty issue has a high 
economic impact. On the other hand, in the retail sector, 50% of respondents think 
that insufficient supply chain integration has a high economic but low environmental
impact on transport (Table 6.10). One explanation to this may be that there is little
/
impact on retailers as consumers have alternative products that they can purchase
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and some buffer stock is held at distribution centres to cope with uncertainty. An 
alternative consideration is the alleged pressure put on suppliers to make deliveries 
(Blythman, 2004), resulting in a low level of delivery failures even when there are 
integration issues.
Frequency
Low M edium High
High Retail- 50% Road freight- 
11%
Grocery- 71%  
Retail- 50%  
Road freight- 67%
Econom ic
Im pact
Medium Road freight- 11%
Grocery- 29%  
Road freight-11%
Low
High Road freight- 11%
Grocery- 87%  
Retail- 50%  
Road freight- 67%
Environm ental
Im pact
Medium Road freight- 11%
G rocery-13%  
Road freight-11%
Low Retail- 50%
Table 6.11 Economic and environmental impact and frequency of insufficient supply 
chain integration
In the retail and road freight sector, the factors affecting this uncertainty source are
disconnections between the sales and logistics departments within the supplier and
\
the carrier and horizontal network duplication between third party logistics providers. 
At the supplier and the carrier, the sales department agree a very loose contract with 
their customers and the logistics department cannot execute it with the expected 
level of efficiency. Also, horizontal network duplication between third party logistics 
providers can affect the level of supply chain integration in the retail sector, since 
carriers do not usually interact from the planning process. Thus, if they have a 
sudden increase in volume, they need to subcontract an extra trip at the last minute. 
Furthermore, in the grocery sector, supply chain integration does not seem to be 
foremost on the priority list of the focus group participants.
128
6.7 Tools Applied to Mitigate Logistics Uncertainty
According to the survey findings, a high proportion of respondents applied analysis 
and design tools that can support their companies to mitigate the effect of the four 
main uncertainty clusters found. Table 6.12 shows the link between the four main 
uncertainty clusters found in the focus groups and confirmed in the survey and the 
mitigation tools applied by companies that responded to the survey. In the four main 
uncertainty clusters, companies apply tools that help them to mitigate the effect of 
logistics uncertainty. In addition, the mitigation tools that they apply are directly 
linked with the problems they face at strategic and operational level.
Uncertainty
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H igh Environm ental 
Im pact High Frequency
Delays X X X 64% 66% 83%
Variable
demand
and/or X 90% 90% 50%
inaccurate
forecast
Delivery X X X 100% 100% 88%constraints
Insufficient
supply chain X X 80% 80% 80%
integration
Table 6.12 Tools applied to mitigate logistics uncertainty
129
In the case of delays, about 65% of the respondents who perceived this uncertainty 
cluster as having high economic and environmental effects and about 83% of 
respondents who think that this uncertainty is very frequent, stated that their 
companies applied strategic optimisation; for example, distribution network design 
software such as Cast and operational optimisation tools such as routeing software 
like Paragon. Furthermore, 100% of respondents who perceive delivery constraints 
as having a high impact on cost and economic performance said that they also 
applied strategic and operational optimisation tools. The main objective of strategic 
optimisation tools is to embed uncertainty into the strategic processes e.g. 
distribution network design and redesign. A large proportion of that uncertainty is 
related to achieving journey time reliability in the delivery process, including all the 
existent constraints in the distribution network. Moreover, operational optimisation 
such as Paragon helps transport operations to optimise the transport movements 
within their distribution networks. Additionally, according to the survey findings, 
delays and delivery constraints are monitored and controlled by applying quality 
management tools such as TQM and Lean Thinking principles.
Another important trend emerging from the responses of survey participants is that a 
substantial proportion of the respondents who perceive that demand and information 
issue have a very considerable effect on economic and environmental performance 
of their distribution networks, stated that their companies used demand forecasting 
tools to achieve a better accuracy of the volumes that their customers need to move. 
Also, 80% of respondents who feel that insufficient supply chain integration has a 
high economic and environmental impact also said that their companies applied 
demand forecasting tools to support the information flow within the logistics triad.
6.8 Reflections on the survey
From the planning process up to the follow-up stage, there were a number of actions 
taken to increase the response rate of the questionnaire as well as mitigating the low 
response rate obtained in the end. The main strategy used to mitigate the low 
response rate obtained was to triangulate the survey data with the focus group 
findings. In that way, the 56 questionnaire responses could be compare with the 
clusters of uncertainty given by 58 focus group participants and also more depth was
130
added to the survey data. Furthermore, due to the initial very low response rate, the 
CILT was involved after four weeks that the questionnaire went lived in the internet. 
That increases the responses from 12 to 56 responses. However, if other strategies 
that were applied from the beginning of the planning stage, an even higher response 
rate could have been achieved.
Throughout the planning and execution stages of the survey a number of decisions 
were taken which seems to be appropriate to stimulate a fairly high response rate at 
the time they were applied. However, if the research had the opportunity to repeat 
the exercise, the following strategies to augment the response rate could be taken:
• Changing the database for identifying and selecting potential survey 
participants: FAME proved to be ineffective in terms of building the invitees’ 
list, when FAME is used as a database, the employees/managers that receive 
the invitation are not the managers responsible for running the logistics 
operation of the target companies. Reflecting on this, it would be a better 
approach to use initially FAME as means of identifying the companies to be 
surveyed, but after having all the companies identifies, sending the invitations 
through the CILT. If this is done from the planning stage the CILT would 
presumably be more in the position of sending more invitations than 25% of 
the companies from the sectors that responded to the first invitation email. 
Two rounds of email could be sent, the first one with the initial invitation to 
contribute to the survey and the second one as a follow-up email to further 
increase the response rate. However, there could be sectors which 
traditionally have a higher number of practitioners registered in the CILT and 
others with very low levels of representation. Hence, the response rate in 
some sectors could still be low. Furthermore, the visibility of the 
characteristics of respondents could be affected by restrictions related to data 
protection laws.
• Involving trade/industry associations throughout all target sectors during the 
follow-up process: Trade/industry-specific association, e.g. the road haulage 
association, British retail consortium, a number of associations of 
manufacturers in the food industry, construction industry association and a 
number of associations of automotive component manufacturer and vehicle
131
assemblers, could be involved to increase the response rate after three weeks 
of the CILT the follow-up email is sent. Nevertheless, the willingness of 
warranting access to their list of members or sending an invitation email to 
their members can be uncertain and highly unpredictable. Also, due to 
confidentiality and ethical restrictions enforced by data protection laws, the 
visibility in terms of the sample characteristics and the process of sending 
follow-up emails in each of these associations could be rather restricted to the 
researcher. Furthermore, by applying this strategy the research could run the 
risk of having overrepresentation from some organisations included in the 
survey.
• Building a database for the survey with either existent lists of logistics 
practitioners used in the Green Logistics project and logistics practitioners 
identified in the internet. The main drawback of this strategy is that it relies on 
purposive sampling for the selection of invitees.
• Giving the survey invitees the option responding to the questionnaire invitation 
either by email filling the questionnaire online or by post answering the 
questionnaire in a Word file: there could be participants who either do not 
have access to the internet in their offices or do not have the sufficient IT 
ability to complete the questionnaire online. Hence, it would be appropriate to 
give the participants the option of completing the questionnaire electronically 
by using Word.com and send a hard copy of their completed questionnaires 
by post using a pre-paid envelop. This could cause confusion among most of 
the invitees regarding what exactly they require to do. Moreover, this strategy
 ^could potentially increase the costs of the survey significantly.
• Giving the fact that surveys are increasingly having low response rate in 
supply chain management and logistics, due perhaps to the fact that 
practitioners are strongly encouraged by their human resources departments 
not to respond to questionnaires because of productivity issues, it would be 
appropriate to consider an alternative method to confirm the findings from the 
focus groups. As in the study undertaken by Manuj and Mentzer (2008), a 
series of individual interviews could be undertaken to verify the focus group 
findings.
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As discussed in the ‘method’ section, a number of strategies were applied in the 
planning and execution of survey to reduce and mitigate the sources of common 
method bias. The fact that the clusters used in the survey were derived by a wider 
sample, including trade associations and policy makers, in the focus groups ensure 
that the survey findings were appropriately triangulated with the focus group data. 
Furthermore, the participation of the eight practitioners in the pilot ensures neutrality 
in the questionnaire questions, items and scales. Moreover, the anonymity of the 
respondents was protected at all times during the survey. However, there are still a 
number of strategies that could have been applied to reduce common method bias 
further. These strategies are:
• The questionnaire could have been completed by the respondent’s company 
and other logistics practitioners in their company’s partners. A question asking 
respondents to forward the questionnaire to their partners could be posed in 
the end of the questionnaire. Hence, multiple responses from a number of 
supply chains could be triangulated. However, this could inhibit the initial 
respondents to participate in the first place. Moreover, this strategy can bring 
some limitations due to the application of snowballing sampling (Saunders et 
al., 2007). The calculation of the response rate is much more difficult. Also, 
the initial invitees are identified randomly, but they purposely pass on the 
questionnaire to practitioners who are interested in the survey.
• The questionnaire could have been completed by other logistics practitioners 
of the same companies responding to the survey. In this way, the potential 
subjectivity of one single person assessing the road freight transport operation
{of a company could have been reduced. However, the initial respondents 
could be inhibited to participate as well. Furthermore, this approach brings 
similar drawbacks due to the application of snowballing sampling.
• The survey respondents could be asked to initially complete the questionnaire 
and after two month being invited to revise their answers. Therefore, the 
responses at two separate given times could be compared and triangulated. 
Even though this strategy could reduce the common method bias, the 
response rate in the second round could be considerably lower than the one 
in the first round.
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6.9 Concluding remarks
The four main uncertainty clusters identified in the focus groups, delays, variable 
demand and/or inaccurate forecast, delivery constraints and insufficient supply chain 
integration and coordination, have been confirmed in the survey. From the focus 
group findings, the general consensus was that companies concentrate on mitigating 
and accommodating to external uncertainties and improving their internal operations. 
This has a negative impact on the efficiency of transport operations. According to the 
survey findings, delays, variable demand and/or inaccurate forecast, delivery 
constraints and insufficient supply chain integration and coordination are confirmed 
as the uncertainty clusters that represent a greater challenge for transport operations 
within the three supply chain roles and three sectors that took part in the survey and 
focus groups.
In addition, these top four uncertainty clusters represent a high degree of risk for the 
economic performance of transport operations. However, with the exception of the 
road freight transport industry, respondents from the other two sectors perceive 
delays and variable demand and/or inaccurate forecast as having a lower 
environmental than economic impact on transport operations. This is also the case 
when the analysis is undertaken based on the supply chain role of respondents. This 
may be because managers within the three supply chain roles and three sectors do 
not have the same level of awareness of the environmental consequence of 
uncertainty as of the economic repercussions of uncertainty. Increases in transport 
cost cpn affect the environmental performance of transport operations only if the rise 
in cost is generated by an increase in fuel consumption due to unnecessary miles 
run caused by logistics uncertainty. In other cases, logistics uncertainty can generate 
time delays without increasing the miles run and the fuel consumption of vehicles. At 
an aggregated level, the three supply chain roles and sectors that participated in the 
focus groups perceived road congestion as the principal cause of delays. Time 
delays increases the labour cost of transport operations but not the CO2 emissions.
The chapter has also highlighted the causes of the four uncertainty clusters at
i
sectoral and supply chain role levels. From the sectoral analysis, in the grocery, 
retail and road freight transport sectors, unplanned road congestion represents the
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largest individual issue leading to uncertainty. This uncertainty cause is also the 
major issue for shippers, carriers and customers. While congestion due to road 
works and peak traffic flows can be incorporated into transport planning, unplanned 
congestion (for example, due to an accident) leads to greater disruption. The 
challenge for transport providers is to mitigate the impact of this unplanned 
congestion without impacting significantly on the efficiency of their operations. Also, 
the analyses based on sectors and supply chain role, disconnection between the 
sales and logistics departments has a considerable impact on the logistics triad 
integration, and as a result, on the sustainability of transport operations within the 
supply chain.
In addition, regarding mitigation tools applied by UK companies to lessen the effect 
of delays and delivery constraints, companies that seem to be more affected by 
these two uncertainty clusters applied strategic optimisation tools when designing 
the network, operational optimisation tools at the setting stage of the transport plan 
and quality management tools to monitor the execution of the transport plan. 
Moreover, respondents stated that demand forecasting tools are applied to lessen 
the effect of variable demand and/or inaccurate forecast, and at the same time, to 
achieve better supply chain integration within the logistics triad.
In this chapter, the conceptual model developed in Chapter 4 and refined in chapter 
5 has been confirmed based only on participants’ perceptions. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, methodological triangulation has been applied to achieve this objective. 
The results from the focus groups increase the depth of the findings, whereas the 
survey validates and confirms the focus group findings. This further strengthens the 
understanding of the main uncertainty clusters within supply chains in the UK. The 
internal root causes of uncertainty can be mitigated while external issues have to be 
accommodated; therefore, mitigation approaches for reducing external and internal 
supply chain uncertainty in transport operations need to be identified through the 
research. This will be explored in the three case study chapters.
In the next three chapters, the findings are verified through the investigation of real- 
world situations, measuring the marginal impact, in economic and environmental
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terms, of logistics disruptions from the loading process at shipper facilities up to the 
unloading process at distribution centres and stores.
6.10 Contribution 
To methodology in logistics research
This chapter shows how the findings from focus groups and a survey can be 
triangulated. It demonstrates that these two research methods complement each 
other. Also, it has used a novel risk assessment tool to evaluate uncertainty clusters 
within three different sectors and three supply chain roles. This assessment tool can 
be used in other sectors and also in other types of transport operations, e.g. inter- 
modal transport operations.
To the PhD
The findings obtained in this chapter confirmed the results of the focus groups. The 
first two research objectives of the PhD have been achieved. In addition, two 
analyses were undertaken in this chapter at a sectoral and a supply chain role level; 
the findings from this chapter complement the focus group findings. Furthermore, 
this chapter links the uncertainty clusters found with the mitigation tools companies 
used to respond to uncertainty. Thus, the third objective of the PhD has been partly 
achieved. Moreover, this chapter also guides the selection of the sectors for the case 
studies.
To th^ topic
This chapter has established an explicit link between uncertainty and the economic 
and environmental performance of transport operation. This link was not previously 
clarified in the literature. However, due to the fact, that the findings are based on the 
opinion of practitioners, they need to be explained and validated at the micro level.
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7.0 Diagnosis of 'extra distance’ in a UK FMGC primary distribution network
7.1 Introduction
So far, the research has focused upon gathering evidence of the causes of 
uncertainty that impact on transport operations by applying opinion-based research 
methods. In this chapter, a case study undertaken to link uncertainty with road freight 
transport performance will be presented. In logistics research, there has been a 
focus on measuring the absolute and/or average performance of road transport 
operations (Fowkes et al, 2004; McKinnon and Ge, 2004). There is scope for 
extending the above research further by quantifying the consequences of these 
uncertainty causes within transport operations. Sector level surveys in the UK do 
highlight the frequency of occurrence of different events and their impact in terms of 
time (for example, Department for Transport, 2007). However, this may not translate 
into a financial cost if there is flexibility in the delivery network to absorb the delays. 
There is a need to understand more fully the marginal distance, ‘extra distance’, that 
occurs due to uncertainty, as this will have a direct financial and environmental cost.
One aspect of performance measurement that appears to be under-researched is 
the impact of unexpected events upon transport performance. In effect, the marginal 
impact of supply chain uncertainty on freight transport performance at an operational 
level has not yet been explored. There is evidence of performance measures 
detailing the number of incidents that occur, and also macro-level measures of 
planned versus actual distance travelled (Department for Transport, 2007). However, 
there 'have been no studies that have assessed the impact of supply chain 
disturbances and disruptions in terms of the extra movements required within the 
transport network. Starting with the assumption that any unnecessary distance run 
creates a proportional additional cost and output of carbon dioxide, the fourth 
objective of this thesis is to:
Introduce the concept of ‘extra distance’ as a means of assessing the marginal 
impact that deviations from the transport plan have on the economic and 
environmental performance of road freight transport operations.
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In addition, there is a need to evaluate the economic and environmental impact and 
frequency that these causes have on road freight transport operations. In order to 
achieve this, an ‘extra distance’ measure has been developed in this chapter to link 
the uncertainty causes found in the case study with freight transport performance. 
Therefore, the fifth objective of this PhD is to:
Evaluate these uncertainty causes in terms of their impact on the environmental and 
economic performance of road freight transport operation and identify potential 
mitigation tools and/or approaches to minimise their effect
The chapter proceeds by explaining the method applied to undertake the research. 
Subsequently, the initial definition of ‘extra distance’ is presented and linked back to 
the literature. After that, the findings are outlined. Also, the existent connections 
between uncertainty and risk and ‘extra distance’ are explicitly drawn. Finally, we 
conclude the chapter by highlighting the managerial implications and limitations of 
the research and stating the contribution to knowledge of the chapter.
7.2 Case study context
In this case study, the ‘extra distance’ measure has been applied to the primary 
distribution network of a UK FMCG supply chain, shown schematically in Figure 7.1. 
Products are moved within a distribution network that consists of a number of 
distribution centres located throughout the UK. The primary distribution network runs 
transport movements from suppliers to distribution centres. During the data 
collection, the author was based in the central planning office of this primary 
distribution network.
In terms of transport planning, the planners receive an estimate of the volumes to be 
moved early in the evening the day before the transport plan is executed. The 
transport planners generate a rough estimate of the resources required for the next 
day. The deliveries for the most remote suppliers are scheduled late in the evening 
on the day that the rough transport plan is generated. The following day, suppliers 
send a confirmation of their volume requirements by mid morning. If there are any
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changes after that, extra trips may be added to the transport plan or ‘extra distance’ 
added to existent trips.
Primary Distribution Secondary'Distribution
Logistics
Provider
Logistics
Provider
CustomerDCSupplier
— V -------
Focus in this
Physical flows
chapter
 ^  Information flows
Figure 7.1 Logistics provider position within UK FMCG primary distribution network
There are a number of reasons why this particular case was chosen:
• The ‘extra distance’ measure was perceived to be important, but before 
undertaking the case study, there were no previous attempts to measure 
‘extra distance’ within this primary distribution network. Also, the operation 
needs to link uncertainty to transport performance, which was the same 
objective of this PhD
• The FMCG sector in the UK is very vulnerable to uncertainty, so it represents 
a good starting point in the case study stage of the PhD
i
• The communication from customers and suppliers to logistics providers in 
primary distribution operations tends to be complex, so there was a particular 
interest in exploring such an operation.
7.3 Method
In order to undertake the ‘extra distance’ assessment in this logistics provider, the
principles of the case study method recommended by Yin (2003) have been applied,
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since the tool needed to be tested in a business setting. The unit of analysis for this 
assessment is a FMCG retail primary distribution operation.
Due to the lack of research into the marginal impact of transport uncertainty, an 
inductive research approach has been adopted. The reason for this is that before 
undertaking the first case study, the boundaries of the transport-focussed uncertainty 
model needed to be redefined, since it was necessary to develop an appropriate and 
clear measure in order to clarify the impact uncertainty has on the economic and 
environmental performance of transport operations, and such a measure was not 
available in the literature. At the beginning of this case study, the objective was to 
make a direct link between miles run, output of carbon dioxide (environmental 
performance) and cost, and from this, the concept of ‘extra distance’ was developed 
in a brainstorming session that involved the case study company champion. 
Consideration was then given as to the different ways in which additional transport 
may be required in response to the clusters of uncertainty identified and verified in 
the conceptual and opinion-based stages of the research.
According to the findings from the focus groups and survey, the main clusters of 
uncertainty that affect transport operations are: delays, variable demand and/or 
inaccurate forecast, delivery restriction, and insufficient supply chain coordination 
and integration. However, these needed to be linked with the performance of 
transport operations in terms of unnecessary deviations from the transport plan. In 
the brainstorming exercise, five types of ‘extra distance’ were identified. Following 
that, the concept of ‘extra distance’ as a measure was presented in a discussion 
panel to transport planners and logistics managers from the primary distribution 
section of the first case study company. They gave feedback about whether or not 
each of the initial five ‘extra distance’ types occur in the primary distribution network 
studied and the potential causes were also verified in the discussion panel. This 
discussion panel with the practitioners in charge of the operation was run before data 
collection began, primarily for two reasons. Firstly, the feedback from the 
practitioners was required to evaluate the validity of the measure. Secondly, the data 
collection approach to gathering data on ‘extra distance’ needed to be defined.
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In the discussion panel, it was agreed that the author of this thesis would observe 
the execution of the transport plan from 30th June until 6th July 2008. Archival data on 
the causes of ‘extra distance’ was not available as the transport planners did not 
record the causes of changes to the transport plan. Also, a confidentiality agreement 
was developed and signed before commencing the case study, so the results shown 
in this chapter include information that retains the case study company’s 
confidentiality. Generic terms will be used throughout the chapter and exact locations 
are not mentioned either. In addition, in order to avoid disclosing sensitive 
commercial information, only percentages are used in the analysis.
Data was collected on the nature of unexpected events and their impact on the total 
number of miles run in the network. This information was obtained through 
observation of the ‘live’ transport planning process. When a supply chain disruption 
or disturbance occurred, four transport planners informed the researcher and the 
researcher and they decided whether or not that incident generated ‘extra distance’. 
The main principle was that any inefficiency generated during the execution of the 
transport plan was ‘extra distance’. However, in terms of increases in the volume to 
be moved, only short-notice volume changes that caused the planner to sub- 
optimally execute the transport movement were classified as causing ‘extra 
distance’. For the purposes of this analysis, only changes in volume to be moved 
that were notified or detected after the mid morning cut-off time were classified as 
eligible for consideration as causing ‘extra distance’, even though in certain 
situations, if volumes had been notified earlier, the loads could have been moved 
more efficiently and with less distance run. After that, the extra kilometres generated 
by each of the incidents identified were estimated by using the route planning 
software package called AutoRoute. This software package calculates kilometres 
with a similar accuracy to Google.com and Paragon. As Table 7.1 shows, before 
starting the data collection, the accuracy of AutoRoute was verified by comparing the 
measure of distance of a number of routes in the UK. Subsequently, the visible 
causes of each of the ‘extra distance’ incidents were also identified. Apart from the 
researcher and the four transport planners, a number of managers from the primary 
distribution operation were constantly validating the data collected and confirming 
that the interpretations of the researcher and planners reflected the reality of the 
operation.
Kilom etres
Origin Destination R ound trip? Paragon Google A utoRoute
North London London Central Round trip 72.5 72.8 72.6
North London South East Midlands Round trip 252.8 246.3 250.4
North W est 
London
North East 
London One way 115.9 117.2 115.1
South East 
England
North W est 
London Round trip 276.9 276.9 277.9
North England South East England One way 561.9 561.9 562.2
Table 7.1 Cross-checking the accuracy of AutoRoute
The week when the data was to be collected was selected by using kilometre data 
over a twelve month period available for the case study. This week was selected 
due to the fact that it was considered by the company staff as a typical or average 
period that fairly represents what happens over a 12-month period. Thus, typical 
case sampling was applied as purposive sampling strategy (Saunders et al, 2007), 
since the objective was to assess the causes of ‘extra distance’ in a week that was 
representative of what happens over a twelve month period. Furthermore, during the 
data collection, the main objective was to find incidents with a common attribute, 
namely, that the incidents collected should generate ‘extra distance’. In this way, it 
was not necessary to monitor every single trip run in the network to measure the 
effect of route diversion due to unplanned road congestion, in terms of ‘extra 
distance’. Moreover, that was not possible, due to the fact that Telematics data on 
planned and actual kilometres was not available to the researcher during the week 
when the data was collected. However, the company stakeholders felt that an 
element of expected road congestion was included within the transport plan.
During the data collection, detailed information about the trips that caused ‘extra 
distance’ was recorded in a data collection pro-forma (see Appendix 3); this 
information includes:
• Incident detail: date, incident number, identified and departure times, planned 
and actual kilometres.
• Consignment details: supplier name, unit load, whether vehicle was own or 
subcontracted, customer location, kilometres run, ‘extra distance’ source, 
visible cause and root cause,
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Subsequently, the results of the data collection were used to estimate the risk that 
each cause of ‘extra distance’, in terms of its probability and impact, represents to 
the operation. Supply chain risk has previously been estimated in a qualitative way 
by investigating the perception of practitioners about the risk that different events 
could have on the whole supply network. Geijron (2009) undertook a case study to 
assess the risk of supply disruptions within the global Ericsson supply chain. Geijron 
(2009) used a matrix for risk evaluation to estimate the probability and the 
consequence of each potential event that can disrupt the supply chain. In topic areas 
like that, accurate quantitative data is not available and the researcher needs to rely 
on practitioners’ perception. However, in other academic fields, when historical data 
has been available, other researchers have undertaken quantitative risk assessment, 
e.g Pratt and Magiera (1972). However, when historical data is available, quantitative 
risk assessment can be undertaken. Operational risk is defined as the risk of loss 
resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people, and systems, or from 
external events (www.riskqlossarv.com). Errors and failures within the supply chain 
can be monitored and recorded, so their probability and impact can be estimated 
based on quantitative data. As stated by Silver (1997), risk is a function of the 
probability that an event occurs and the impact of that event. The risk of each cause 
of ‘extra distance’ has been estimated as a function of one probability of their 
occurrence and their impact.
Due to insufficient live information concerning the route selected by drivers while the 
vehicle is on the road, during the data collection, in this case study, it was not 
possible to estimate the probability and impact of route diversion due to unplanned 
road congestion. This is because, in order to collect data on route diversion, it is 
necessary to monitor every trip that is run within the distribution network. Also, the 
logistics providers were particularly interested in assessing the risk of the causes of 
‘extra distance’ that could possibly be controlled by them and their supply chain 
partners. They perceived unplanned road congestion as an uncontrollable cause of 
‘extra distance’, so it did not represent a high priority for them.
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In addition, the ‘extra distance’ generated by every incident was calculated. It was 
important to record sufficient detail of each incident of ‘extra distance’, because the 
practitioners in charge of the operation could validate the data in a more rigorous 
manner. An Excel spreadsheet was used to undertake an evaluation exercise that 
could link each cause of uncertainty with the ‘extra distance’ generated. Appendix 4 
shows this Excel spreadsheet. From the spreadsheet, the extra distance’ generated 
by each cause of ‘extra distance’ was calculated. For each cause of ‘extra distance’, 
in order to inform future ‘extra distance’ reduction programmes, frequency and 
impact were also calculated.
The data of ‘extra distance’ was collected most of the time when the planners 
received the extra load requirements, before the movements were executed. 
However, when suppliers loaded less than they advised after the trips were run, the 
logistics provider realised that there was unexpected space in the vehicles. The 
logistics provider management team identified two suppliers as the two main culprits 
of this type of ‘extra distance’ and the researcher and planners together re-planned 
the trips for the whole week and calculated the miles of these trips. Subsequently, 
the actual miles were compared with the better optimised miles to quantify ‘extra 
miles’.
The cost of every incident of ‘extra distance’ was calculated by multiplying the cost 
per kilometre by the extra kilometres run. Also, the Kg of CO2 emitted due to every 
incident of ‘extra distance’ was calculated by multiplying the average fuel 
consumption in the network by the extra kilometres per incident of ‘extra distance’ 
and by the road freight transport conversion factor for diesel recommended by Defra 
(2007), 2.63 Kg of CO2 per litre of fuel.
After completing the analysis of the data, a feedback presentation was delivered to 
the management team of the primary distribution operation. In that meeting, all the 
managers involved validated the findings. From their perspective, this presentation 
represented a starting point towards identifying the potential mitigation strategies and 
tactics to reduce ’extra distance’.
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7.4 Initial definition of 'extra distance’
From the initial brainstorming session, the following definition of ‘extra distance’ was 
developed:
Any additional transport movements that are a consequence of 
unforeseen changes in the delivery process e.g. due to congestion and/or 
late changes in customer requirements.
With this definition, it was assumed that the original transport plan produced is an 
optimum given the constraints imposed. From this, five types of ‘extra distance’ were 
identified, in response to uncertain events within the delivery operations. These are 
described in the following sections and summarised in Table 7.2.
Type of 'extra  
distance' D escription
Exam ple o f uncertainty cause  
from  literature
Extra distance due 
to optimal route 
diversion
Extra distance needs to be run to 
minimise the delay to the trip.
Unplanned road congestion 
(Boughton 2003)
Extra trips due to 
delays
Extra trips are required due to the fact 
that the vehicle original assigned to the 
trip could not arrive on time.
Loading delays at shippers or at 
customers (Geary et al 2003)
Unload time uncertainty (Esper and 
Williams 2003)
Extra trips due to 
load more than 
advised
Extra trips are caused because there is 
not enough time to find the most 
economical way to move the extra 
volume.
Demand variability and forecast 
inaccuracy (Mason-Jones and 
Towill 1998)
Extra trips due to 
load less than 
advised
There is unexpected extra space in the 
vehicles, so the transport plan is 
suboptimal and unnecessary trips are 
operated.
Inaccurate demand forecast (Mason- 
Jones and Towill, 1998); Warehouse  
inefficiencies (van der Vorst and 
Beulens 2002)
Extra trips due to 
inapprqpriate 
vehicle size
A  smaller vehicle than planned is 
provided, requiring additional trips to 
deliver all products.
Transport delays due to internal 
reasons e.g. defective vehicle or 
lack of driver (Mason et al., 2003)
Table 7.2 Types of ‘extra distance’ and potential causes 
7.4.1 Extra distance due to optimal route diversion
This type of ‘extra distance’ can occur when there is unplanned road congestion 
along the optimal route initially planned for the trip, so the vehicle needs to be 
diverted. When the driver is infornrted of a traffic jam that will delay the vehicle, a
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decision may be taken to use an alternative route so as to minimise the delay. If that 
occurs, the vehicle runs a greater distance within the trip due to the use of a non- 
optimal route.
7.4.2 Extra trips due to delays
Occasionally delays can occur within the delivery process, such as production and/or 
loading delays at shippers (Esper and Williams, 2003), unloading delays at 
customers (Geary et al, 2003) and unplanned road congestion (Boughton, 2003). 
The consequence of each is that the vehicle will be late for the next load in its 
schedule, so a different vehicle may be needed to operate that movement, either as 
an additional trip, or a diversion of an existing trip. In either case it is likely to be less 
efficient and involve more kilometres being run as a consequence of the earlier 
delay.
7.4.3 Extra trips due to load more than advised
Inaccurate and/or variable volume forecasts can lead to the short notice requirement 
to move additional product volumes. Whilst there may be spare capacity to absorb 
small increases, there may be a need for additional trips that are not moved in the 
most optimal way due to insufficient time to move the extra load. These result in 
‘extra distance’. From a carrier perspective, this type of ‘extra distance’ is difficult to 
control since it is generated by the carrier’s supply chain partners. Also, if the carrier 
can charge its customer for the ‘extra distance’ run, there is less commercial 
incentive for the carrier to mitigate it. However, from a supply chain perspective, 
volume forecast inaccuracy and/or variability can have a negative environmental 
impact in terms of extra cost and carbon dioxide emissions.
7.4.4 Extra distance/trips due to load less than advised
Equally, inaccurate forecasts can mean the load to be moved is smaller than 
originally planned. This would result in unexpected space in the vehicle but 
insufficient time to re-plan the network to utilise or remove this empty space. From a 
different perspective, this means that the actual volume to be moved could have
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been moved more efficiently, either on fewer trips or truncated trips, which in turn 
means that ‘extra distance’ has been run.
7.4.5 Extra distance/ trips due to inappropriate vehicle size
Planning of transport movements is based on specified vehicle capacities within the 
transport planning system. If the correct vehicle is not available when required for 
loading, due to a planning failure or technical issue with the vehicle, additional trips 
can be required in order to complete the delivery of the load.
7.5 ‘Extra distance’ and value-added transport
It is necessary to link the ‘extra distance’ concept back to the literature. Through the 
feedback process, it became apparent that the approach adopted is similar to the 
identification of waste within lean production systems. Therefore, a literature search 
was carried out to see how the two concepts relate.
The concept of value adding activities has its origins in the Toyota Production 
System, in particular the principles of identification and elimination of waste. 
According to Shingo (1989), waste is any activity that does not contribute to an 
operation. Also, Taiichi Ohno defined seven common forms of waste activities that 
add cost but no value to the operation: production of goods not yet ordered; waiting; 
rectification of mistakes; excess processing; excess movement; excess transport; 
and excess stock (Japan Management Association, 1985).
A number of authors have tried to apply the seven wastes defined by Ohno to 
logistics. At a conceptual level, Sutherland and Bennett (2007) developed a 
framework for logistics operations, with seven wastes:
• Overproduction due to inaccurate demand forecast
• Delays and waiting in loading and unloading bays
• Unnecessary transport movements due to lack of backhaul consolidation
• Unnecessary motions within a warehouse because of unsuitable warehouse
design
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• Warehouse space available inefficiently utilised due to non-standardised 
pallet sizes
• Excessive inventory
• Manufacturing errors that caused product rework.
Simons et al. (2004) developed a new measure called Overall Vehicle Effectiveness 
(OVE). OVE is the result of combining three attributes: availability, performance and 
quality. OVE is affected by four transport wastes: driver breaks, excess load time, fill 
losses and speed losses. These four transport wastes have an impact on the 
performance of transport operations in terms of time. However, the OVE measure 
does not include the distance dimension of transport performance, which can have a 
direct transport cost.
The concept of ‘extra distance’ can thus be seen to link directly into that of ‘excess 
transport’ proposed by Taiichi Ohno, and more specifically into that of ‘unnecessary 
transport due to lack of backhaul consolidation’ proposed by Sutherland and Bennett 
(2007). However, the latter appear to propose the ‘lack of backhaul consolidation’, 
for which it can be read ‘lack of schedule optimization’, as a direct cause of waste in 
itself; this research develops the concept by demonstrating situations where the lack 
of consolidation is actually an effect, with a series of root causes related to 
uncertainty creating it. In particular, the other six supply chain wastes can create 
extra trips at the operational level. For example, delays at shippers and/or customers 
can lead to a vehicle arriving late back at a distribution centre, so the consignment 
fails to make a scheduled transhipment, leading to an unplanned additional trip being 
generated within the transport network. Alternatively, warehouse problems can lead
i
to excessive queues at distribution centres, generating delays that later result in 
‘extra distance’.
7.6 Results and analysis
In this section of the chapter, the overall results of the data collection will be 
presented first. After that, the impact of the causes of ‘extra distance’ will be
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discussed, highlighting their potential root causes. Subsequently, a risk assessment 
of all the causes of ‘extra distance’ found will be shown.
During the week of data collection, 2.4% of the kilometres run within the primary 
distribution network studied were ‘extra distance’. This generates a proportionate 
amount of extra cost and extra Kg of CO2. A total of 68 incidents of ‘extra distance’ 
were recorded during that week, which represents approximately 3.1% of the total 
number of trips run in that period. Even though the total ‘extra distance’ found is 
2.4%, it still represents a substantial monetary value for the logistics provider 
studied.
7.6.1 Main causes of 'extra distance’
As shown in Table 7.3, seven causes of ‘extra distance’ were identified while 
gathering data. They were late notification of extra volume to be moved, physical 
load smaller than advised, loading delays at suppliers, planning failures, unplanned 
road congestion, product not loaded and product mis-loaded. Table 7.3 shows the 
‘extra distance’, extra cost, extra CO2 emissions and frequency in terms of 
percentages. The cost and the Kg of CO2 emissions of the seven ‘extra distance’ 
causes has been calculated by multiplying the extra kilometres of each cause by the 
cost per kilometre and by the average fuel consumption per kilometres and the Defra 
conversion factor mentioned in the method section. Given the fact that the logistics 
provider only allowed the researcher to show percentages in this chapter and the 
percentages of extra kilometres, extra cost and extra Kg of CO2 emissions are the 
same for each cause of ‘extra distance’, in this section, the author will only refer to 
the percentages of extra kilometres and of ‘extra distance’ incidents.
‘Late notification of extra volume to be moved’ was the main cause of ‘extra distance’ 
identified. This cause of ‘extra distance’ represents 39% of the total ‘extra distance’ 
found. Also, this cause of ‘extra distance’ represents 55% of the total number of 
‘extra distance’ incidents observed in the data collection. This cause of ‘extra 
distance’ generates the need for extra trips and/or the need for extending existent 
trips. Thus, in order to reduce the level of unnecessary ‘extra distance’ run, a key
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priority is to improve the accuracy of volume forecast provided to the logistics 
providers.
‘Extra d istance' 
type
‘Extra d istance' 
C ause
Extra  
D istance (%)
Cost
(%)
Kg o f 
C 02  (%) Frequency (%)
Extra distance due 
to route diversion
Unplanned road 
congestion Not measured
Extra distance/trips 
due to delays
Loading delays at 
shippers 7 7 7 6
Unplanned road 
congestion 4 4 4 5
Extra distance/trips 
due to load more 
than advised
Late notification of 
extra volume to be 
moved
39 39 39 55
Extra distance/trips 
due to load less 
than advised
Physical load 
smaller than 
advised
36 36 36 20
Extra distance/trips 
due inappropriate 
vehicle size
Technical vehicle 
failure No incidents found
Not considered
Planning failure 8 8 8 12
Product not loaded 3 3 3 1
Product mis- 
loaded 3 3 3
1
Table 7.3 Overall impact of ‘extra kilometres’ on the primary distribution network 
studied
Another very significant cause of ‘extra distance’ found in the data collection was 
‘physical load smaller than advised’, which represents 36% of the ‘extra distance’ 
identified in the primary distribution network studied. This cause of ‘extra distance’ is 
originated at the suppliers. The number of incidents of ‘load smaller than advised’ 
represents 20% of the total number of ‘extra distance’ incidents found in the data 
collection. This cause of ‘extra distahce’ occurs since two particular suppliers usually 
plan for more volume than they actually need. Thus, this generates unexpected 
space in the vehicles run for the trips, and as a result, the trips are run in a sub- 
optimal manner and ‘extra distance’ is generated because of that. Hence, the 
logistics provider needs to revise the forecast of volumes generated by these two 
suppliers.
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Consequently, if the delay is more than an hour, it can generate the necessity for an 
additional trip.
The other two causes of ‘extra distance’ were identified during the data collection. 
They are ‘product not loaded at distribution centres’ and ‘product mis-loaded’ or 
loaded to the wrong destination (distribution centre) by suppliers. As in the case of 
planning failures, these two causes of ‘extra distance’ were not identified in the 
discussion panel run before starting the case study. Each of these two ‘extra 
distance’ causes generates only 3% of the total ‘extra distance’ recorded and is 1% 
of the total number of incidents observed in the data collection. Therefore, they 
should be at the bottom in terms of priority of any ‘extra distance’ reduction 
programme implemented by the logistics provider and its supply chain partners.
After finishing the analysis of the data, the initial definition of ‘extra distance’ was 
slightly modified, reflecting the findings from the case study. This definition is:
‘Extra distance as a measure is non value-added or unnecessary distance run 
within a distribution network due to supply chain uncertainty, and defined as the 
difference between the distance vehicles actually ran, and the distance they 
would have needed to have run if:
• the transport operation had received accurate and timely information on the 
volumes to be moved, and/or
• there had been no unexpected delays at loading or unloading points and/or
• there had been no operational failures within the distribution network and/or
• there had been no congestion on the journey that could not have been 
foreseen
7.6.2 Risk assessment of 'extra distance’ causes
In order to evaluate the relative importance of all of the ‘extra distance’ causes, as 
has been mentioned in the method section, the risk that they represent has been 
calculated as a function of impact and probability. Figure7.2 shows the impact and 
probability of the seven ‘extra distance’ causes found in the data collection.
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‘Planning failure’ represents the third most significant ‘extra distance’ cause, but has 
an overall impact of only approximately one eighth of the ‘extra distance’ caused by 
inaccurate volume notification from suppliers as already discussed. It is important to 
highlight that this cause of ‘extra distance’ was not considered while developing the 
initial definition of ‘extra distance’. In total, 8% of the ‘extra distance’ found and 12% 
of the ‘extra distance’ incidents are caused by planning failure. In most of the cases, 
‘planning failure’ occurs when the communication and coordination within the 
distribution network is insufficient. Also, in a few cases, planning errors were found 
where planners had committed resources where they were not needed. In mitigating 
this ‘extra distance’ cause, the information flow and allocation of resources within the 
network required attention. However, in the short term, the logistics provider should 
focus much more on finding alternative solutions for achieving more accurate 
suppliers’ volumes from the transport planning to the execution of the suppliers’ 
collections.
‘Loading delays at suppliers’ represent a smaller proportion of the total ‘extra 
distance’ found. A small minority of the suppliers tend to hold the vehicles at their 
loading bays, but when the delay is more than two hours it could affect the next trip 
allocated to the vehicle held. Therefore, the decision is made at the logistics provider 
to send the vehicle back to the distribution centre where the product is required and 
another vehicle is allocated to collect the rest of the load. This represents 7% of the 
total ‘extra distance’ found and 6% of the total number of incidents. Extra trips 
caused by ‘loading delays at the supplier’ generally do not have an economic impact 
on the logistics provider, since when they occur the suppliers are charged for the 
extra trip. However, they have a considerable impact on the overall transport cost 
and environmental performance of the whole supply chain.
In the week of data collection, three other ‘extra distance’ causes were recorded. 
Firstly, when ‘unplanned road congestion’ causes sufficiently severe delays, this 
generates the need for an extra trip. ‘Unplanned road congestion’ represents 4% of 
the ‘extra distance’ found and 5% of the total number of incidents observed in the 
data collection. Within the total delivery time, there is generally about an hour of 
slack time embedded in the transport plan to tackle unplanned road congestion.
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Figure 7.2 Risk assessment of ‘extra distance’ causes
‘Late notification of extra volume to be moved’ occurs about 1.7% of the total trips 
run in the network, which means that it is very important to intensify its monitoring 
and control. Although it has the lower impact per incident, 103 kilometres per 
incident, it occurs relatively far more frequently than the other six ‘extra distance’ 
causes. Meanwhile, ‘physical load smaller than advised’ has an impact of about 260 
kilometres per incident but occurs about 0.6% of the total trips run in the network. It
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is important to note that the probability of ‘physical load smaller than advised’ is 
lower than ‘late notification of extra volume to be moved’. These two types of ‘extra 
distance’ are caused due to inaccuracy of volume forecast at suppliers. Therefore, 
they should have similar probabilities. The potential reason why ‘physical load 
smaller than advised’ has a lower probability is that this type of ‘extra distance’ was 
calculated for two suppliers that were identified as the main culprits of the problem. 
However, both these causes of ‘extra distance’ can be mitigated by improving the 
accuracy of volumes to be moved.
The other five causes of ‘extra distance’ have a medium impact in terms of 
kilometres per incident, but they occur as rarely as less than 0.35% of the total trips 
run in the network. Therefore, they should be of a lower priority for the logistics 
provider and its partners.
7.6.3 Linking ‘extra distance’, uncertainty and risk
In this section of the chapter, the link between supply chain uncertainty and risk and 
‘extra distance’ is explicitly drawn to connect cause and effect. The types of 
uncertainty actually observed in the case study have been categorised according to 
the framework presented in the focus group findings chapter. In some instances, the 
uncertainty arises from more than one source. These are then mapped against the 
cause of ‘extra distance’ observed in the case study. The results can be seen in 
Figure7.3.
It can be seen from Figure7.3 that the research suggests that operational issues 
tend to be generated to a greater extent at the supplier and control systems rather 
than at the carrier. Variable demand and/or inaccurate volume forecast is the major 
supply chain uncertainty found in this case study. This uncertainty cluster generates 
75% of the extra Kg of CO2 and 75 % of the extra cost measured in the case study in 
the form of extra kilometres. ‘Late notification of extra volume to be moved’ is 
recorded as a supplier and control systems uncertainty source since the volume 
forecast process is one of the control systems of the whole supply chain, and if it is 
tightly integrated, volumes could be more accurate. Other issues relating to the size
t
of loads are also focused upon the supplier and control systems within the supply
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chain, reflecting the roles of both of these in generating transport demand in the 
primary distribution network studied.
It is important to state that delays in the form of loading delays at the supplier and 
due to unplanned road congestion did seem to have a lower risk in comparison to 
variable demand and/or inaccurate forecast. However, this could be due to the fact 
that the research has currently failed to identify any links to route diversion. This is 
very possibly due to the data collection approach which did not track each and every 
individual trip.
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Figure 7.3 Link between uncertainty, risk and ‘extra distance’
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7.7 Transport uncertainty mitigation approach
Table 7.4 summarises how the context in which the logistics provider is influences 
how they respond to uncertainty. The approach that the logistics provider takes to
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mitigate uncertainty is influenced by the fact that, for the customer, it is equally 
important to ensure that the products are available at the customer facilities at all 
times so as to minimise the transport cost. Also, cost factors drive the fact that the 
logistics provider considers cost as a highly important attribute. Labour cost and fuel 
cost in the UK are very high in comparison to developing countries, and also the 
fixed cost of transport is very high. The vehicle acquisition and fuel costs are high in 
the UK due to the fact that the tax duty on acquisition of vehicles and of fuel prices is 
very high there. Hence, throughout the fleet, an average vehicle capacity utilisation 
of 85% is generally achieved, so if there is a disturbance or disruption ‘extra 
distance’ is very likely to be generated. The suppliers sometimes are charged for 
additional miles run, but this only happens if they are directly identified as the cause 
of the ‘extra distance’, which typically means that additional trips have been run 
dedicated to moving the supplier’s product.
In terms of the transport planning process, the suppliers need to submit all their final 
and confirmed volume requirements by mid morning on the day that their load needs 
to be moved. Furthermore, the secondary distribution centres tranship volume 
movements between them to optimise the movements within the network and 
minimise empty miles. The transport plan is fairly flexible; it can be changed if 
volume patterns change within the UK. The transport plan is elaborated with the 
volume requirement information received from suppliers, vehicles available in each 
depot and the existent restrictions within the network.
After the transport plan is completed, any extra volume from a supplier is allocated 
either pwn or subcontracted fleet depending on which is the more cost-effective 
given the time available to plan. The most economical routes for all the extra trips 
generated by uncertainty are identified by looking at all the movements within the 
whole network.
It is important to highlight that the logistics provider charges the suppliers for the 
‘extra distance’ generated by them as long as they are identified as the entity that 
directly originates the ‘extra distance’. In this particular case study, 82% of the ‘extra
distance’ recorded is generated by suppliers. When the ‘extra distance’ is generated
/
due to ‘physical load smaller than advised’ the extra kilometres were calculated by
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re-planning the trips considering the actual volumes, so the suppliers could not be 
charged for their volume inaccuracy, since the logistics provider was not aware of 
this problem. However, as long as the suppliers are charged for their extra 
kilometres, the suppliers have an economic incentive to reduce them.
Customer Product availability High priority
main targets Transport cost High priority
Labour cost High
Cost factors Fuel cost High due to tax duty
Fixed cost High due to tax duty
Cost
structure Type of contract Not disclosed
Daily deadline By mid morning
Volume requirements driven by Supplier and distribution centres
Flexibility
The transport plan is fairly flexible, it can be 
changed if volume patterns change throughout 
the UK
Transport
planning
Average vehicle capacity utilisation 85%
Fleet ownership Mix of owned, leased and subcontracted fleet
ICT transport system
Information on the volume requirements are 
received from suppliers through an order 
electronic system and the distribution centres 
report in other system when the loads are 
received, and the planners draw up the transport 
plan in Excel
Capacity available in transport plan?
Any extra volume from a supplier is allocated 
either an own or subcontracted fleet depending 
on which is the more cost-effective given the 
time available to plan
Location of the load?
If the load is on a location where a reasonably 
close backload cannot be found, the transport 
planner gives the load to a subcontractor
Response to 
uncertainty
i
Who will run the extra trip?
If a vehicle is not available internally within the 
network or the cost of running the trip is lower, 
an extra consignment is given to a subcontractor
Route re-optimisation
The most economical route is selected for the 
extra trip, depending on the availability of fleet 
and time to plan
Who pay for the load?
The entity that is generating the extra kilometres, 
if it is identified the same day. If not; the logistics 
provider absorbs the hidden cost
Monitoring
Every day a report that summarises all the added 
trips and economical knock-on effect of them is 
produced
Table 7.4 How the logistics provider mitigates uncertainty
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7.8 Managerial implications
Even though the case study presented in this chapter is a FMCG primary distribution 
network run by a logistics provider from the UK, the research has identified a number 
of opportunities applicable to other transport operations within the UK and other 
countries. From this, some generic managerial implications can be established. The 
chapter has emphasised why it is important to measure the impact that supply chain 
uncertainty has on road transport performance. Previous research works have 
primarily proposed transport time-based performance measurement tools. However, 
from a road transport operation viewpoint, it is equally important to evaluate transport 
performance in terms of distance.
The ‘extra distance’ assessment applied in this case study can be used as a 
diagnostic tool in other road transport operations, especially within the FMCG sector. 
In this way, a more explicit link between supply chain uncertainty and unplanned 
incidents in the execution of the transport plan could be made. A more explicit link 
between uncertainty and extra cost and extra CO2 emissions generated due to ‘extra 
distance’ can also be drawn. Moreover, the ‘extra distance’ assessment has 
informed future decision making within the logistics provider studied.
Furthermore, variable demand and/or inaccurate forecast of volumes to be moved 
generates about three quarters of the ‘extra distance’ recorded. In this case study, 
the suppliers forecast the volume from the customer. Therefore, it is necessary to 
establish which is the root cause of this ‘extra distance’ cause. In many cases, ‘extra 
distance’ generated due to demand variability and/or inaccurate forecast is 
originated at suppliers, but in some other cases the customer has a considerable 
share of responsibility for this ‘extra distance’ cause. In order to mitigate this 
uncertainty cluster, the logistics provider re-plans the extra trips in the most optimal 
way possible. However, in some cases, the suppliers inform of the extra volume 
requirements at very short-notice, so the logistics provider cannot find the most 
economical route for moving the extra loads. Therefore, in order to reduce the extra 
cost and extra CO2 emissions generated by this uncertainty cluster, the volume 
forecast process of the whole supply chain should be reviewed. However, the 
logistics provider needs the support of the other supply chain partners to do so.
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One issue that needs addressing is that in order to reduce ‘extra distance’, there is a 
need for the logistics provider to actively engage with the suppliers and retailers, and 
that while there are overall supply chain benefits, these may not be evenly 
distributed between the all parties. When the logistics provider identifies that a 
supplier directly generates ‘extra distance’, that supplier would generally have an 
economic incentive to reduce extra distance, although in many cases suppliers are 
driven primarily by their customer demand. However, the challenge is that in many 
cases it is not possible for the logistics provider to identify a supplier as the main 
cause of the ‘extra distance’ incident. This can be considered a significant barrier for 
the reduction of ‘extra distance’ and the extra CO2 emitted by the logistics provider’s 
partners. Previous research has highlighted the fact that transport is often seen as a 
commodity within the supply chain (Stank and Goldsby, 2000) and so suppliers may 
want to take the cost benefit. However, others have argued that the supplier, carrier 
and customer should work together and share benefits, through a concept termed 
the logistics triad (Beier, 1989). This would enable all to gain from a reduction in 
empty kilometres.
7.9 Concluding remarks
So far, the ‘extra distance’ measure has been defined as any non value-added 
distance run within a distribution network. This chapter presents a tool that applies 
‘extra distance’ as a measure to assess road transport functions within distribution 
networks. It can be applied to assess the efficiency of road freight transport 
operations in terms of distance, or more specifically in terms of unnecessary vehicle 
usages and fuel consumption. Also, it can be used to evaluate the causes of 
unnecessary mileage and estimate the risk that they represent. Table 7.5 shows the 
strengths and weaknesses of the ‘extra distance’ assessment undertaken in this 
case study.
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Strengths W eaknesses
• It draws a clear link between uncertainty 
and transport performance.
•  It can be used to estimate the marginal 
impact of uncertainty on cost and C 0 2  
emissions.
•  It causes the researcher to interact 
continuously with the planners, so the 
validity of the data collection was 
continuously verified.
•  It does not measure the impact of route 
diversion on ‘extra distance’.
•  It does not measure the impact of uncertainty on 
the time dimension of transport performance.
•  It can be considerably labour intensive. For 
example, the researcher needed to spend a 
significant amount of time per day over a seven 
day period in the planning office of the primary 
distribution operation and act as a liaison 
between all the transport planners involved.
Table 7.5 Strengths and weaknesses of the ‘extra distance’ assessment
According to the results of this study, in this UK-based primary distribution network, 
2.4% of the total kilometres run are ‘extra distance’ or non-value added kilometres. 
The two main ‘extra distance’ causes recorded are ‘late notification of extra volume 
to be moved’ and ‘physical load smaller than advised’. Jointly, they represent 
approximately 75% of the ‘extra distance’ found. When suppliers are charged for 
their failures, they are incentivised to improve the accuracy of their volume forecast. 
However, when the inaccuracy is caused by their customers rather than themselves, 
they need to communicate with their customers in order to reduce ‘extra distance’. 
Moreover, the logistics provider moves any extra load either with own or 
subcontracted fleet depending on which is the more cost-effective, given the time 
available to plan. In addition, the assessment of the seven causes of ‘extra distance’ 
has been done by calculating the risk that they represent, in terms of their probability 
and impact. In order to reduce ‘extra distance’ the logistics provider needs to find a 
mechapism to encourage the suppliers to improve the forecast accuracy of volumes 
to be moved.
Before embarking in any ‘extra distance’ reduction programme, the logistics provider 
should monitor ‘extra distance’ for a longer period of time. The results of the case 
study presented in this chapter are based on data collected over an average week. 
Therefore, the outcome of this exercise should be taken as a guide for future 
decision making, but the exercise needs to be repeated in order to verify the 
recurrence of the findings.
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In this chapter, ‘extra distance’ as a measure has been developed and tested in a 
primary distribution network in the UK FMCG sector. The validity of the ‘extra 
distance’ measure requires testing in other road transport operations, if possible, 
including a case study from another country. Therefore, the ‘extra distance’ measure 
has been applied in two other case studies, two secondary distribution networks, one 
based in the UK and the other based in South Africa. The findings from these two 
case studies will be presented in the following two chapters. Additionally, in these 
two case studies, the time dimension of transport performance is included in the 
assessments due to the fact that the time dimension is also important for assessing 
the impact of uncertainty on cost, while ‘extra distance’ is a measure that can be 
used to evaluate the environmental effects of uncertainty. Moreover, in this case 
study, the effect that unplanned road congestion has on ‘extra distance’ due to route 
diversion was not measured due to the fact that planned and actual kilometres of 
individual planned trips were not available to the researcher. Therefore, the 
researcher observed the re-planning and execution of the transport process to 
gather data on the ‘extra distance’ generated by uncertainty events that occurred 
after the original transport plan was made. In order to address this limitation, data on 
the effect that unplanned road congestion has on ‘extra distance’ will be included in 
the analysis undertaken in the case study undertaken in the UK secondary 
distribution operation presented in Chapter 9. Finally, information on the efficiency of 
road transport operations varies from company to company. Therefore, before 
applying the ‘extra distance’ measure in the two case studies presented in the 
following two chapters, a detailed review has been undertaken of how information on 
the delivery process is recorded, so data can be collected in the most effective way 
possible.
7.10 Contribution
To methodology in logistics research
The chapter shows that when there is no archival data of the effect of different types 
of uncertainty on transport performance, it is still possible to gather the data live 
while the transport planners elaborate and execute the transport plan. Furthermore, 
the chapter shows that when a company does not measure a problem, it is important
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to clarify the problem with the practitioners in charge of the operation before starting 
to collect data. Most of the incidents collected in these case studies required the 
careful consideration of the context involved in each incident. This can be used as a 
guide for the application of new uncertainty measurement systems in operations 
when there is a lack of historical data at the start of the case study.
To the PhD
In this chapter, the application of the ‘extra distance’ measure defined in the previous 
chapter has been demonstrated. Also, variable demand and/or inaccurate forecast, 
one of the four main uncertainty clusters found in the focus groups and confirmed in 
the survey, represent 75% of the extra kilometres recorded in the study, although 
delays and coordination problems caused a proportion of the extra kilometres found, 
It should also be remembered that the direct effect of route diversion due to 
unplanned congestion on ‘extra distance’ has not been measured, unless the 
consequent delays directly resulted in subsequent ‘extra distance’ being run.
To the topic
In this chapter, a FMCG primary distribution operation from the UK has been studied 
to show the effects that uncertainty has in this type of operation in the UK. Variable 
demand and/or inaccurate forecast cause a significant proportion of inefficiency 
within this distribution network. Therefore, this demonstrates the impact that the 
demand forecast inaccuracy and lack of visibility of information from shippers and 
the customer have on the performance of a primary distribution operation run by a 
logistic^ provider.
162
8.0 Diagnosis of 'extra distance’ and ‘extra time’ in a South African FMCG 
secondary distribution network
8.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, a case study was used to test the findings of the initial 
stages of this PhD. In order to do that, ‘extra distance’ as measure has been 
developed. That case study was based on data collected in a UK logistics provider 
that operates the primary distribution network of a FMCG customer. An ‘extra 
distance’ assessment has been developed and tested in that case study. However, 
in order to improve its validity, the ‘extra distance’ assessment needs to be tested 
further in another FMCG supply chain. Time as a dimension of performance is as 
important as distance. Therefore, an ‘extra time’ assessment to quantitatively 
evaluate the risk that delays represent to the supply chain will be shown. Therefore, 
the objective of this chapter is to quantitatively evaluate the consequences of 
different uncertainty causes, using the ‘extra distance’ measure applied in the 
previous chapter and complement that assessment by also including ‘extra time’. 
This case study introduces the definition of ‘extra time’. The assessment has been 
undertaken by combining two measures, ‘extra distance’ and ‘extra time’. In chapters 
8 and 9, a combined assessment of ‘extra distance’ and ‘extra time’ has been 
undertaken to assist the author in achieving the sixth objective of this PhD to:
Develop a decision-making tool, based on a combined assessment of ‘extra 
distahce’ and ‘extra time’, for the diagnosis of the effects that different causes of 
uncertainty have on the performance of road freight transport operations, in terms of
cost and CO2 emissions.
In order to achieve this objective, a case application from the FMCG sector based in 
South Africa is used.
The chapter proceeds by briefly introducing the case study company. Following that, 
the method applied to undertake the research is explained. Subsequently, the 
findings are outlined. Also, the existent connections between uncertainty and risk 
and ‘extra distance’ are explicitly drawn. Finally, the chapter is concluded by
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highlighting the managerial implications and limitations of the research and 
contribution to knowledge of the chapter.
8.2 Case study context
In this case study, the ‘extra distance’ measure has been put in practice to the 
secondary distribution network of a South African FMCG customer, shown 
schematically in Figure 8.1. The customer has over 200 outlets throughout South 
Africa, serviced by a network of three distribution centres (DCs) located in 
Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban. The transport operations within this network 
are outsourced to a third party provider and, during data collection, the researcher 
was based in this company. However, the warehousing function and the customer 
outlets are operated by the customer. This logistics provider is the sole organisation 
involved in secondary distribution, as well as being responsible for a small proportion 
of primary distribution movements. The secondary distribution section of this logistics 
provider, which sits between DCs and the customer, was selected for the case study. 
The assessment of ‘extra distance’ and ‘extra time’ was undertaken in the 
Johannesburg and Cape Town DCs, which represent about 90% of the transport 
movements of the whole network.
Primary Distribution Secondary Distribution
Logistics
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Retailer
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Figure 8.1 Logistics provider position within South African FMCG secondary 
distribution network
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The transport planning process is almost fixed and dictated by the FMCG customer. 
On the day before the execution of the plan, the transport manager of the DC run by 
the customer gives the logistics provider the extra trips required due to increases in 
volume and operational problems at the DC. Following that, the logistics provider 
adds extra vehicles to the fleet available to achieve the original transport plan. In this 
distribution network, product availability and on-time deliveries to customer outlets 
are considered more important than vehicle utilisation.
There are a number of reasons why this particular case was chosen:
• The ‘extra distance’ measure was developed in the context of UK operations 
and so an international comparison aids generalisation
• While similar logistics challenges exist between, for example, European 
countries, additional challenges unique to South Africa/developing countries 
may create different causes of uncertainty (King 2008)
• By looking at the FMCG retail sector, comparisons with UK case study 
applications are possible.
8.3 Method
As in the first case study, in order to undertake the ‘extra distance’ assessment in 
this secondary distribution network from South Africa, the principles of the case 
study method have been applied, since the tool needed to be tested in a different 
distribution network. The unit of analysis of this case study is a FMCG retail 
secondary distribution operation. This operation was chosen since the objective was 
to test the ‘extra distance’ measure in another logistics context, so the validity of the 
measure can be confirmed. Furthermore, a secondary distributidn network was 
selected, since after developing the ‘Extra distance’ measure in a primary distribution 
network, the measure needed to be tested also in secondary distribution networks.
In the planning stage of the case study, the findings from the first case study were 
presented to the logistics provider’s management staff in a teleconference meeting. 
The main objective of this meeting was to set the planning of the case study and 
decide the scale and scope of the project. Also, another objective of this meeting
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was to present the ‘extra distance’ measure to the practitioners from the company, 
so they could evaluate the suitability of the measure in their operation. As noted 
earlier, the customer has three secondary DCs in South Africa. However, in order to 
keep the project on a realistic scale, a decision was made to concentrate on the two 
larger DCs, in Johannesburg and Cape Town. In order to maximise the time spent in 
South Africa, during the data collection, the author was assisted by another 
researcher from the South African CSIR, and a supply chain analyst from the case 
study company.
In addition, a number of managers from the secondary distribution operation studied 
were constantly validating the data collected. Firstly, the operation managers in both 
of the DCs were validating the data collection on a daily basis. Moreover, after 
collecting the data in Johannesburg, a presentation with the initial findings was 
delivered to the management board of the company and other key operational staff 
from the Cape Town DC. The reason for this constant validation of the data was to 
ensure that the data collected reflect the realities of the operation, so the final results 
could be used for setting future improvement initiatives within the logistics provider 
and at a supply chain level.
The ‘extra distance’ data used for the analysis was gathered in the last two weeks of 
January 2009. Due to the fact that the company had archival data available, the 
week commencing 5th January 2009 was selected. As in the first case study, this 
period was considered by the company staff as a typical or average week that fairly 
represents what happens over a twelve-month period. Also, as in the first case 
study, the sampling strategy applied in this study was attribute-based sampling, 
since the main objective was the same, to find incidents generating ‘extra distance’.
All incidents that generated ‘extra distance’ were identified from the company 
historical reports and input into an Excel spreadsheet. The role of this Excel 
spreadsheet was to determine the main causes of ‘extra distance’. In the study, there 
was a particular interest in determining the causes of ‘extra distance’. Therefore, the 
frequency and impact of each of the/extra distance’ causes could be quantified. As 
in the first case study, a risk assessment was undertaken to support the decision
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makers in evaluating the ‘extra distance’ causes found in terms of their relative 
priority.
The data collection approach is based on archival data. Although the same data was 
collected overall, different reports were used for each DC. In the Johannesburg DC, 
two reports were used to gather the ‘extra distance’ data. One of them was the 
additional volume report, which summarised the extra trips run due to short-noticed 
volume increases. The other report used was the one that summarised the extra 
trips run due to operational failures at the DC, stores and within the delivery process. 
In the Cape Town DC, the data was gathered from a single report, which 
summarised the service levels and delivery performance for the operation. The 
differences in terms of how the two DCs record transport performance data did not 
affect the data collected for the case study, since the final data gathered for the 
‘extra distance’ assessment was arranged in the Excel spreadsheet, so performance 
data was transformed to ‘extra distance’ data, taking account of how the two 
secondary distribution operations record performance data. In this process, the 
researcher had the support of the operation managers.
As in the first case study, detailed information about the trips that caused ‘extra 
distance’ was gathered; this information included: store location, kilometres run, 
‘extra distance’ source, visible cause and root cause. In this chapter, ‘extra distance’ 
is calculated in kilometres. This information was gathered from a daily report that 
specifies all the additional trips, so the pro-forma used to collect the data in the first 
case stddy (see Appendix 3) was not used in this case study. The Excel spreadsheet 
presented in Appendix 5 was used to calculate the ‘extra distance’ generated by 
every incident identified and categorise all the incidents depending on their causes. 
In the spreadsheet, the number of ‘extra distance’ generated by each uncertainty 
cause was calculated. The extra kilometres generated by every ‘extra distance’ 
incident gathered were estimated by using Google maps. The relative accuracy of 
Google against Paragon and AutoRoute has been estimated in Chapter 7 (see Table 
7.1). The cost of every incident of ‘extra distance’ was calculated by multiplying the 
cost per kilometres that the logistics provider charges their customer, which is 29.67 
ZAR per kilometres. Also, the kg of CO2 emitted due to every incident of ‘extra 
distance’ was calculated by multiplying the ‘extra distance’ generated by every ‘extra
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distance’ incident by the average fuel consumption in the week of data collection 
(0.37 It per Km), provided by the logistics provider, and the road freight transport 
conversion factor for diesel recommended by Defra (2007), 2.63. Also, the cost of 
delays was calculated by multiplying the ‘extra time’ generated by every incident of 
‘extra time’ by the labour cost per extra hour (60.5 ZAR per hour) provided by the 
operation.
Furthermore, as in the first case study, a risk assessment of the different ‘extra 
distance’ causes found was undertaken, so the probability and impact of each ‘extra 
distance’ cause were calculated. Similarly to the first case study, due to the fact that 
an accurate telematics system was not available in the logistics provider, the impact 
and probability of unplanned road congestion on planned trips and on extra or 
extended trips could not be estimated.
In addition, while conducting the data collection to evaluate the different ‘extra 
distance’ causes, the existent causes of ‘extra time’ in terms of delays within the 
delivery process were also recorded. This was done by gathering information about 
all the delays that occurred at the operations of the DCs during the same week of 
data collection. This information was gathered from a management report at the two 
DCs. The information includes the causes of delays and impact of the delays in 
terms of time.
To understand more about the root causes of ‘extra distance’ and the causes of 
‘extra time’, informal interviews and discussions were held with managers and 
transport planners within the secondary distribution operations, both from the 
logistics provider and the customer. These discussions also helped to confirm the 
validity of the exercise.
After finishing the analysis, a feedback presentation was delivered to the 
management board of the logistics provider. In that meeting, all the managers 
validated the findings. From their perspective, this presentation represents a starting 
point towards identifying the potential mitigation strategies to reduce ’extra distance’.
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8.4 Results and analysis
In this section of the chapter, the overall results of the data collection will be 
presented first (Table 8.1). This includes the two secondary DCs involved in the 
study. After that, the impact of the causes of ‘extra distance’ will be discussed, 
highlighting their potential root causes. Subsequently, a risk assessment of all the 
causes of ‘extra distance’ found will be shown.
Johannesburg C apeT ow n O verall
Km  run 172,000 35,000 207,000
‘Extra
d is tance ’
(km )
11,538 1,605 13,143
Cost
(ZAR) 342,332 47,620 389,952
Kg o f C 0 2 11,228 1,562 12,789
% o f ‘Extra  
d is tance ’ 6.71 4.59 6.35
‘extra  
tim e ’ (hr) 63 4 67
C ost
(ZAR) 3,812 242 4,053
%  ‘extra  
tim e ’ 0.86 0.24
0.74
Table 8.1 Overall impact of ‘extra kilometres on the two South African secondary 
DCs
\
During the week of data collection, 6.71% of the kilometres run within the secondary 
distribution network studied were ‘extra distance’. A total of 90 incidents of ‘extra 
distance’ were recorded during that week, which represents approximately 4.28% of 
the total number of trips run in that period. Even though the total ‘extra distance’ 
found is 6.35%, it still represents a substantial monetary value for the logistics 
provider studied. The cost of this is estimated to be ZAR 390,000 (£29,000). More 
specifically, this cost can be decoupled into variable and fixed costs. The fixed cost 
is ZAR 328,000. The total ‘extra distance’ gathered in the week of data collection 
represents 20,591 Kg of CO2 emissions. This is due to the fact that if ‘extra distance’
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does not occur, the required fleet could be smaller than the current fleet. The 
variable cost is ZAR 63,000 and is related to the running cost of the vehicles.
In addition, during the week of data collection, there were several ‘extra time’ 
incidents, in the form of delays that did not cause ‘extra distance’, but still impacted 
on the variable cost of transport. In total, there were 67 hours of delays within the 
delivery process. Economically speaking, these delays impact only on the variable 
transport cost (the running cost of vehicles), since they do not generate extra trips. 
Nevertheless, they still increase the labour cost. The ‘extra time’ found during the 
week of data collection represents 0.74% of the total running time of the whole fleet 
and an extra cost of ZAR 4,053 (£310). Hence, in this case study, when ‘extra time’ 
does not generate ‘extra distance’, it does represent a relatively much smaller 
economic impact.
In the remainder of this section, more in-depth insights from the analysis will be 
discussed.
8.4.1 Main causes of ‘extra distance’
As Table 8.2 depicts, the four causes of ‘extra distance’ found during the data 
collection are ‘product not loaded’, ‘late notification of extra volume to be moved’, 
‘physical load smaller than advised’ and ‘planning failures’. Table 8.2 has been 
drawn based on Table 7.2 (see Chapter 7). From these four causes of ‘extra 
d is tan t’, ‘product not loaded’ at DCs is the one that generated most of the ‘extra 
distance’ gathered and ‘late notification of extra volume to be moved’ also generated 
a very significant amount of ‘extra distance’. These two ‘extra distance’ causes 
represent about 90% of the ‘extra distance’ found and 84% of the number of ‘extra 
distance’ incidents observed in the data collection.
‘Product not loaded’ at DCs was the main cause of ‘extra distance’ recorded in the 
study. As shown in Table 8.2, 41% of the incidents gathered and 50% of the ‘extra 
distance’ recorded was caused by this issue. According to the staff involved in the 
data collection, this ‘extra distance’ cause is originated in the picking process at the 
two DCs. The DCs are operated by the customer rather than the logistics provider.
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Picking delays occur due to the fact that there are insufficient staff members for 
picking and sorting products.
‘Extra distance' type ‘Extra d is tance ' C ause Extra  Distance (%) Frequency (%)
Extra distance due to 
route diversion
Unplanned road 
congestion Not measured
Extra distance/trips due to 
delays
Loading delays at 
shippers No incidents found
Unplanned road 
congestion No incidents found
Extra distance/trips due to 
load more than advised
Late notification of extra  
volume to be moved 40 43
Extra distance/trips due to 
load less than advised
Physical load smaller than 
advised 6 8
Extra distance/trips due 
inappropriate vehicle size Technical vehicle failure No incidents found
Not considered
Planning failure 4 8
Product not loaded 50 41
Product mis-loaded No incidents found
Table 8.2 Overall impact and frequency of the different ‘extra distance’ causes found 
in the South African secondary distribution network
‘Late notification of extra volume to be moved’ was the second most important ‘extra 
distance’ cause found. It represents 40% of the total ‘extra distance’ generated in the 
week of data collection. Furthermore, it was the most frequent cause of ‘extra 
distance’ gathered, with 43% of a total of 90 incidents of ‘extra distance’ observed. 
According to the logistics provider’s" staff, this issue primarily occurs because the 
forecast of volumes is not sufficiently accurate.
The other two causes of ‘extra distance’ found are ‘physical load smaller than 
advised’ and ‘planning failures’. The first represents 6% of the total ‘extra distance’ 
and the second is 4% of the ‘extra distance’ recorded. These two ‘extra distance’ 
causes were found in the Cape Town operation only. In Cape Town, the transport 
planning process is undertaken by the customer instead of by the logistics provider. 
In Cape Town DC, the planned volumes are more than the actual volumes, since the
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customer over-plans the resources to have more flexibility during the delivery 
process. However, the fact that the retailer creates an artificial need for spare 
capacity has a knock-on effect on vehicle capacity utilisation. There are between 3 
and 6 vehicles a day that have less than 30% capacity utilisation. Therefore, the 
transport network could be better optimised if forecasted volumes were more 
accurate.
‘Planning failures’ occur primarily due to the fact that the vehicle size is less than 
planned because of breakdowns of vehicles returning from store deliveries. When 
there is a breakdown of a vehicle and only a smaller vehicle size is available, there is 
the need to use two vehicles instead of one. However, vehicle size less than planned 
represents only 4% of the total ‘extra distance’ found.
8.5 ‘Extra time’ as a measure to evaluate delivery time reliability
Due to the fact that secondary distribution operations tend to be very sensitive to 
delays, the researcher perceived a need to measure the amount of unnecessary 
time that is generated during the delivery process due to uncertainty. In many cases, 
‘extra distance’ and ‘extra time’ have a significant impact on the performance of road 
transport operations. Delays can occur in the execution of the transport plan and 
also there could be ‘extra distance’ generated in a previous delivery cycle. Moreover, 
unplanned road congestion can either delay the vehicle or add ‘extra distance’ to the 
optimal route originally planned for the trip. Therefore, when road freight transport 
operations are significantly sensitive to these two dimensions of transport 
performance, the assessment should include both. Also, when archival data is 
available to undertake a combined time-and-distance assessment, this opportunity 
should be taken to demonstrate which of the two dimensions are more important.
By applying a combined time-and-distance assessment, a holistic analysis of the 
impact that different causes of uncertainty have on road freight transport 
performance can be undertaken. In this way, the potential tradeoffs within road 
transport operations between the time and distance dimensions of performance can 
be clarified.
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Simons et al’s (2004) OVE assesses different dimensions of the delivery process. 
However, the application of this measure can prove difficult in a road transport 
environment, since it combines factors that are very complex to measure at the 
same time. According to the focus group and survey findings, delays in the delivery 
process are the main cause of uncertainty in transport operations. However, the 
marginal impact of different causes of delays on the economic performance of 
transport operations needs to be examined. Previously, other researchers have 
evaluated the different causes of delays using the survey method to assess the 
delivery process of the grocery retail sector (Fowkes et al 2004; McKinnon and Ge 
2004). They have measured delays in terms of the extent to which vehicles arrive 
late to their loading and/or unloading destinations relative to the delivery windows 
that have been set to them in the transport schedule. In this PhD, unnecessary time 
is measured from the time vehicles depart for their destination up to when vehicles 
arrive back at their distribution centres. In this way, uncertainty can be connected to 
extra cost in terms of extra driver labour cost. Hence, ‘extra time’ is defined as:
Any additional or unnecessary time used in the delivery process that is a 
consequence of disruptions that can occur from the time that products are 
manufactured and loaded to the moment the products are received at the 
destination that requested them in the first place
Table 8.3 shows all the types of ‘extra times’ found in the literature and the 
focus group stage of this research project. According to the conceptual model 
and focus group findings, ‘extra time’ can be originated due to a number of 
reasons. These causes are:
Type of 'extra tim e' E x am p le  o f  uncerta in ty  cause from  literature
‘Extra time’ due to unplanned road 
congestion
Unplanned road congestion (Boughton 2003)
‘Extra time’ due to delays at loading 
bays
Loading delays at shippers (Geary et al 2003)
‘Extra time’ due to delays at unloading 
bays
Unload tim e uncertainty (Esper and Williams 2003)
‘Extra time’ due to internal transport 
failures
Transport delays due to internal reasons e.g. defective 
vehicle or lack of driver (Mason et al., 2003)
Table 8.3 Types of ‘extra time’ and potential causes
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8.5.1 Unplanned road congestion
When a traffic jam occurs, either due to an accident or unexpected road works, the 
vehicle usually does not have time to divert from the optimal route selected in the 
transport plan. Thus, load arrival at the destination is delayed. Transport operations 
usually mitigate this by using real time information of the delivery process monitoring 
deliveries throughout the day with track-and-trace systems. In addition, transport 
operations include a slack on their delivery time based on DfT data on the average 
speed on every UK road and the standard deviation of these speeds.
8.5.2 Delays at loading bays
There can be two sorts of delays at loading bays, those that occur at suppliers and 
those that occur at distribution centres. Products can be delayed at supplier facilities 
due to production delays and also due to queues at loading bays. Usually when 
there is a delay at loading bays, a trade-off arises on holding the vehicle or 
scheduling an extra trip for loads left behind. When the vehicle is held, there is an 
impact on cost in terms of staff upstream in the supply chain, including warehousing 
and transport staff, and there could also be an economic cost for not having the 
product on time at the store shelf.
8.5.3 Delays at unloading facilities
There are two types of delays at unloading bays, those that originate at distribution 
centres and those that originate at the customer outlets. When product is delayed at 
a distribution centre usually is because of the fact that the vehicle is waiting for other 
vehicles to be unloaded, but sometimes, delays at distribution centres happen due to 
lack of staff at distribution centres when the vehicle needed to be unloaded. At 
customer outlets, delays occur due to insufficient staff for unloading the product. 
When the vehicle is held, there is an impact on cost in terms of staff upstream in the 
supply chain, including warehousing and transport staff,
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8.5.4 Internal transport failures
Internal transport failures, such as planning errors and technical vehicle failures, can 
originate a delay within the delivery process. This type of delay can occur before the 
vehicle starts running, when the vehicle is on the road, and when the load is dropped 
at its destination. This type of delay can increase the variable cost of transport in 
terms of staff extra hours.
8.5.5 Main causes of fextra time’
As Table 8.4 shows, the three causes of ‘extra time’ gathered during the data 
collection are ‘delays at DCs’, ‘delays at stores’ and ‘transport failures’. These 
causes of ‘extra time’ were recorded in the Excel spreadsheet that is shown in 
Appendix 6. ‘Delays at DCs’ are the cause that generated most of the ‘extra time’ 
gathered. This ‘extra time’ cause represents about 62% of the ‘extra time’ found and 
71% of the number of incidents of delays observed in the data collection. According 
to the staff involved in the data collection, this ‘extra time’ cause is due to either 
insufficient staff and/or excessive queues at the distribution centres.
Delays originated at customer outlets is another significant ‘extra time’ cause 
recorded in the study. As depicted in Table 8.4, 3.15% of the incidents gathered and 
19% of the ‘extra time’ recorded was generated by the customer outlets. The root 
cause of this issue is that there is insufficient staff for unloading at customer outlets.
i
‘Transport failures’ was the other cause of ‘extra time’ found. These represented 
19% of the total ‘extra time’ generated in the week of data collection. In addition, it 
was the less frequent cause of ‘extra time’ collected, with 14% of a total of 71 
incidents of ‘extra time’ found. According to the logistics provider’s staff, this issue 
occurs due to two reasons. The first is failures in the vehicles that delay the delivery 
process. The second is lack of coordination within the distribution network, so the 
vehicle scheduled is not available at the loading time.
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‘Extra time' type ‘Extra time' 
Cause
‘Extra time’ 
(% )
Frequency
(% )
‘Extra time' due to 
unplanned road 
congestion
Unplanned road 
congestion Not measured
‘Extra time' due to 
delays at loading bays Delays at DCs 62 71
‘Extra time' due to 
delays at unloading 
bays
Delays at stores 19 15
‘Extra time’ due to 
internal transport 
failures
Transport
failures 19 14
Table 8.4 Overall impact and frequency of the different ‘extra time’ causes found in 
the South African secondary distribution network
Due to the fact that the impact of ‘extra distance’ found in this case study is 100 
times greater than the impact of ‘extra time’, in the next section of the chapter, only 
the risk associated with ‘extra distance’ will be estimated and presented.
8.5.6 Risk assessment o f 'extra distance’ causes
In order to assess the relative importance of all the ‘extra distance’ causes, the risk 
of all them has been calculated as function of impact and probability. Figure 8.2 
shows the impact and probability of the four ‘extra distance’ causes found in the data 
collectibn.
As Figure 8.2 depicts, ‘product not loaded’ at DCs and ‘late notification of extra 
volume to be moved’ have relatively high impact and medium probability. A ‘product 
not loaded’ at DCs occurs on average just over 110 extra kilometres and occurs 
about 1.85% of the time, or to be more specific, approximately five times a day. 
Therefore, this ‘extra distance’ cause needs to be closely monitored and controlled. 
Also, in order to reduce this ‘extra distance’ cause, the logistics provider and the 
retailer should evaluate the process of picking and sorting of products, especially 
within the Johannesburg DC.
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Figure 8.2 Risk assessment of ‘extra distance’ in the South African FMCG
secondary distribution network
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A late notification of extra volume from the customer originates just over 85 extra 
kilometres and happens around 1.75% of the time, or about 5 times a day. 
Therefore, the logistics provider needs to concentrate on it in order to reduce ‘extra 
distance’. This issue is caused by inaccuracy of volume forecast by the customer, 
hence in order to minimise it, the customer needs to revise their product demand 
forecast process.
As shown in Figure 8.2, according To the assessment, ‘physical load smaller than 
advised’ occurs less than once a day (with a probability of about 0.29%) and 
generates about 60 extra kilometres per incident. Therefore, this ‘extra distance’
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cause is of medium priority, which means that the logistics provider should not focus 
on it in the initial stage of any ‘extra distance’ reduction programme, but it should be 
considered at a later stage. In order to mitigate this cause of ‘extra distance’, the 
transport planning process at the Cape Town DC requires revision.
The other ‘extra distance’ cause evaluated in this risk assessment exercise is vehicle 
size less than planned. This happens approximately once a day (with a probability of 
0.39%) and generates 30 extra kilometres per incident. Therefore, in order to reduce 
‘extra distance’, the logistics provider should focus on the other ‘extra distance’ 
causes found in the data collection.
According to the risk assessment undertaken, the logistics provider should focus on 
better monitoring and control of the volume demand forecast. However, due to the 
fact that the customer is in charge of the product demand forecast and the operation 
of the two DCs, the customer has an essential role to play in the reduction of these 
two ‘extra distance’ causes.
8.5.7 Linking 'extra distance’, uncertainty and risk
As in the previous chapter, the causes of uncertainty observed in the case study 
have been categorised according to the framework presented in Chapter 5. In some 
cases, the uncertainty arises from more than one source. These are then mapped 
against the uncertainty causes observed in the case study. In order to assess the 
relative importance of all the uncertainty causes found, the cost and CO2 emissions 
generated by the ‘extra distance’ and/or ‘extra time’ generated by them have been 
calculated, as can be seen in Table 8.5. To link uncertainty with ‘extra distance’ and 
‘extra time’, three different categories have been identified. These categories are 
considered in Figure 8.3 by increasing the thickness of the arrows that connect 
uncertainty causes with uncertainty clusters.
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Extra distance' 
type
Uncertainty
causes
‘Extra  
d istance ' d ue  
to  extra  trip s  
(Km )
‘Extra  
t im e ’ due  
to  d e lay  
(hr)
Cost (£) Kg o f C 0 2
Priority
category
Extra distance 
due to route 
diversion due to
No measured
Extra distance/ 
trips caused by
Store 41 .54 2,513 C
Suppliers 12.73 770 C
Carrier 12.73 770 C
Extra distance 
due to load 
more than 
advised due to
Late 
notification of 
extra volume 
from stores
6,648 197,246 6,469 A
Physical load 
smaller than 
advised
385 11,423 375 B
Extra distance / 
trips due to 
inappropriate 
vehicle size due 
to
Planning
failure 580
17,209 564 B
Other
Product not 
loaded at 
distribution 
centres
5,530 164,075 5,381 A
Total Cost (£) 389,953 4 ,054
Total C 0 2  (Kg) 12,789
Cost (£/Km) 29.67
Labour cost (ZAR/hr) 60.5
Average Fuel 
Consumption 0.37
Defra factor 2.63
Conversion to Kg of 
1 CO2
0.973
Table 8.5 Cost and CO2 of uncertainty causes
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Late 
notification of 
extra volume
Control
External
Uncertainty External
UncertaintyPhysical loaa smaller than 
advised
Coordination
Transport
failures
banning
failures;
C arrier
Delays at 
DCs
‘Extra
distance’
Product 
not loaded
Physical loaa 
smaller than 
advised
Delays Variable demanc 
and/or 
inaccurate 
forecast
Supplier Custom er
Late 
notification of 
extra volume.
‘Extra
time’ Unloading
delays
Cause of uncertainty
Risk categories Category A
Cluster Source of uncertainty
Category B Category C
Figure 8.3 Link between uncertainty, risk and ‘extra distance’
As depicted in Figure 8.3, it can be observed that the research suggests that 
operational issues tend to be generated to a greater extent at the customer and 
control systems rather than at the carrier. Lack of coordination at the DCs managed 
by the customer is the major supply chain uncertainty found in this case study. 
Frequently, products are not loaded on time for the deliveries due to insufficient staff 
for picking and sorting at the DCs, so this issue generates a sheer volume that 
needs to be moved by the carrier the next day and as a consequence, extra cost and 
CO2 emissions are generated. Variable demand and/or inaccurate forecast in the 
form of ‘late notification of extra volume to be moved’ is recorded as the customer 
and control systems uncertainty sources because the volume forecast process is 
one of the control systems of the whole supply chain If it is tightly integrated, 
volumes could be more accurate. However, other issues relating to the size of load 
are more focused upon how the customer manages the volumes at distribution 
centres. This issue generates unnecessary cost and CO2 emissions as well.
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Physical load smaller than advised and planning failures represent a medium priority 
for the logistics providers, due to the fact that they generate about 10% of the total 
cost and C02 emissions generated by uncertainty events gathered in the 
assessment. Also, delays at stores, at suppliers and at the carrier present a low 
priority, due to the fact that they only generate 4,054 ZAR, which is a very small 
proportion of the total cost due to uncertainty.
It is important to state once again, that the ‘extra distance’ generated due to route 
diversion in the form of unplanned road congestion was not measured. The research 
has currently failed to identify any links to route diversion, although this is likely to be 
due to the data collection approach which did not track each and every individual 
trip, on account of the lack of an appropriate telematics system at the logistics 
provider.
8.6 Transport uncertainty mitigation approach
Table 8.5 shows the approaches that the logistics provider uses to prepare for and 
mitigate uncertainty and the context in which their business is influenced by their 
behaviour towards uncertainty. For the customer, it is much more important to 
ensure that the products are available at the customer outlets at all times than to 
keep the transport cost down. As in the previous case study, distribution centres are 
cross-docking operations rather than inventory holding operations. Moreover, the 
logistics provider considered service far more important than cost, due to the fact 
that in South Africa the labour cost and the fuel cost are comparatively lower than in 
the UK. The fixed cost of transport is as high in South Africa as in the UK; this is 
primarily due to the fact that vehicles are imported from Europe or Asia to the UK 
and South Africa. Hence, the target vehicle capacity utilisation through the fleet is 
55%, so, in the case of demand uncertainty, extra volume can theoretically be 
allocated within spare capacity of originally planned trips. However, that does not 
occur since the customer imposes very tight and rigid delivery windows on the 
logistics provider.
i
In addition, the fact that the vehicles are owned by the logistics provider is a driving 
factor in the uncertainty mitigation approach that is applied in this secondary
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distribution network. However, the customer pays a fixed sum of money weekly to 
cover the fixed cost of vehicles and to ensure that vehicles are available for their 
operation. Additionally, the customer is charged the variable cost of the trips after the 
outlets receive the volumes.
On each planning day, the customer needs to send all their final and confirmed 
volume requirements by 07:00 am on the day outlet drops are executed. In addition, 
the secondary distribution centres drive volume movements between them to 
optimise the movements within the network and minimise empty miles. The transport 
plan is very rigid, so any changes due to uncertainty are added on top of the 
transport plan with extra vehicles. The customer imposes very tight time windows on 
the deliveries. Furthermore, delivery windows of outlets located at close proximity 
one to another are at different times of the day. The transport plan is fixed every day 
of the week and extra trips are added to this transport plan approved by the 
customer. All the transport planning and re-planning activities are undertaken in 
Excel.
If an extra load is generated due to operational failures within the logistics triad 
and/or due to volume increases from customer outlets, the transport planners first 
check in the transport plan whether there is space available within a vehicle or a 
number of vehicles that have spare capacity within originally planned trips. However, 
the transport planner very often decides to add a new vehicle due to the fact that 
delivery window restrictions imposed by the customer make it very difficult for the 
planner to find a planned trip with spare capacity that is scheduled for a drop in a 
store located within the area where and when the extra volume is needed.
It is important to highlight that ‘extra distance’ generated by the customer is paid by 
the customer. In the secondary distribution network studied, 90% of the ‘extra 
distance’ found is generated by the customer. Thus, the logistics provider very often 
receives an economical benefit when ‘extra distance’ is generated within the 
network. Also, it is important to note that delays do not generate ‘extra distance’, but 
cause 67 hours of ‘extra time’. This is because of the fact that in the case of delays, 
the scheduled trip, which a delayed vehicle has to make, is re-allocated to another
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vehicle, and when the delayed vehicle arrives the load originally allocated to the 
other vehicle is re-allocated to the delayed vehicle.
Customer 
main targets
Product availability High priority
Transport cost Medium priority
Cost factors
Labour cost Low
Fuel cost Medium
Fixed cost High due to import and also health and safety, vehicles are replaced every three years
Cost
structure
Vehicle ownership The logistics provider, but customer pay an amount at front to have vehicle available
Fixed cost paid by Paid by customer in front
Variable cost paid by Paid by customer when trip is completed
Transport
planning
Daily deadline Fixed transport plan, extra trips are received from the customer at 07:00 am
Volume requirements driven by Distribution centres
Flexibility
Rigid, any changes are added with extra 
vehicles. Customer imposes time restrictions 
on the stores
Vehicle capacity utilisation 55%
Fleet ownership Logistics provider
Transport plan
Fixed transport plan in Excel, the operation 
m anager take the decision to fit the extra trips 
into the transport plan
Response to 
uncertainty
Capacity available in transport plan?
Capacity utilisation is not the main target, 
customer imposes a considerable degree of 
restrictions in the delivery windows at 
unloading bays of stores
Proximity of the load?
If the additional load is more than 200  
kilometres away, a supplier is integrated into 
the trip
Who will run the extra trip?
Always the logistics provider, but vehicle can 
be provided by other fleet from other operation 
within the group the logistics provider belongs
Route re-optimisation
Due to the restricted time windows of store 
deliveries, there are not multi-store drops, 
usually single deliveries
Who pay for the load?
The entity that is generating the extra 
kilometres
Monitoring
There are two reports that summarise the extra 
trips due to late notification of volume 
increases and product left over at distribution 
centre
Table 8.6 How the logistics provider mitigates uncertainty
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8.7 Managerial implications
Although the case study presented in this chapter is a logistics provider from South 
Africa, the research has identified a number of opportunities to other transport 
operations within South Africa and other countries. From this, it is possible to identify 
some generic managerial implications. The chapter has highlighted the importance 
of measuring the impact that uncertainty has on transport performance. Previous 
research has primarily focused on proposed transport time-based performance 
measurement tools. However, from a transport operation perspective, it is equally 
important to measure transport performance in terms of distance. In this case study, 
‘extra distance’ and ‘extra time’ have been measured. The results of this combined 
assessment show that ‘extra distance’ in this case study is much more important 
than ‘extra time’. This is due to the fact that ‘extra distance’ impacts on the variable 
and fixed cost of transport, whereas ‘extra time’ only impacts on the variable cost of 
transport.
The combined time-and-distance assessment applied in this case study can be used 
as a diagnostic tool in other transport operations, especially within the FMCG sector. 
In that way, a more explicit link between uncertainty and transport performance could 
be made. Furthermore, the assessment has informed future decision making within 
the logistics provider studied.
In addition, ‘product not loaded’ at DCs generate about half of the ‘extra distance’ 
found.’ In the supply chain studied, the transport operation is run by the logistics 
provider and the warehousing operation is run by the customer. This can be 
regarded as a significant barrier between these two supply chain functions. 
Therefore, both companies need to review the warehousing process to improve the 
coordination between the DCs and the transport network. Moreover, due to the fact 
that about 40% of the ‘extra distance’ found are generated by ‘late notification of 
extra volumes’, the customer needs to evaluate the process of volume forecast from 
the stores to the logistics provider.
One issue that needs addressing is that in order to reduce ‘extra distance’, there is a 
need for the logistics provider to actively engage with the customer (as the shipper
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and receiver of the products), and that while there are overall supply chain benefits, 
these may not be evenly distributed between the two parties.
8.8 Concluding remarks
This chapter presents a combined tool that applied the ‘extra distance’ and ‘extra 
time’ measures to assess road transport functions within distribution networks. As in 
the previous chapter, the ‘extra distance’ measure can be applied to assess the 
efficiency of road transport operations in terms of distance, or more specifically in 
terms of unnecessary vehicle usages and fuel consumption. However, it is also 
important to comparatively assess the impact of ‘extra time’. In this particular case 
study, ‘extra distance’ has 100 times more impact than ‘extra time’. This is due to the 
fact that only ‘extra distance’ impact on the fixed cost of transport and also because 
of the fact that in South Africa labour cost represents a much smaller proportion of 
the overall transport cost than in the UK.
According to the results of this study, in this South Africa-based secondary 
distribution network, 6.35% of the total kilometres run are ‘extra distance’. The two 
main ‘extra distance’ causes recorded are ‘product not loaded at DCs’ and ‘late 
notification of extra volume to be moved’. Jointly, they represent approximately 90% 
of the ‘extra distance’ found. In addition, the assessment of the four causes of ‘extra 
distance’ has been carried out by calculating the risk that they represent, in terms of 
their probability and impact. In order to reduce ‘extra distance’, the logistics provider 
needs to find a mechanism to encourage the customer to improve their warehousing 
processes and their volume forecast process. Due to tight and rigid delivery windows 
imposed by the customer, the transport planning process is very rigid and very often 
the logistics provider responds to uncertainty by adding extra trips to the transport 
plan.
It is important to note that, because most of the opportunities of reducing ‘extra 
distance’ found are generated by the customer, it is the customer who will be the 
entity that can achieve most of the economical benefits, and conversely, any 
reduction of ‘extra distance’ will represent a reduction in revenue for the logistics 
provider. This is a point found in the case study presented in Chapter 7 as well and
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means that, when a logistics provider plans, manages and runs the distribution 
network, in order to achieve any reduction of ‘extra distance’, the logistics provider’s 
customer needs to find a mechanism to share the benefits with the logistics provider.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, before initiating any ‘extra distance’ reduction 
programme, the logistics provider should measure ‘extra distance’ for a longer period 
of time. The results of this study are based on data collected over a fairly average 
week. Therefore, the outcome of this exercise should inform future decision making. 
However, it is necessary to repeat the exercise in order to confirm the recurrence of 
the findings.
Up to this point, the ‘extra distance’ as a measure has been developed and tested in 
two FMCG distribution networks, one UK-based primary distribution network and one 
South Africa-based secondary distribution network. Moreover, due to the fact that 
‘extra time’ could be of significant importance in secondary distribution operations, 
the assessment undertaken in this case study also includes ‘extra time’ as a 
measure. The validity of the combined time-and-distance assessment requires 
further testing in another secondary distribution network from the UK. Furthermore, 
data on the effect that unplanned road congestion has on ‘extra time’ and ‘extra 
distance’ will be included on the analysis undertaken in the secondary distribution 
operation from the UK.
8.9 Contribution*
To methodology in logistics research
The chapter shows that when there is archival data of the effect of different types of 
uncertainty on transport performance, it is possible to collect data from different 
distribution centres within the same secondary distribution network. Also, the chapter 
demonstrates how a quantitative assessment of uncertainty can be undertaken by 
deciding the data collection approach with the practitioners that manage the 
operations prior to starting data collection. The case study identified data sources 
that could be used for the assessment. In addition, it demonstrates how quantitative 
findings can be complemented by interviews with the decision makers from the 
operation. Also, the chapter includes the ‘extra time’ as part of the assessment and
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shows how uncertainty can be evaluated in terms of time and distance in one 
assessment.
To the PhD
In this chapter, the ‘extra distance’ assessment applied in the previous chapter has 
been improved by measuring ‘extra time’ in terms of delays. Furthermore, the 
application of the tool in a secondary distribution network from another country 
shows the differences between UK and South African operations, and how the tool 
can be implemented in different networks in the world, not only in the UK. The 
application of the tool in this secondary distribution network is a foundation for the 
third case study, where a combined assessment of ‘extra distance’ and ‘extra time’ 
will be applied in a UK secondary distribution network.
To the topic
In this chapter, a FMCG secondary distribution operation from South Africa has been 
studied to show how the different causes of uncertainty can be evaluated in this type 
of operation. Variable demand and/or inaccurate forecast and lack of coordination 
represent 90% of the ‘extra distance’ gathered during the data collection. They are 
two of the main uncertainty clusters found in earlier stages in the research. The 
findings of this chapter can be used to compare the effect of uncertainty on FMCG 
transport operations in South Africa and the UK.
i
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9.0 Diagnosis of ‘extra distance’ and ‘extra time’ in a UK FMCG secondary 
distribution operation
9.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters, two case studies were applied to test the findings of the 
initial stages of the PhD at the micro level. In order to achieve that, ‘extra distance’ 
as measure was first developed and subsequently tested in the two case studies. 
These two case studies were based on data collected in two logistics providers that 
manage and run two different distribution networks, the primary one from the UK and 
the secondary one from South Africa. In both cases, the effect of unplanned road 
congestion on ‘extra distance’ and ‘extra time’ could not be measured on every trip 
planned by the logistics provider. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to 
quantitatively evaluate the consequences of different uncertainty causes, using the 
‘extra distance’ measure applied in the previous chapter and complementing that 
assessment by also including ‘extra time’. This assessment will also consider route 
diversion generated due to unplanned road congestion. In order to achieve this aim, 
a UK FMCG secondary distribution network was studied.
The chapter proceeds by briefly presenting the case study company. Subsequently, 
the method applied to conduct the case study is discussed. Following that, the 
findings from the assessment are outlined. Also, the existent connections between 
uncertainty and risk and ‘extra distance’ and ‘extra time’ are explicitly drawn. 
Moreover, a section on the tools applied by the case study company to mitigate 
uncertainty will be included to link the results of the survey in previous chapters and 
how the case study company mitigates uncertainty. Finally, the chapter ends by 
highlighting the managerial implications and limitations of the research and the 
contribution to knowledge of the chapter.
9.2 Case study context
In this case study, the ‘extra distance’ measure has been applied to the UK 
secondary distribution network, depicted in Figure 9.1. This secondary distribution 
network is managed and run entirely by one of the biggest FMCG companies in the
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UK. They have a considerable number of secondary distribution centres within the 
UK. This network includes 172 locations most of which are outlets (about 89 outlets, 
59 suppliers and 24 distribution centres). Outlet deliveries represent about 85% of 
the forward flows of the network, but the operations of this distribution centre include 
backloads performed for suppliers and other distribution centres in the South of 
England. For this case study, a secondary distribution centre located in North 
London has been selected. The transport operation within this network is managed 
and run by the case study company, and during the data collection, the researcher 
spent five days training to use the transport ICT (Information and Communication 
Technology) system that the company uses to optimise, track and trace, and re­
optimise the whole network. This company manages and runs the secondary 
distribution network, but they outsource a significant proportion of the primary 
distribution network to a number of logistics providers. The North London secondary 
distribution section of this company, which sits between the DC and outlets, will be 
the focus of this case study, but also a small proportion of backhaul and primary 
flows will be included in the assessment.
Primary Distribution Secondary Distribution
Logistics
Provider
Logistics
Provider
Retailer
Store
Retailer
DC
Supplier
 Physical flows Focus in this chapter
Information flows
Figure 9.1 Transport operation position within UK FMCG secondary distribution 
network
The transport planning process is run by the case study company. They use an ICT 
transport system that includes three modules. One of the modules optimises the
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network, including backhaul opportunities, volume demand from outlets, locations 
from all the outlets and any primary volumes required from suppliers that can fit 
within the secondary distribution fleet available. Following that, when the deliveries 
are executed, another module tracks and traces the vehicles to determine whether 
the vehicles are either late or too early. That information is fed into another device 
that controls the vehicles within the transport fleet. This information is fed into the 
third module where updated information, in terms of vehicle availability, is used to re­
optimise the network. This process is repeated several times during the same day.
There are a number of reasons why this particular case was selected:
• The ‘extra distance’ tool was applied to a secondary distribution network in 
South Africa, so it was interesting to apply the measure in another secondary 
distribution from the UK
• It was also necessary to draw a comparison between primary and secondary 
distribution operations within the UK
• The network studied has the appropriate Telematics system to measure the 
impact of external uncertainty causes such as unplanned road congestion in 
terms of ‘extra distance’ and ‘extra time’
• The secondary distribution centre located in North London was selected due 
to the fact that its network includes a combination of locations that together 
are different from the rest of the UK. The secondary distribution network 
managed and run by this distribution centre includes flows from areas in
 ^London located to the north of the River Thames. These areas could present 
considerable problems of unplanned road congestion. In addition, the network 
studied also covered areas of the East Midlands that are located to the north 
of the River Thames.
9.3 Method
As in the first case study, in order to undertake the ‘extra distance’ assessment in 
this secondary distribution network from the UK, the principles of the case study 
method have been applied, since the tool needed to be tested in a different 
distribution network. The unit of analysis of this case study is a FMCG secondary
190
distribution operation. This operation was chosen since the aim was to undertake a 
comprehensive assessment of ‘extra distance’ and ‘extra time’.
In the planning stage of the study, a presentation based on the findings from the first 
case study was delivered at a meeting with the management staff of the transport 
operation of the company studied. The main objective of this presentation was to set 
the planning of the case study and decide the scale and scope of the project. 
Another objective of this meeting was to evaluate the suitability of the ‘extra distance’ 
measure in their operation. As noted earlier, the case study company has several 
secondary distribution centres located within the UK. However, in order to keep the 
project on a realistic scale, the North London secondary distribution network was 
selected for the assessment.
Before starting data collection, the author spent five days in the transport office of the 
secondary distribution centre. The reason for this was that the author needed to 
identify data sources for the assessment and familiarise himself with the case study 
company ICT transport system. Subsequently, the data was collected remotely from 
the researcher’s workplace. This made the process more productive and reduced the 
cost of the data collection.
During the data collection, two separate assessments were undertaken. These two 
assessments were undertaken in the week between 27th November at 19:00 and 4th 
December at 19:00. This week was regarded by the case study company as an
i
average week. The reasons for conducting two separate assessments were: (1) to 
measure ‘extra distance’ by applying the same principles applied in the other two 
case studies; (2) to measure ‘extra time’ in terms of delays as was measured in the 
South African secondary distribution network; and (3) to include route diversion in 
analysis since in the other case studies the information was not available. The first 
assessment was undertaken by gathering all the extra trips caused by uncertainty 
that occurred during the week of data collection. In this assessment, as in the 
second case study, the extra trips that occurred in the week of data collection were 
gathered from a report produced manually in the transport department of the 
secondary distribution centre studied. All ‘extra distance’ incidents identified were 
input into an Excel spreadsheet, which is shown in Appendix 7. The role of this Excel
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spreadsheet was to undertake an evaluation of the different causes of uncertainty. 
Therefore, the frequency and impact of each of the ‘extra distance’ causes was 
quantified. As in the first case study, a risk assessment was undertaken to support 
the decision makers in evaluating the ‘extra distance’ causes found in terms of their 
relative priority.
In the first assessment, as in the first case study, detailed information about the trips 
that generate ‘extra distance’ was recorded; this information includes: outlet location, 
kilometres run, fuel consumption of the trip, ‘extra distance’ cause. As in the other 
two case studies, in this chapter, ‘extra distance’ is calculated in kilometres, due to 
the fact that this is the metric unit used by the company. The extra kilometres of all 
the extra trips identified were calculated by using Paragon. As in the previous two 
chapters, the relative accuracy of Paragon against Google and AutoRoute was 
checked (see Table 7.1). In the spreadsheet, the number of ‘extra distance’ incidents 
generated by each uncertainty cause was calculated. The cost of every incident of 
‘extra distance’ was calculated by multiplying the cost per kilometres that the 
logistics provider charges their customer, which is £1 per kilometre. Also, the kg of 
CO2 emitted due to every incident of ‘extra distance’ was calculated by multiplying 
the extra kilometres generated for every ‘extra distance’ incident by the actual fuel 
consumption of the trip, as recommended by the Carbon Trust (2009), provided by 
the case study company, and by the road freight transport conversion factor for 
diesel recommended by Defra (2007), 2.63. In addition, the cost of delays was 
calculated by multiplying the ‘extra time’ generated by every incident of ‘extra time’ 
by the labour cost per hour, £14 per hour. Furthermore, as in the first case study, a 
risk assessment of the ‘extra distance’ causes found was undertaken, so the 
probability and impact of each cause were calculated.
The second assessment was undertaken by comparing the original transport plan 
with the actual execution of the delivery process during the week of data collection. 
This week can be described as a typical average week that fairly reflects what 
happened through a twelve month period. In order to collect the data, a stratified 
sampling strategy was applied based on three attributes, location, time of day and 
day of the week. Forty-one per cent of the planned picks and/or drops served by the 
North London secondary distribution were selected for the second assessment. In
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fact, 30% of the trips for every location covered in the network were selected. In 
addition, for every hour within the 24 hrs of every seven days of the week, 30% of 
the trips were selected. The researcher chose 30% of the trips and not 100%, since 
the data gathering process was very time consuming and the researcher had limited 
time to finish the data collection. Furthermore, 30% of the trips gathered are a fair 
reflection of what happened in 100% of the trips.
In the second assessment, for every trip identified, the planned and actual 
turnaround times for every dropping and/or loading point within the trips were 
gathered. Moreover, the planned and actual total delivery times were collected from 
the system, together with any unplanned stops reported by drivers. Apart from that, 
planned and actual data on fuel consumption and kilometres run were gathered. 
With this data, the difference between actual and plan was calculated in terms of 
percentage for four variables: turnaround time, vehicle running time, and total extra 
kilometres run for each of the trips gathered. These calculations were conducted in 
the Excel spreadsheet shown in Appendix 8.
In this assessment, two different factors were explored: the causes of ‘extra time’ 
within the network and the causes of ‘extra distance’ due to route diversion within the 
network. In the case of delays, the reason why vehicles were delayed was identified 
and categorised and the cumulative time delayed for each cause of delay was 
calculated. The cost of delays was calculated by multiplying the ‘extra time’ 
generpted by every incident of ‘extra time’ by the driver labour cost per hour. In the 
case of ‘extra distance’ due to route diversion, the extra kilometres run within the 
networks were categorised depending on the cause of ‘extra distance’ due to route 
diversion found. The cost and CO2 emissions of every incident of ‘extra distance’ 
were calculated in the same way as in the first assessment.
Apart from that, in the second assessment, a variance analysis of the four variables 
named previously was undertaken using four factors identified during the analysis: 
geographical location of the trips, time of the day and day of the week, and the 
number of locations that each trip involved. The reason for analysing the variance 
based on these four variables was to identify different degrees of variances 
generated by these four factors. Eleven geographical locations were selected using
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two referential locations: the secondary distribution centre and central London. Also, 
five time periods were identified: 22:00 till 04:00, 04:00 till 09:00, 09:00 till 12:00, 
12:00 till 17:00 and 17:00 till 22:00. These time periods were selected based on the 
degree of traffic congestion and the number of staff available in the company outlets. 
They were approved by the management staff within the transport function of the 
company. Moreover, the variance analysis was undertaken by considering the day of 
the week when the deliveries were executed, since it was intended to consider the 
difference in volume and traffic congestion in the seven days of the week. 
Furthermore, trips with one, two and three loading and/or unloading locations were 
identified and they were categorised depending on the number of locations had. 
Thus, the impact of having more or fewer locations within a trip was considered by 
undertaking a variance analysis. In this exercise, a risk assessment was undertaken 
to establish the level of importance of the different causes of ‘extra distance’ 
identified due to route diversion. Also, a risk assessment was undertaken to estimate 
the probability and impact of ‘extra time’ in terms of delays.
In addition, a calculation of the cost and CO2 emissions of all the causes of ‘extra 
distance’ and ‘extra time’ recorded in the two assessments was undertaken. The 
extra kilometres of the two causes of route diversion calculated from the second 
assessment were scaled to 100% of the kilometres run in the network. This scaling 
factor is 3.51, which is the result of dividing the total kilometres run in the network, 
300,341 kilometres, by the kilometres of all of the trips gathered in the second 
assessment, 85,477 Kilometres. In order to scale the ‘extra time’ gathered in the 
second assessment to the total number of trips run in the network, a time scaling 
factor was calculated dividing the total trips run in the week of data .collection, 1,957 
trips, by the total number of trips gathered in the second assessment, 585 trips.
To understand more about the root causes of ‘extra distance’ and ‘extra time’ and 
the tools the company applied to mitigate uncertainty, informal interviews and 
discussions were held with management staff within the secondary distribution 
operation studied from the company transport department. These discussions also 
helped confirm the validity of the exercise.
After finishing the analysis of the data, the findings from the study were fed back to 
the management staff directly involved with the study. In that meeting, all the
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managers involved validated the findings. From their perspective, this presentation 
represented a starting point towards identifying the potential mitigation strategies to 
reduce ’extra distance’ and ‘extra time’.
9.4 Results and analysis
In this section of the chapter, the overall results of the data collection will be 
presented first (Table 9.1). This includes the two assessments undertaken in the 
study. Following that, the causes of ‘extra distance’ derived from the two 
assessments will be evaluated and also the relative risk that the two sorts of ‘extra 
distance’ raise: ‘extra distance’ due to extra trips; and ‘extra distance’ due to route 
diversion of originally planned trips. Subsequently, the causes of ‘extra time’ found in 
the second exercise will be assessed together with an evaluation of their risk. For the 
two assessments, a variance analysis of time and distance will also be, included in 
this section. Moreover, the link between these and uncertainty will be explicitly drawn 
based on a cost analysis of the different causes of ‘extra distance’ and ‘extra time’.
First
A ssessm ent
Kilometres run 300,341
Extra distance' due to extra trips 9,170
% 'Extra distance' 3.05
Cost (£) 9 ,170
Kg of C O 2 7,705
Second
A ssessm ent
Kilometres run 85,477
Extra distance' due to route 
diversion of planned trips 4080
% 'Extra distance’ 4 .77
Cost (£) 4 ,008
Kg of C O 2 3,368
Total delivery time (hr) 2902
Delays (hr) 276
Early deliveries (hr) -200
'Extra time' 76
% 2.62
Cost (£) 1,064
Table 9.1 Overall findings of ‘extra distance’ and ‘extra time’ on the secondary 
distribution centre network
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In the first assessment, a total of 9,170 km were run due to uncertainty. This 
represents 3.05% of the total kilometres run in the secondary distribution network, 
which represents £9,170 and 7,705 Kg of C02. On the other hand, in the second 
assessment, from a total of 85,477 km run in the network, 4.77% were run due to 
route diversion generated by either unplanned road congestion or ad-hoc and 
unexpected road restrictions imposed by the 27 London boroughs that the 
distribution centre covered. When the data sample is scaled to 100% of the trips, 
route diversion represents about £14,083 of extra cost and 11,820 extra Kg of C02 
in the week of data collection. Even though route diversion has a larger impact on 
transport cost and C02 emissions, a great proportion of it is generated by ad-hoc 
and unexpected road restrictions that are imposed by 27 London boroughs. Thus, 
the case study company needs first to concentrate on mitigating the uncertainties 
generated internally in their operations or their partners’ operations and 
subsequently working together with the government to mitigate route diversion. This 
will be discussed in more detail in the following section of the chapter.
In addition, in the second assessment, 2.62% of the total hours dedicated for the 
deliveries, 2,902 hr, were ‘extra time’. In fact, 276 hr of delays and 200 hr of early 
deliveries were found, so the net figure is 76 hr, which is the estimate of extra driver 
hours generated by delays, although it is important to say that overall there is a 
considerable degree of unreliability in the delivery time. When the data sample is 
scaled to 100% of the trips, ‘extra time’ added £3,739 to the total transport cost. It is 
important to say delays always cause ‘extra time’, but do not always cause ‘extra 
distance’. When a delay causes ‘extra distance’, it has a greater impact on cost and 
the environment, since it increases, the fixed cost of transport and also generates 
extra CO2 emissions, but when they generate ‘extra time’, delays only increase the 
variable labour cost incurred during the delivery process .
In the rest of this section, more in-depth insights from the analysis will be discussed.
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9.4.1 Assessment of 'extra distance’ due to extra trips
9.4.1.1 Main causes o f 'extra distance’
As Table 9.2 shows, in the first assessment, eight causes of ‘extra distance' due to 
extra trips were found. Delays within the delivery process generated 69% of the extra 
kilometres found in the assessment and 62% of the ‘extra distance’ incidents 
recorded during the assessment. Outlets generated a greater proportion of the extra 
kilometres caused by delays (56%) in comparison to suppliers (6%) and unplanned 
road congestion (7%). Meanwhile, another less important, but still considerable, 
cause of ‘extra distance’ found was late notification of extra volume from either 
outlets (15%) or suppliers (4%). It is important to note that at outlets these two 
causes of ‘extra distance’ together generated 71% of the ‘extra distance’ measured 
in the first assessment.
‘Extra distance' type ‘Extra distance' Cause
Extra
Distance'
(% )
Frequency
(%)
Extra distance due 
to route diversion
Unplanned road congestion Measured in the second assessment
Extra distance/trips 
due to delays
Loading delays at shippers 6 8
Loading delays at outlets 56 59
Unplanned road congestion 7 5
Extra distance/trips 
due to load more 
than advised
Late notification of extra 
volume from suppliers
4 4
Late notification of extra 
volume from outlets
19 20
Extra distance/trips 
due to load less 
than advised
Physical load smaller than 
, advised
0 0 '
Extra distance/trips 
due inappropriate 
vehicle size Technical vehicle failure
4 1
Product not loaded at DC 3 3
Product not loaded at 
supplier
2 1
Product mis-loaded 0 0
Table 9.2 Overall impact and frequency of the different ‘extra distance’ causes due 
to extra distance found in the UK secondary distribution network
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The other three causes of ‘extra distance’ found are ‘technical vehicle failure’, 
‘product not loaded’ at the secondary distribution centre studied and ‘product not 
loaded at suppliers’: The first generates 4% of the total extra kilometres found apd 
the second represents 3% of the ‘extra distance’ recorded. ‘Product not loaded at 
suppliers’ represents only 2% of the total extra kilometres gathered in the 
assessment. Technical vehicle failure’ generates ‘extra distance’ since when a 
vehicle presenting a technical failure is not available for departure and in some 
cases only other smaller sized vehicles are available, then two small-sized vehicles 
are needed instead of one large-sized vehicle. On the other hand, when the product 
is not loaded at the distribution centre or suppliers, a sheer volume accumulates for 
the next day and this product ultimately needs to be moved, adding extra kilometres 
to the original transport plan. However, these three causes of ‘extra distance’ should 
not be at the top of the priority list of any ‘extra distance’ reduction programme.
9.4.1.2 Risk assessment of 'extra distance’ causes due to extra trips
In order to assess the relative importance of all the ‘extra distance’ causes, the risk 
of all them has been calculated as function of impact and probability. Figure 9.2 
shows the impact and probability of the four ‘extra distance’ causes found in the data 
collection.
As Figure 9.2 depicts, ‘delays at outlets’ has a relatively much higher risk than the 
rest of ‘extra distance’ causes found. This is due, to a large extent, to its relatively 
higher probability of occurrence. There seems to be a considerable level of 
inefficiency in the unloading process at outlets, so, in order to mitigate this cause of 
‘extra distance’, the productivity of the unloading process at outlets, including the 
capacity of unloading bays, should be reviewed. Furthermore, other ‘extra distance’ 
cause that represent a considerable risk for the operation is ‘late notification of extra 
volume to be moved at outlets’. This cause presents the second highest probability 
of occurrence, about 1.00%, of all the causes of ‘extra distance’ found.
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due to either delays and/or volume increases. Therefore, these two problems should 
be corrected locally rather than centrally throughout the network.
According to the risk assessment undertaken, the company should focus on better 
monitoring and control of the delivery process to lessen the delays at outlets. Also, 
they need to check how certain outlets are forecasting their volume requirements.
9.4.2 Assessment of 'extra distance’ due to route diversion of originally 
planned trips
9.4.2.1 Main causes of route diversion
Table 9.3 shows the results of the assessment of ‘extra distance’ due to route 
diversion of originally planned trips. Two main causes of ‘extra distance’ due to route 
diversion were found: unplanned road congestion and ad-hoc and unexpected road 
restrictions. Both are external causes originating outside the logistics triad. There are 
restrictions that are not pre-established and informed to the case study company by 
the local government in London. The 27 London boroughs impose road restriction to 
truck operators in an ad-hoc and unexpected manner. These restrictions are 
imposed since trucks are perceived to generate noise during the night, so the 
government decided to restrict access to a considerable number of roads in Central 
London. These restrictions change very frequently and are regarded as ad-hoc by 
the management staff of the operation. The issue is that each London borough 
changfes the restrictions in an uncoordinated manner. This cause of ‘extra distance’ 
generates 61% of the extra kilometres caused by route diversion of originally 
planned trips and 14% of the incidents gathered in the second assessment are route 
diversion due to ad-hoc and unexpected road restrictions. The company could ask 
the government to be more flexible and avoid restricting certain roads, but this is a 
problem that is very difficult to eliminate, since the government has the role of 
protecting residential and commercial neighbourhoods. Therefore, ad-hoc and 
unexpected road restriction should be better embedded into the transport plan, so 
the planned kilometres of the restricted routes are more accurate, but the case study 
company need the support of the local London government.
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No ‘Extra distance’ cause
1 Delays at outlets
2 Late notification of extra volume to be 
moved at outlets
3 Delays at suppliers
4 Technical vehicle failures
5 Late notification of extra volume to be 
moved at suppliers
6 Unplanned road congestion
7 Product not loaded at suppliers
8 Product not loaded at DCs
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Figure 9.2 Risk assessment of ‘extra distance’ causes due to extra trips
A total of six causes of ‘extra distance’ represent less risk for the operation than the 
other two ‘extra distance’ causes discussed previously. These six causes of ‘extra 
distance’ are: ‘volume increase at outlets’; ‘volume increase at suppliers’; delays at 
suppliers’, ‘product not loaded at suppliers’ ‘product not loaded at DC’ and ‘technical 
vehicle failure’. From all these causes of ‘extra distance’, the only causes that should 
be carefully considered are: volume increases in particular generated by outlets. This 
means that the forecast process undertaken to estimate the product demand 
requirement at outlets needs to be revised. It is important to state that out of the 
outlets in the network, eight outlets generated the vast majority of ‘extra distance’
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‘Extra distance* 
type
‘Extra distance* Cause Extra
Distance*
(%)
Frequency
(%)
Extra distance due 
to route diversion
Unplanned road congestion 39 86
Ad-hoc and unexpected 
road restrictions 61 14
Table 9.3 Overall impact and frequency of the different ‘extra distance’ causes due 
to route diversion of existent trips found in the UK secondary distribution network
In addition, unplanned road congestion was the other ‘extra distance’ cause found in 
the second assessment due to route diversion. It generated 39% of the extra 
kilometres gathered, but it occurs 86% of the time. Route diversion due to unplanned 
road congestion occurs due to the fact that most of the time drivers select the 
quickest route, but that route is not always the most environmentally friendly. Within 
the case study company, the sales department is a customer of the transport 
department. From an economical viewpoint, the sales department wants the 
products to be on time at outlets. Therefore, drivers feel that they need to take the 
quickest route possible. Furthermore, as in the case of the incidents due to ad-hoc 
and unexpected road restrictions, the planned kilometres need to be revised and 
made more accurate with the support of the London City authorities.
According to the variance analysis, the coverage areas that presented more variance 
in terms of extra kilometres are Central London, East London, North West London 
and §outh West London. These areas are the areas covered by the London 
distribution centre network that are affected by ad-hoc and unexpected road 
restrictions. Moreover, the greater variance in terms of extra kilometres occurs within 
the time period from 04:00 to 12:00. Within this time, most of the outlets are stocked 
for the rest of the day, and that combined with a higher intensity of passenger 
transport movements generates a greater degree of and more variability in traffic 
congestion on the road that considerably builds from 06:00 until 12:00. Additionally, 
greater variation in terms of extra kilometres is generated from Tuesday to Friday. 
There is more variation from Tuesday to Friday since there is more chance of
i
diversion due to unplanned road congestion on weekdays than at weekends. 
Furthermore, the trips with only one supply chain link are the ones that present
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greater variation. It is important to say that these single trips are most of the time 
outlet deliveries to London areas located in Zone 1, so they tend to have more traffic 
congestion problems than those that involve two or three links, as with supplier 
collections outside London. These types of trips are generally run on motorways that 
have much less traffic congestion problems than roads inside the London area.
9.4.2.2 Risk assessment o f ‘extra distance’ causes due to route diversion
In order to assess the relative importance of all the ‘extra distance’ causes due to 
route diversion, the risk of all them has been calculated as function of impact and 
probability.
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Figure 9.3 Risk assessment of ‘extra distance’ causes due to route diversion
As explained in the previous section, unplanned road congestion is an ‘extra 
distance’ cause that cannot possibly be mitigated and in this risk assessment has 
relatively high occurrence but low impact, while ad-hoc and unexpected road 
restrictions have relatively low occurrence but high impact (Figure 9.3). However, it is 
important to conduct a joint analysis of the cost and CO2 emissions of all the 
uncertainty causes found in this case study, including route diversion and delays.
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Thus, the magnitude of all uncertainty causes found can be better compared. This 
will be done after presenting the assessment of ‘extra time’ due to delays.
9.4.3 Assessment o f 'extra tim e’ due to delays
9.4.3.1 Main causes of 'extra tim e’
As Table 9.4 depicts, the four causes of ‘extra time’ gathered during the data 
collection are ‘delays at suppliers’, ‘delays at outlets’, ‘delays due to unplanned 
stops’ and ‘delays due to unplanned road congestion’. ‘Delays due to unplanned 
stops’ made by drivers are the ‘extra time’ cause that generated more hours of 
delays and occurred more frequently. This ‘extra time’ cause occurs since legally 
drivers have the right of a break if the journey is more than 7 hours. The issue in this 
case is that these stops are not included in the initial transport plan. The case study 
company cannot possibly mitigate this ‘extra time’ cause, since it occurs due to a 
government regulation, so it is a restriction that needs to be included into the 
transport plan but cannot be eliminated.
‘Extra tim e' type ‘Extra  tim e ' C ause ‘Extra  
tim e ’ (%)
Frequency
(%)
‘Extra time’ due to delays 
at loading bays
Delays at DCs 0 0
Delays at suppliers 30 21
‘Extra time’ due to delays 
at unloading bays Delays at outlets
33 31
‘Extra time’ due to internal 
transport failures
Unplanned stops 34 45
v Unplanned road 
congestion 3 3
Table 9.4 Overall impact and frequency of the different ‘extra time’ causes found in 
the UK secondary distribution network
The two causes of ‘extra time’ that can be mitigated by the retailer and its partners 
are delays originated at outlets and suppliers. ‘Delays at outlets’ represents 33% of 
the total hours of delays gathered in the data collection and are a third of the total 
incidents of delays found. Furthermore, ‘delays at suppliers’ generated 30% of the
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hours of delays and are a fifth of the total incidents found. These delays are 
generated by operational problems at loading and unloading bays. At unloading 
bays, the vehicles need to wait excessively to be unloaded, so they arrive late at the 
distribution centre. This problem is caused primarily by lack of productivity at outlets 
or perhaps insufficient staff for unloading. At loading bays, the loads to be collected 
are not ready, so vehicles need to wait for the complete load. These two causes of 
‘extra time’ increase the labour cost of transport, since drivers need to work 
overtime.
In terms of variance, the areas that presented more variance in terms of outlet 
turnaround time are East London, South West London, North and North East. There 
are a number of outlets in these areas that have insufficient staff available to unload 
products. Also, the variance analysis shows greater variance between 22:00 and 
09:00. In these two periods of time, most of the outlets are stocked for the rest of the 
day, so the outlets receive a disproportionate volume of products in comparison with 
the rest of the day. Moreover, much of the variation in turnaround time is generated 
from Tuesday to Thursday and on Sunday. On these days, there is more variation 
due to the fact that there are greater volumes coming to the outlets. Meanwhile there 
are insufficient staffs available to unload the products in the outlets. Furthermore, the 
trips with only one supply chain link are the ones that show more variation in terms of 
turnaround time and net vehicle running time. This is because of the fact that outlets 
tend to be more unreliable in terms of turnaround time than suppliers.
The other ‘extra time’ cause found is unplanned road congestion. This represents 
3% of the extra hours gathered during the exercise. Unplanned road congestion has 
a much smaller impact than delays at outlets and suppliers, since this uncertainty 
cause usually generates more kilometres but not delays. In fact, this uncertainty 
cause can cause vehicles to arrive earlier at their destination, since by using 
Telematics systems; the driver can take a quicker but longer route if traffic 
congestion problems are promptly anticipated. Generally across all the DC coverage 
areas, the variation is more skewed towards the negative side of the scatter plot 
which means that most of the trjps lasted less time than their planned vehicle 
running time. This is a reflection of the fact that in this supply chain, time is more
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important than distance, so drivers are encouraged to arrive on time at their 
destinations no matter the kilometres they need to run.
9.4.3.2 Risk assessment o f ‘extra tim e’ causes due to delays
In order to assess the relative importance of all the ‘extra time’ causes, the risk of all 
of them has been calculated as function of impact and probability. Figure 9.4 shows 
the risk assessment of ‘extra time’ causes due to delays generated in the data 
collection. Even though delays due to unplanned stops have the highest impact and 
probability of occurrence, it does not represent an important priority for the company, 
since drivers are entitled to a break by law. The two ‘extra time’ causes that have 
medium risk for the operation are delays at outlets and at suppliers. These two 
causes are the areas of greater opportunity where the retailer can look for reduction 
of ‘extra time’.
25.00
20.00
c0>2
•£ 15.00
c
E,
I  10.00 
E
9
5.00
0.00
0.00 2.00 4.00 6.00 8.00
Probability (%)
10.00 12.00
No ‘Extra distance’ cause
1 Delays at outlets
2 Delays due to unplanned stops
3 Delays at suppliers
4 Delays due to unplanned road congestion
Figure 9.4 Risk assessment of ‘extra time’ causes due to delays
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9.4.4 Linking 'extra distance’ and 'extra time’ to uncertainty
In order to assess the relative importance of all the uncertainty causes found in the 
study, the cost and CO2 emissions generated by their ‘extra distance’ and/or ‘extra 
time’ have been calculated, as can be seen in Table 9.5. To link uncertainty with 
‘extra distance’ and ‘extra time’, three different categories have been identified. 
These categories are considered in Figure 9.5 by increasing the thickness of the 
arrows that connect uncertainty causes with uncertainty clusters.
Extra
distance'
type
Uncertainty
causes
‘Extra 
distance' 
due to extra 
trips (Km)
‘Extra 
distance' due 
to route 
diversion 
(Km)
‘Extra time’ 
due to 
delay (hr)
Cost
(£)
Kg of 
C02
Priority
category
Extra distance 
due to route 
diversion due 
to
Ad-hoc and 
unexpected 
oad 
restrictions
2,520 8,845 7,517 A
Unplanned
Road
Congestion
1,488 6 5,523 4,713 A
Extra 
distance/ trips 
caused by
Outlets 5,173 92 6,461 4,362 A
Suppliers 510 83 1,672 438 B
Unplanned
stops 95 1,330 0 B
Unplanned
Road
Congestion
625 625 535 A
Extra distance 
due to load 
more than 
advised due 
to
Late 
notification of 
extra volume 
from outlets
1,721 1,721 1,189 B
Late 
notification of 
extra volume 
from suppliers
348 348 286 C
Extra distance 
/ trips due to 
inappropriate 
vehicle size 
due to
Technical 
vehicle failure 357 357
306 C
Other
Product not 
loaded at 
distribution 
centres
247 247 210 C
Product not 
loaded at 
suppliers
189 189 154 C
Early
deliveries -200
Total Cost (£) 9,170 14,068 3,301
Total C02 (Kg) 7,705 11,820 0
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Factors used for the calculation
First Assessment (Km) 300341
Second Assessment (Km) 85477
Kilometre scaling factor 3.51
Time scaling factor 3.30
Cost (£/Km) 1
Labour cost (£/hr) 14
Defra factor 2.63
T a b le  9 .5  Cost and CO2 of uncertainty causes
As in the previous two chapters, the causes of uncertainty gathered in this case 
study have been clustered according to the framework developed in Chapter 5. In 
some instances, uncertainty arises from more than one source. These are then 
mapped against the cause of ‘extra distance’ and/or ‘extra time’ observed in the case 
study. The results can be seen in Figure 9.5.
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•^Xtra volume Control
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Unloading
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Loading
delays Coordination Product not 
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F ig u re  9 .5  Link between uncertainty, ‘extra distance’ and ‘extra time’
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As Figure 9.5 shows, it can be observed that operational issues within the delivery 
process tend to be generated to a greater extent at the customer and supplier, rather 
than at the carrier. External sources of uncertainty, such as route diversion due to 
unplanned road congestion and ad-hoc and unexpected road restrictions, are the 
main uncertainty causes found in this case study. Together they represent £14,083 
of extra cost and 11,820 kg of additional CO2. These external causes of uncertainty 
can be linked back to the uncertainty cluster of delivery constraints found in the focus 
groups (see Chapter 5). However, in these two uncertainty causes the influence on 
them of the case study company can be marginal, since they are generated by 
government regulations and/or traffic congestion problems. Therefore, it is more a 
case of embedding them better into the transport plan to budget their cost more 
realistically and also to internalise their environmental impact. Unloading delays at 
outlets are the main internal cause of uncertainty found in the case study. These 
generate extra trips that increase the economic and environmental cost of transport, 
and they also generate ‘extra time’ that is added to the time originally planned for the 
trips.
Delays are originated at outlets to a greater extent than at the suppliers. Delays at 
outlets generated £6,461 of extra cost and 4,346 of extra kg of CO2 in the week of 
data collection.
Variable demand and/or inaccurate forecast in the form of ‘late notification of extra 
volume to be moved’ is recorded as the customer, the supplier and control systems 
uncertainty sources, since the volume forecast process is embedded into the ICT of 
the case study company and the suppliers are supposed to be integrated with it. 
However, just fewer than 10% of the outlets generate most of the extra trips due to 
‘late notification of extra volume’. This uncertainty cause represents £1,720 of extra 
cost and 1,446 extra Kg of CO2. Therefore, this uncertainty cause seems to be a 
local operational problem generated at the specific outlets, rather than a central 
issue originating in the company central planning department.
All four clusters of uncertainty found in the focus groups have been recorded in this 
case study. These are: delays, variable demand and/or inaccurate forecast, delivery 
constraints and insufficient supply chain coordination. Delays always generate ‘extra
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time’ in terms of extra driver cost, but do not always generate ‘extra distance’ in 
terms of extra kilometres run. Consequently, they have a greater impact on cost and 
on the environment if they cause vehicles to miss the next load scheduled for them, 
and as a result, extra trips are added to the transport plan. On the other hand, 
variable demand and/or inaccurate forecast and lack of coordination always 
generate ‘extra distance’ but not ‘extra time’.
In the previous two case studies, the extra kilometres generated due to route 
diversion were not measured due to the absence of an appropriate Telematics 
system. Owing to the fact that the case study company possesses a very advanced 
ICT transport system capable of comparing plan and actual, the ‘extra distance’ 
generated due to unplanned road congestion and ad-hoc and unexpected road 
restrictions has been measured.
9.5 Transport uncertainty mitigation approach
The approaches that the case study company take are shown in Table 9.6. They are 
driven by the fact that it is equally important to ensure that the products are available 
at stores at all times so as to keep the transport cost as low as possible. As in the 
previous two case studies, distribution centres are cross-docking operations rather 
than inventory holding operations. As in the first case study, high labour cost, high 
fuel prices and high fixed cost of vehicles economically encourage the customer to 
optimise the network tightly. Also, as in the UK primary distribution network, the 
target vehicle capacity utilisation through this network is 85%, so disturbances or 
disruptions are very likely to generate ‘extra distance’.
In terms of the transport planning process, the outlets need to submit all their final 
and confirmed volume requirements by 07:00 am on the day that loads need to be 
moved. In addition, the secondary distribution centre studied moves volume from 
other secondary distribution centres. The transport plan is completely flexible; if there 
is a vehicle that is delayed, the transport system allocates the next load initially 
scheduled for that vehicle to other vehicles. Also, if there is a vehicle that arrives 
early at its destination, the system allocates other loads to that vehicle. The ICT 
transport system plans and re-optimises the network. It can be described as a
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transport system that continuously optimises the network. This system consists of 
three modules: Paragon, IsoTrack and Fleet Controller. Paragon is the network 
optimisation tool, IsoTrack is the track-and-trace tool and Fleet controller is the tool 
that updates the availability of vehicles and feeds this information into Paragon which 
then re-optimises the network.
Customer
main
targets
Product availability High priority
Transport cost High priority
Cost
factors
Labour cost High
Fuel cost High due to tax duty
Fixed cost High due to tax duty
Cost
structure
Vehicle ownership
Customer owns all the vehicles used for secondary deliveries 
and these vehicles are used to do 20%  of the primary 
collections through backhaul of store vehicles, the rest of 
them are undertaken by logistics providers
Fixed cost paid by Internal and control by the customer
Variable cost paid by Internal and control by the customer
Transport
planning
Daily deadline Inputted into Paragon by 07:00 am
Volume requirements 
driven by Stores and suppliers
Flexibility
Totally flexible, if there is a vehicle that is delayed the 
transport system allocates the next load initially scheduled for 
that vehicle to other vehicle. Also, if there is a vehicle that is 
early, the system allocate other load to that vehicle
Vehicle capacity 
utilisation 85%
Fleet ownership Customer
Transport ICT system
This can be described as a transport system that continuously 
optimises the network. There are three systems: Paragon- the 
network optimisation tool, IsoTrack- the track-and-trace tool 
and Fleet controller- the tool that update the availability and 
location of vehicles and feed this information into Paragon and 
Paragon then re-optimise the network
Response
to
uncertainty
Capacity available in 
transport plan?
Paragon re-optimises the network if there is capacity available 
within the system, but usually uncertainty generates extra trips 
due to the fact that the network is run very tightly
Proximity of the load?
If supplier is remotely located, a logistics provider, if it is an 
extra trip generated by a store, the trip is run in house
Who will run the extra 
trip?
Most of the time own fleet, but during peak times, e.g. at 
Christmas, logistics providers
Route re-optimisation
Paragon is continuously updated by IsoTrack and Fleet 
Controller about the availability of vehicles and re-optimises 
the network according to that information
Who pay for the load? Internal transaction within the customer
Monitoring
Most of the monitoring is in terms of time, but there is no 
'extra distance' monitoring at an individual trip level
Table 9.6 How the logistics provider mitigates uncertainty
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In addition, the case study company invested a considerable amount of funds in a 
new, state of the art ICT transport system to mitigate more effectively the uncertainty 
generated within the delivery process that caused ‘extra distance’ and ‘extra time’. 
However, physically the extra trips are still required. If an extra load is generated by 
operational errors within the logistics triad and/or due to late notification of extra 
volumes from outlets and suppliers, the system first checks in the transport plan 
whether there is space available within the originally planned fleet. However, due to 
the fact that the network is run at 85% overall vehicle capacity utilisation, uncertainty 
often generates the need for extra trips, which are added manually by the transport 
planners.
In the secondary distribution network studied, a large proportion of the cost and CO2 
emissions generated by uncertainties are originated both externally and at the 
company outlets. In the case of the uncertainties that are generated externally, the 
company accommodates them by embedding them into the delivery time. In addition, 
it is important to note that ‘extra time’ due to delays generates a comparatively larger 
proportion of increases in cost than in the South African secondary distribution 
network; this is due to the fact that in the UK the labour cost is much higher than in 
South Africa. The distribution centre studied is monitored in terms of time merely by 
two Key Performance Indicators (KPI), location turnaround time and net vehicle 
running time. However, the only distance-related indicator monitored is the fuel 
consumption of vehicles, but currently there is no monitoring of extra trips generated 
by uncertainty.
i
9.6 Managerial implications
Although the case study presented in this chapter is a secondary distribution network 
from the UK, the research has identified a number of opportunities to other 
secondary distribution operations within the UK and other countries. From this, it is 
possible to identify some generic managerial implications. The chapter has shown 
the importance of measuring the effects of uncertainty in terms of ‘extra distance’ 
and ‘extra time’. As in the previous two chapters, this chapter shows the assessment 
of uncertainty in terms of distance, but also considers the time dimension of 
performance. The results of this combined assessment show that in this case study
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‘extra distance’ is more important than ‘extra time’. However, due to the fact that 
labour cost is higher than in developing countries like South Africa, the results of the 
assessment show that ‘extra time’ causes have a greater economic impact in this 
case study than in the South African one.
In this case study, two assessments have been undertaken, an ‘extra distance’ 
assessment based on the extra trips added to the transport plan and a 
comprehensive assessment that compares the transport plan with the actual 
performance. This combined time-and-distance assessment can be applied as a 
diagnostic tool in other transport operations, especially within the FMCG sector. In 
that way, a more explicit connection between uncertainty and its economic and 
environmental consequences can be drawn. Furthermore, the assessment has 
informed future decision making within the company studied.
In addition, route diversion generated on the road, either by ad-hoc and unexpected 
road restrictions or traffic congestion, has been the greatest source of uncertainty 
identified in this study. It is estimated that these two uncertainty causes generated 
£14,083 of extra cost and 11,820 of extra Kg of CO2 in the week of data collection. 
The results of this case study can inform local government in London about the 
impact that external uncertainty has on cost and on CO2 emissions. On the other 
hand, delays at outlets have been the main internal cause of uncertainty found. 
These can be reduced by improving the control and monitoring of the unloading 
process at certain outlets. Also, a minority of outlets generates increases in volume
that cause extra trips. This issue can be mitigated internally by the case study
*
company.
9.7 Concluding remarks
In the previous chapter, an assessment was undertaken to estimate the impact of 
uncertainty in terms of time and distance, but route diversion could not be included in 
that exercise. This case study demonstrates the application of a combined tool that 
considers the ‘extra distance’ and ‘extra time’ measures to assess road transport 
functions within a secondary distribution network. In this way, a clear link between 
uncertainty and the economic and environmental performance of road freight
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transport operations can be made. As in the previous two chapters, the ‘extra 
distance’ measure can be used to evaluate the efficiency of road transport 
operations in terms of distance, or more specifically, in terms of unnecessary vehicle 
usage and fuel consumption. However, it is also vital to comparatively evaluate the 
impact of ‘extra time’. In this particular case study, ‘extra distance’ has about six 
times more impact than ‘extra time’. This is due to the fact that only ‘extra distance’ 
impacts on the fixed cost of transport and generates extra fuel consumption. 
However, the difference between the economic impact of ‘extra distance’ and of 
‘extra time’ is greater in the South African secondary distribution network than in this 
UK secondary distribution network. This is because the labour cost in the UK is 
much higher than the labour cost in South Africa. Furthermore, even though the ICT 
transport system continuously re-optimises the network, a more physical and formal 
system is needed to control and reduce extra distance.
According to the results of this study, in this UK-based secondary distribution 
network, 3.05% of the total kilometres run are ‘extra distance’ due to extra trips and 
‘extra distance’ due to route diversion is 4.77% of the total kilometres run in the 
network. The three main ‘extra distance’ causes are route diversion due to 
unplanned road congestion, route diversion due to ad-hoc and unexpected road 
restriction and unplanned road congestion and ‘delays at unloading bays’. Jointly, 
they generated £20,829 and 16,427 kg of CO2 emissions in the week of data 
collection. In addition, the assessment of all the causes of ‘extra distance’ and ‘extra 
time’ has been undertaken by calculating the risk that they represent in terms of their 
probability and impact.
i
Internally at the case study company, in most of the cases, the case study company 
plans the transport in the most optimal way; nevertheless, ad-hoc and unexpected 
road restrictions are included in the transport plan. Moreover, when uncertainty 
affects the network, the ICT transport system re-plans the network automatically. 
However, a significant proportion of ‘extra distance’ is generated due to delays at 
outlets, so physical monitoring of the unloading processes at these outlets needed to 
be revised. In order to reduce ‘extra distance’ and ‘extra time’ generated externally, 
the case study company needs to find a mechanism to encourage the government to 
reduce the ad-hoc and unexpected road restrictions they have imposed on
213
commercial transport operators, possibly by communicating with FMCG businesses 
that could share the same problem.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, before initiating any ‘extra distance’ and/or 
‘extra time’ reduction programme, the retailer should apply the assessment for a 
longer period of time. The results of this study are based on data collected over a 
fairly average week. Therefore, the outcome of this exercise should inform future 
decision making, but the exercise should be repeated in order to verify the 
reoccurrence of the findings.
9.8 Contribution
To methodology in logistics research
In this chapter, the application of an assessment tool that links uncertainty and 
transport performance has been demonstrated. The chapter highlights the 
importance of measuring the effect of uncertainty in terms of ‘extra distance’ as well 
as in terms of ‘extra time’. In addition, when measuring the effects of uncertainty on 
performance, the assessment tool includes the variance analysis of four indicators, 
two time-based indicators and two distance-based indicators. Moreover, in the 
variance analysis undertaken in the chapter, four factors have been used to support 
the findings.
To the PhD
In this chapter, the assessment exercise applied in the previous two chapters has 
been improved. First, in measuring ‘extra distance’, the effect of route diversion on 
extra kilometres has quantitatively been assessed by monitoring a sample of 30% of 
the deliveries to outlets and suppliers of a secondary distribution operation. This 
adds strength to the findings of the first two case studies. In the previous chapter, 
only a list of the trips that were delayed was included in the analysis. Secondly, a 
variance analysis of the performance of the sample used in the case study has been 
undertaken to demonstrate the effects of uncertainty on ‘extra time’; this includes 
early and delayed deliveries. In terms of findings, the chapter highlights which are 
the uncertainties that greatly affect the transport performance of secondary 
distribution operations.
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To the topic
In this chapter, the findings from the two previous case studies are complemented. 
This is a FMCG secondary distribution operation from the UK that is highly affected 
by delays at unloading bays and variable demand and inaccurate forecast. These 
were two of the four uncertainty clusters found in the focus groups and confirmed in 
the survey. Also, a secondary distribution operation that covers the North River 
Thames areas can be considered as an exemplar case, since it highlights the effect 
of unplanned road congestion and city restrictions on the economic and 
environmental performance of road transport operations.
\
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10.0 Discussion
In this chapter, the overall findings of the PhD will be discussed. In the previous 
chapters, the topic has evolved and the research objectives have been addressed. 
Also, this PhD has developed a guide for applied research in logistics, so the key 
contribution to knowledge from the application of logistics research will be 
highlighted. The main aim of this chapter is to discuss the overall contribution to 
knowledge of this research. The chapter proceeds by discussing the methodological 
path applied in this research study. Following that, based on the advantages and 
limitations of the methods used, the knowledge learned from the application of all the 
methods and in particular how they complement each other, will be discussed. 
Subsequently, a discussion on the new and innovative tools applied to collect and 
analysed data in the focus groups, survey and the case studies will be undertaken. 
Moreover, the findings from each of the stages of the research will be compared, 
highlighting the uncertainty causes that were confirmed in all the stages and any 
differences between the opinion-based research stage and the case studies. In 
addition, a refined decision-making framework, developed to diagnose and mitigate 
uncertainty in road freight transport operations, will be presented. Furthermore, the 
final section of this chapter will consist of a brief synthesis of the contribution to 
knowledge of this research work.
10.1 Multi-methodological research path
In this PhD study, as Figure 10.1 depicts, the researcher took a combined deductive- 
inductive approach, as in the case of Kerssen-van Drongelen (2001). In the initial 
stages of the research, although there were works on uncertainty and supply chain 
management, little attention had been focused on uncertainty and freight transport. 
Therefore, the existent supply chain uncertainty frameworks were extended to 
develop the conceptual model. The conceptual model consists of five uncertainty 
sources based on the logistics triad. These uncertainty sources were populated with 
literature examples of uncertainty that can affect transport operations. Following that, 
the conceptual model was refined through the application of seven focus groups and
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the focus group findings were confirmed in an online structured questionnaire. Up to 
that point, the research approach taken was deductive.
Expert opinion
Empirical
Conceptual
Refined
uncertainty
framework
Transport-focussed uncertainty model
7 focus groups
An online structured questionnaire
A pilot case study 
2 case studies
V  D e d u c tiv e  
A p p ro a c h
^  In d u c tiv e  
A p p ro a c h
Figure 10.1 Methodological path to achieve the evolution of the PhD topic
After completing the survey, the refined transport-focused uncertainty model needed 
to be tested in real distribution networks. The objective was to connect uncertainty 
with transport performance in terms of cost and CO2 emissions. However, the 
researcher did not find an appropriate measurement tool in the literature to achieve 
that objective. Therefore, a new and innovative measurement tool was developed 
and applied in a pilot case study. The learning experience of this demonstrated that 
theory cannot always be developed from the literature. This contradicts the positivist 
research paradigm. In this PhD, knowledge was developed initially from the 
literature, but a large proportion of the knowledge creation came from industry, which 
is what renders this PhD truly innovative.
In addition, methodological triangulation was used to validate and refine the findings 
throughout the PhD research path. Methodological triangulation has recently been 
recommended by a number of researchers in the logistics discipline. According to 
Dunn et al. (1993), ‘a given discipline may be underachieving if all of its research is 
being conducted within a narrow methodological domain’. The methodological
217
approach of this thesis can be used as a guide for future doctoral works in the 
logistics discipline. The application of multiple methods has supported the research 
by iteratively refining the scope and boundaries of the thesis. In terms of the topic, 
the scope of the thesis was initially on the identification of uncertainties affecting 
transport operations, and after that, the impact of those uncertainties were measured 
and potential mitigation approaches to tackle them identified, so the topic was 
explored in its surface and explained at the micro level. Furthermore, in terms of 
boundaries, in the conceptual model and focus groups, rail freight transport was 
included, but in the survey and case studies there was a focus on road freight 
transport operations. The research path of this thesis contributed to a considerable 
extent to the evolution of the PhD topic.
According to the literature, the research methods applied in this thesis have 
strengths and limitations. Before their application, the researcher analysed them and 
decided that the methods used in the research can complement each other. This 
could improve the validity of the overall research findings. However, after 
undertaking the research, the researcher reflected on the strengths and limitations of 
the methods applied. This will be included in the next section, highlighting the 
complementary features between the methods and also the limitations learnt in their 
application.
10.2 Methodological synergies found between the methods applied in this 
thesis
Through the application of the research methods used in this PhD, as Table 10.1 
shows, the researcher has reflected on the strengths and limitations of these 
methods to demonstrate how they have complemented each other in reality. Initially, 
it was clear in the literature that a conceptual model is applied to explore existent 
gaps and integrate knowledge within a research topic. Also, according to the 
literature a conceptual model is the starting point for knowledge creation. However, 
the literature emphasises that a conceptual model is still not scientifically proven. On 
the other hand, in the thesis, the researcher learnt that a conceptual model can be 
used to set direction for the rest of the PhD and synthesise and extend the body of 
knowledge on a topic. However, the findings from a conceptual model still need to be
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refined by applying exploratory research methods that involve practitioners in the 
research process.
It is very difficult to verify a conceptual model by applying a structured survey. A 
method was needed that could support the transition between a conceptual model 
and a survey. Therefore, the focus group method was identified in the literature as a 
method capable of providing focus to a research topic offering a high degree of 
flexibility during the research process, since the interactions of participants from 
relatively small groups representing a large population can support the refinement of 
the conceptual model. On the other hand, the literature highlighted the fact that focus 
groups are an effective method to explore topics at the macro level but not at the 
micro level. Furthermore, in the conduction of focus groups, a facilitator with specific 
skills is required. This was overcome in the research by facilitating the group 
sessions with multiple researchers who could provide feedback to each other. From 
the literature, the researcher was aware that participants’ personalities can 
negatively influence group discussions. This was an issue that was overcome by 
asking participants to record their opinion before the discussions began.
With regard to the conduct of the focus groups, it is important to highlight that this 
method is a very effective exploratory data collection technique. Moreover, due to 
the fact that practitioners are very interested in learning from each other, the 
attendance rate from the focus groups is considerably high, which compensates for 
the low response rate obtained in the survey, even after applying all the literature 
recommendations. However, given the fact that the focus group method is usually 
exploratory and a comprehensive contribution from each participant is required, a 
purposive sampling strategy was applied, so the findings still needed to be 
confirmed. This was overcome by applying the survey method, because the literature 
states that the survey method is an effective data collection technique capable of 
refining and testing theory. Furthermore, in the focus groups, theory saturation could 
be reached only at the micro level, but within individual sub-segments that took part 
in the focus groups.
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Method Type of 
RQs
Literature Reflection
Strengths Limitations Strengths Limitations
Conceptual
model
What?
Which?
- Capable of 
exploring existent 
gaps in the 
literature
- Knowledge 
within the 
literature can be 
integrated
- Support 
learning and 
knowledge 
creation
- It is not
scientifically
proven
- Can set direction 
of research
- Capable of 
synthesising and 
extending body of 
knowledge in a 
topic
- It is conceptual and needs 
to be refined by applying 
primary research
- The scope of the research 
is still not well defined
Focus
groups
Which? - Give focus to a 
research topic
- Provide high 
degree of 
flexibility in the 
process
- Small groups 
that can
represent a large 
population
- Participants’ 
interactions 
enhance data 
quality
- Flexible 
facilitation is 
needed
- Explore the 
macro but not 
the micro
- Group 
personality can 
negatively 
influence the 
findings
- Effective 
exploratory 
research method
- Practitioners are 
very willing to 
contribute, so 
response rate is 
fairly high
- Purposive sampling 
applied, further confirmation 
needed
- According to the literature, 
it was difficult to record the 
opinion of participants, but 
their opinions were recorded 
before starting the 
discussion.
- Theory saturation can be 
reached at the macro level 
but not at individual sub- 
segments of the groups
Survey Which?
How?
- Effective to 
refine and test 
theory
- Findings can be 
statistically 
proven
- Capable of 
achieving 
academic rigour
- Only capable 
of describing 
and/or
explaining the 
surface of a 
topic
- Typically low 
response rate
- Effective 
confirmatory 
method
- Effective method 
to undertake sub- 
segment analysis
- Jointly with the 
focus group defines 
the scope of the 
research
- Low response rate, even 
after following all the 
literature recommendations
- Subjectivity involved in 
quantifying qualitative 
constructs
- Provides breadth but not 
depth to the study
Pilot case 
study
I
Which?
How?
Why?
- Inductive in 
nature, so new 
and innovative 
knowledge can 
be developed
- Provides depth 
to a topic that 
has not been 
explored at the 
micro level
- Single case 
studies are 
only valid if 
they are 
exemplar 
cases
- In many 
instances, 
case studies 
do not have a 
network 
perspective
- Findings from 
qualitative 
case studies 
are based only 
on a few 
interviews are 
anecdotal
- Capable of 
developing and 
testing a concept 
not explored before 
in an industrial 
setting
- Continuous 
feedback from the 
actors
- Depth is achieved 
through 
triangulation of 
hard data and 
interviews
- A topic that was not 
previously measured in the 
company, so it needed time 
to be developed
- The researcher and 
planners spent a day 
refining the measure
- Telematics data on 
planned and actual 
kilometres was not available 
to the researcher, so ‘extra 
distance’ due to route 
diversion could not be 
measured
Further
case
studies
How?
Why?
- Learning from the 
pilot case study can 
be used to improve 
the data collection
- Breadth is added 
to improve the 
study validity
- More case studies needed 
to generalise the findings
- Automated data collection 
needed to be more 
productive
- Simulation is needed to 
generalise the results
Table 10.1 How the methods applied in the PhD complement each other
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The findings from the online structured questionnaire assisted the researcher to 
complement the results of the focus groups and undertake an analysis based on the 
participants’ sectors and supply chain roles. Moreover, it is important to state that the 
focus groups and survey jointly helped the researcher to define the scope of the 
research undertaken in the empirical stage of the methodological path.
In terms of the limitations of the survey method, the researcher also learnt that there 
is a considerable degree of subjectivity when respondents scored on the basis of 
their opinions. This was partially overcome by initially providing respondents with the 
definitions of the constructs before they began answering the questionnaire. 
However, the hard data and the interviews collected in the case studies helped the 
researcher to test the findings from the survey and focus groups. The empirical 
findings from the case studies tested and validated the opinions of the focus group 
participants and the survey respondents, since a continuous feedback from 
practitioners gave depth to the analysis and complemented the findings from the 
focus groups and survey.
According to the literature, case studies are inductive in nature, so new and 
innovative knowledge can be developed. In addition, the case study method is 
capable of providing depth to a topic that has not been explored at the micro level. 
However, the literature emphasises that multiple case studies are needed to ensure 
the validity of the research and a single case study is only valid if that is an exemplar 
case. According to methodological papers from the logistics discipline, findings from 
logistics case studies are often based on a single company rather than taking a 
holistic network approach. In the three case studies undertaken in this PhD, a 
network perspective has been taken including suppliers, the carrier and the 
customer. Furthermore, the literature provides a constructive critique of case studies 
in logistics, because many of them based their findings on anecdotal data from 
interviews. In the case of this PhD, hard data collected from the transport systems 
and processes of the companies has been triangulated with interviews with operating 
and management staffs.
While undertaking the case studies, the researcher experienced some additional 
strengths and limitations that were not highlighted in the literature. The empirical
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research stage of this PhD consists of two parts: a pilot case study and two further 
case studies. Through the pilot case study a measure, the ‘extra distance’ measure, 
which had not previously been applied, could be developed. One of the limitations 
observed in the pilot case study was that the ‘extra distance’ measure was first 
applied to the first case study company when the case study started, so the 
researcher spent a considerable amount of time explaining the measurement to the 
planners. Additionally, on the first day of the data collection, the data gathered 
needed to be refined, since the planners still did not have a clear view of what 
incidents generate ‘extra distance’. Furthermore, ‘extra distance’ due to route 
diversion was not gathered because data on planned and actual kilometres was not 
available to the researcher during the week when the data was collected. The 
lessons learnt in the pilot case study were used to improve the measurement tool, 
including route diversion and the time dimension of performance. Moreover, the two 
case studies add breadth to the findings from the first case study. One of the key 
learning points from this PhD is that when a concept, system and/or measure has 
not been studied before in the literature, an inductive pilot case study is needed to 
properly develop the topic explored, after which the topic can be tested in that and 
other case studies.
Nevertheless, there remain some limitations to the case studies applied in this 
thesis. The findings found on the topic of uncertainty and road freight transport 
operations cannot be generalised, since further case studies from the FMCG sector 
are needed. The researcher needed to spend a considerable amount of time in the 
case study companies collecting and analysing data. This could be avoided if the 
data collection were automated. Furthermore, in order to generalise, the findings 
data from the three case studies could be used to simulate different uncertainty 
events so that their frequency and impact, in terms of ‘extra distance’ and ‘extra 
time’, could be estimated.
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10.3 New and innovative measurement tools for data collection in logistics 
research
In the data collection, two new and innovative data collection and analysis 
techniques have been developed and applied. At all the stages of the focus groups, 
frameworks and techniques were developed to undertake the research. In addition, 
throughout the case studies, a measurement system was developed and improved 
by taking an inductive approach. These two techniques will be discussed in the next 
section of the chapter.
10.3.1 Tools applied to gather and analyse data in focus groups
In order to apply the focus group method, as presented in Figure 10.2, a series of 
frameworks and techniques were developed. This is one of the key contributions of 
this PhD. First, the literature on focus group research from the management field 
provides an initial guide to the researcher. A generic framework for designing and 
conducting focus groups and analysing data collected from focus groups was 
developed from the literature (Krueger 1998, Morgan 1998), but also adapted to 
logistics research. Furthermore, from the lessons learnt in the focus group process, a 
framework was developed to guide the design and conduct of future focus groups in 
logistics. As shown in Figure 5.3 in Chapter 5, this framework highlights the factors 
that influence the effectiveness of focus groups.
In addition, according to the literature in logistics, focus groups are regarded as a 
method lacking in academic rigor, since the discussions tend to be biased due to the 
fact that participants with strong personalities can mislead the group. In this PhD, the 
data collection approach was intended to mitigate that limitation by asking 
participants to record their opinion in Post-It notes. Although one could argue that 
this arrangement might inhibit the group discussion, this was not the case, since a 
discussion was facilitated where participants had the opportunity to explain their 
Post-It notes while other participants contributed to the discussion. After that, the 
participants clustered all the Post-It notes and a cause-and-effect exercise was run 
from the cluster that had more Post-It notes. By starting with the individual comments
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from the Post-It notes, the data collection technique gave equal opportunity to all 
participants to intervene in the group discussion; this gave breadth to the data 
collected. Meanwhile, the cause-and-effect exercise provided depth to the analysis.
Stages Contribution
Focus
group J 
research
Data 
V analysis
r
Design and 
conduction
Data
collection
Method
Factors influencing 
focus group 
effectiveness
Post-it Cluster Cause-and- 
note *  exercise ^  effect 
exercise exercise
Generic focus group 
process adapted for 
logistics research
Two-way tables
Figure 10.2 Tools used to apply the focus group method in logistics research
Additionally, due to the fact that the data presented a number of dimensions, 
uncertainty causes, uncertainty clusters, participant’s sector and participant’s supply 
chain role, two-way tables were used to analyse the findings. This is a technique that 
was not found in the literature, but can support the analysis of future focus groups 
undertaken in logistics research.
10.3.2 Transport uncertainty evaluation tool
Previously, researchers have focussed on measuring the absolute and/or average 
performance of road freight transport operations (Fowkes et al. 2004; McKinnon and 
Ge, 2004). However, the link between difference uncertainty causes and the 
economic and environmental performance of road freight transport operations have 
not been previously researched. In this PhD, this gap has been addressed by
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developing and testing a transport uncertainty evaluation tool. In the case studies 
undertaken in this study, as Table 10.2 shows, a transport uncertainty evaluation tool 
has been developed and improved. The sector chosen to develop this tool was the 
FMCG sector, which encompasses grocery and clothing. The decision to select the 
FMCG sector was based on the fact that, according to sector level, surveys in the 
UK do highlight the frequency of occurrence of different events and their impact in 
terms of time (for example, Department for Transport, 2007). However, this may not 
translate into a financial cost if there is flexibility in the delivery network to absorb the 
delays. There was a need to understand more fully the marginal distance, ‘extra 
distance’, that occurs due to uncertainty, as this will have a direct financial and 
environmental cost.
Before starting the first case study, the researcher did not find an appropriate 
measurement system to assess uncertainty affecting road freight transport 
operations. Therefore, ‘extra distance’ as a measure was developed before 
commencing the data collection in the pilot case study. In this case study, the ‘extra 
distance’ due to extra trips generated by uncertainty causes originated within the 
supply chain and externally was measured. However, the ‘extra distance’ generated 
due to route diversion was not measured because the logistics providers did not 
make available to the researcher telematics data at individual planned trip level, so 
the researcher could not compare the planned and actual kilometres of every trip. 
Also, in the first case study, the time dimension of performance was not included in 
the assessment, since the most important objective was to develop and test the 
‘extra distance’ measure.
In the second case study, the ‘extra distance’ measure was improved from the 
lessons learnt in the first case study. The assessment used company reports 
instead, collecting the data live. The logistics provider records all the extra trips 
generated due to unforeseen events. In addition, the researcher used the experience 
of applying the tool in the UK and provided training to the practitioners involved in the 
data collection. In the assessment, the ‘extra distance’ measure was complemented 
by an additional measure of ‘extra time’ developed after the second case study. This 
measure was developed from the literature on delays (Fowkes et al, 2004; McKinnon 
and Ge, 2004). The uncertainty causes that generate delays, but not extra trips,
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were gathered from a company report. This case study did not measure route 
diversion of individual trips and variance in terms of time and distance within all the 
planned trips.
ase study
Supply-chain uncertainty 
assessment External uncertainty evaluation Measure(s)
Limitations and 
improvement
‘Extra 
distance’ 
due to 
extra 
trips
‘Extra
time’
Variance
analysis
‘Extra 
distance’ 
due to 
extra 
trips
‘Extra
time’
‘Extra 
distance’ 
due to 
route 
diversion
Variance
analysis
K primary 
istribution 
network 
Chapter 8)
S ✓ ‘Extradistance’
- Route 
diversion was 
not measured
- The time 
dimension of 
performance 
was not 
considered
South
African
econdary
istribution
network
Chapter 9)
S ✓ ✓ S
‘Extra 
distance’ 
complemented 
by the causes 
of delays
- A trip-level 
assessment 
was not 
undertaken
UK
econdary
istribution
network
Chapter
10)
s ✓ ✓ S ✓ S
Combined 
assessment of 
‘extra
distance’ and 
‘extra time’
- Time- 
consuming 
assessment, it 
needs to be 
automated.
Table 10.2 Evolution of the transport uncertainty assessment tool
The limitations from the second case study were used in the third case study to
improve the transport uncertainty evaluation tool. In the final case study, two 
assessment exercises were undertaken. The first was based on data recorded by 
the transport operation on the extra trips generated due to uncertainty originated 
within 'the supply chain and externally; basically the same approach used in other 
two case studies was applied. However, an additional assessment was included to 
compare the transport plan with the execution of the delivery, including the two 
dimensions of transport performance, distance and time. This assessment was 
undertaken at individual trip level. Also, a variance analysis was undertaken to assist
the researcher in identifying key patterns within the data gathered.
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10.4 Transport uncertainties found throughout the PhD
In the first stage of this PhD, a transport-focussed uncertainty model was developed 
from the literature. This model was developed based on previous supply chain 
uncertainty frameworks (Davis, 1993; Mason-Jones and Towill, 1999; Peck et al. 
2003). The objective of the model was to identify the uncertainty causes that 
generate inefficiency within transport operations. The literature on uncertainty and 
transport operations was fragmented and disjointed. The aim of this section is to 
review the main uncertainty causes found throughout the research stages of the 
thesis.
Main uncertainty 
causes from the 
conceptual 
model
Main 
uncertainty 
causes 
from the 
focus 
groups
Uncertainty 
causes 
found in the 
case 
studies
Where identified d
Uncertainty clusters 
eveloped in the focus 
roups and the survey
Consequences measured 
in the case studies
Focus
groups
Case
study De
la
ys
Va
ria
bl
e 
de
ma
nd
 
an
d/
or
 
ina
cc
ur
ate
 
fo
re
ca
st
La
ck
 
of 
su
pp
ly 
ch
ai
n 
int
eg
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tio
n 
and
 
co
or
di
na
tio
n
De
liv
er
y 
co
ns
tra
in
ts
O
th
er Extra
trips
Extra
distance
Extra
time
Demand and 
inventory 
management 
issues 
(25 papers)
i
Demand
forecast
accuracy
Late 
notification 
of extra 
volume
✓ (1). (2) &(3) ✓ ✓
Product
demand
volatility
✓ ✓
Lack of 
information 
visibility
✓
Sub-
optimal
inventory
policy
✓ ✓
Physical 
load smaller 
than 
advised
(1) ✓
Supplier 
inefficiency 
(25 papers)
Supply
disruptions ✓ ✓
Loading
delays
Loading
delays
(1). (2) 
&(3) V
✓
Product not 
loaded at 
supplier
(1). (2) 
&(3) ✓ ✓
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in uncertainty 
causes from the 
conceptual 
model
Main 
uncertainty 
causes 
from the 
focus 
groups -
Uncertainty 
causes 
found in the 
case 
studies
Where identified d
Uncertainty clusters 
eveloped in the focus 
roups and the survey
Consequences measured 
in the case studies
Focus
groups
Case
study De
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I 
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ma
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re
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of 
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ly 
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n 
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tio
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y 
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in
ts
O
th
er Extra
trips
Extra
distance
Extra
time
Unloading 
inefficiency 
(8 papers)
Unloading
delays
Unloading
delays ✓
(2)&
(3)
✓ ✓ ✓
Insufficient fleet 
capacity 
(6 papers)
✓
Internal carrier 
inefficiency 
(11 papers)
Technical
vehicle
failure
(2)&
(3)
✓ ✓
Product not 
loaded at 
distribution 
centres
(2)&
(3)
S ✓
Planning
failures
(1). (2) 
&( 3) S ✓
Unplanned
stops (3) ✓
Macroeconomic 
factors that 
impact on cost 
(13 paper)
✓
Unplanned road 
congestion and 
road restrictions 
(7 papers)
Unplanned
road
congestion
Unplanned
road
congestion
S (1)&
(3)
S ✓ ✓ ✓
Delivery
curfews
Road
restrictions S (3) ✓
Road
restriction s ✓ ✓
Insufficient 
supply chain 
integration 
(13 papers)
Sales not 
connected 
to logistics
✓ s
Cam'er not 
integrated 
to the 
supply 
chain
- s
Issues related to 
unloading 
restrictions 
(8 papers)
Limited
storage
capacity
s ✓
Tight
delivery
windows
s ✓
Table 10.3 Uncertainty causes found throughout the PhD
In the focus groups, 15 uncertainty clusters were developed. Furthermore, the focus 
group findings highlight that the main four uncertainty clusters affecting transport 
operations are: delays, variable demand and/or inaccurate forecast, lack of 
coordination and delivery constraints. These uncertainty clusters were confirmed in 
the survey. As Table 10.3 shows, uncertainties relating to these uncertainty clusters
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have connections with the main uncertainty themes found in the conceptual model. 
In addition, Table 10.3 draws connections between the uncertainty causes gathered 
in the case studies and uncertainty causes and clusters found in the earlier stages of 
the research. Moreover, it shows the consequences, in terms of extra trips, ‘extra 
distance’ and ‘extra time’, that the uncertainty causes can have.
10.4.1 Delays
The main uncertainty cluster found in the focus groups was delays. The main 
uncertainty causes related to delays populated in the conceptual model are: supplier 
inefficiency, unloading inefficiency, internal carrier inefficiency and unplanned road 
congestions and road restrictions. All these uncertainty causes found in the literature 
occurred within the delivery process. In the literature, there is considerable emphasis 
on delays generated during the delivery process (Esper and Williams, 2003; Fowkes 
et al. 2004; McKinnon et al. 2009). However, the literature does not clarify how 
delays can negatively affect the economic and environmental performance of road 
freight transport operations. With the exception of carrier inefficiency, all these 
uncertainty causes were found in the focus groups and confirmed in the survey. 
However, all of these causes were gathered in the case studies. Also, delays 
throughout the delivery process always generate ‘extra time’, but only generate extra 
trips if the vehicle that is delayed missed the next load scheduled for it, so an extra 
vehicle needs to be added to the operation. Furthermore, delays due to unplanned 
road congestion can generate ‘extra distance’ if the vehicle is diverted from its 
optimal route, ‘extra time’ if the vehicle is held in a traffic jam and extra trips if that 
vehicle missed its next consignment assigned in the transport schedule. This is one 
of the main findings of this PhD, since the previous literature does connect 
unplanned road congestion with delays (Boughton, 2003; Fowkes et al. 2004; 
McKinnon and Ge, 2004; McKinnon et al. 2009) but not to ’extra distance’. This will 
be explained further in the next section.
10.4.2 Variable demand and/or inaccurate forecast
Variable demand and/or inaccurate forecast’ was the second most important
i
uncertainty cluster gathered in the focus groups. This was confirmed in the survey. In
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the conceptual model, the main uncertainty theme that relates to this cluster is 
‘demand and inventory management issues’. A number of authors emphasise that 
difficult and non-standard orders can have a negative impact on the delivery process 
(Boughton, 2003; Fowkes et al. 2004; Vickery et al. 1999). However, the literature 
does not link ‘variable demand and/or inaccurate forecast’ with unnecessary or extra 
transport movements run within distribution networks. During the focus groups, this 
uncertainty cluster was linked either with demand and forecast issues or inventory 
issues. On the other hand, although uncertainty causes related to ‘variable demand 
and/or inaccurate forecast’ were recorded in all three case studies, the level of 
importance of this uncertainty cluster was bigger in the first two case studies than in 
the third case study. A possible reason for this difference is that route diversion due 
to unplanned road congestion and ad-hoc and unexpected road restrictions was not 
measured in the first two case studies, but was measured in the third case study.
One of the main limitations that the first two case studies have is the fact that ‘extra 
distance’ due to route diversion could not be measured. This could make the effects 
of ‘variable demand and/or inaccurate forecast’ slightly larger in these two case 
studies. ‘Variable demand and/or inaccurate forecast’ was found in the case studies 
in two forms: ‘late notification of extra volume’ and ‘physical load smaller than 
advised’. ‘Late notification of extra volume’ occurs when the suppliers and/or the 
customer increase their volume requirements but give less than two hours notice to 
the carrier to arrange and start the delivery process. This problem generates extra 
trips due to the fact that the load is not moved in the most efficient way, whereas 
‘physical load smaller than advised’ occurs when vehicles arrive at loading bays and 
the aptual load is less than the planned load. Thus extra trips are generated because 
these movements are sub-optimally run. This will be discussed to a greater extent in 
the following section.
10.4.3 Insufficient supply chain integration and coordination
Another main uncertainty cluster found in focus groups and confirmed in the survey 
was ‘insufficient supply chain integration and coordination’. In the conceptual model, 
the main uncertainty themes that can be linked to this uncertainty cluster are:
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supplier inefficiency, insufficient fleet capacity, internal carrier inefficiency and 
insufficient supply chain integration. A considerable number of authors emphasise 
the importance of supply chain coordination (Fowkes et al. 2004; Mason et al. 2003; 
Morash and Clinton, 1997). Also, a number of research works highlight the fact that 
insufficient supply chain integration can affect the overall performance of the supply 
chain (Fowkes et al. 2004; Mason et al. 2003; Naim et al. 2006). However, the 
impact of this uncertainty cluster on the performance of road transport operation is 
not clarified in the literature. In the focus groups, the uncertainty causes under this 
cluster that had more Post-It notes were ‘sales not collected to logistics’ and ‘carrier 
not integrated to the supply chain’. These two uncertainty causes are caused by 
problems of communication within the carrier and the shipper and/or an adversarial 
relationship between the customer and the carrier.
These are uncertainty causes that are difficult to measure at the micro level, since 
they are intangible and qualitative factors. Hence, they were not found in the case 
study quantitative assessments, but insufficient supply chain integration was an 
important theme that leads to most of the ‘extra distance’ gathered. For example, in 
the South African secondary distribution operation, most of the ‘extra distance’ 
gathered was generated due to communication and relationship barriers between the 
customer and the carrier. Also, in the UK primary distribution operation, a large 
proportion of the ‘extra distance’ found was generated due to a lack of integration in 
the volume forecast process within the logistics triad. On the other hand, in the case 
studies, there were three uncertainty causes that generate extra trips that can be 
linked with insufficient coordination and integration. These are technical vehicle 
failure, planning failures and product not loaded at distribution centres. When there is 
a technical vehicle failure and the vehicle available to replace the broken vehicle is of 
a smaller size than the required si^e according to the transport plan, the need for an 
extra trip is generated. Similarly, when there is a planning failure in terms of the size 
of the load required, more trips are run in a suboptimal manner when the delivery is 
executed.
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10.4.4 Delivery constraints
Other important uncertainty cluster gathered in the focus groups and also confirmed 
in the survey was ‘delivery constraints’. In the conceptual model, the main themes 
that are related to this uncertainty cluster are: ‘unplanned road congestion and road 
restrictions’ and ‘issues related to unloading restrictions’. Unplanned road congestion 
and road restrictions have been identified in previous research works as a major 
barrier in the delivery process (Fowkes et al. 2004; Golob and Regan, 2001; 
McKinnon and Ge, 2004; McKinnon et al. 2009). These authors have stated that 
unplanned road congestion and road restrictions are two of the main causes of 
delays. However, in the third case study, these two uncertainty causes generate 
‘extra distance’ due to route diversion rather than delays. This adds a new dimension 
to the literature on unplanned road congestion and road restrictions. In the focus 
groups, there were two ‘delivery constraints’ issues originated in unloading facilities 
and one that can be originated while the vehicle is running. According to the focus 
group participants, limited storage capacity and tight delivery windows at customer 
facilities can generate confusion and excessive queues at unloading bays. Although 
these two uncertainty causes were not recorded in the case studies, they were one 
of the main causes of delays at outlets in the third case study, the UK secondary 
distribution operation.
In the case studies, the only ‘delivery constraint’ uncertainty cause found was ad-hoc 
and unexpected road restriction. The distribution network study in this case study is 
a UK secondary distribution network that covers the North River-Thames London 
area9 and areas of South East Midlands. One of the key findings from the third case 
study is that this issue generate ‘extra distance’, since the vehicles need to be 
diverted from the most optimal route. However, road restrictions should not generate 
extra trips, because they are considered, in the form of slack time within the delivery 
time of night deliveries, when the transport plan is undertaken.
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10.5 Refined decision-making framework for the diagnosis and mitigation of 
uncertainty in transport operations
In this section of the chapter, the main findings of the PhD are synthesised into the 
framework that is shown in Figure 10.3. The objective of this framework is to guide 
future diagnosis of uncertainty in road freight transport operations. Also, this refined 
framework connects the causes and clusters of uncertainty recorded in the case 
studies with the mitigation approaches applied by the three road freight transport 
operations studied.
10.5.1 Delays
In the case studies, delays originated at unloading and loading bays, and due to 
unplanned stops and unplanned road congestion. In the literature on delays, there 
was an emphasis on measuring and evaluating the different causes of delays in 
terms of time (Esper and Williams, 2003; Fowkes et al. 2004; McKinnon et al. 2009). 
However, in the case studies, the impact that delays have on road freight transport 
performance is measured in terms of ‘extra distance’ and ‘extra time’. In this way, it 
is possible to connect delays with the extra transport cost and extra CO2 emissions 
that they generate. In the UK primary distribution network, delays at loading bays 
only generate 7% of the extra kilometres gathered. On the other hand, in the South 
African secondary distribution operation, 62% of delays generate at loading bays, but 
they do not generate extra trips since the transport planners re-scheduled the loads 
within the vehicles that are available in the distribution centres. So, delays in this 
transport operation generate ‘extra time’ but not extra trips. This is due to the fact 
that this operation has a considerable degree of contingency embedded within the 
delivery process in the form of a cbmparatively low target vehicle capacity utilisation 
(55%) and more slack time within the delivery time. Whereas, in the UK secondary 
distribution operation, the target vehicle capacity utilisation is 85% and there is not 
as much slack time within the delivery time as in the South African secondary 
distribution operation. For this reason, in this UK secondary distribution operation, 
delays at unloading bays represent a greater proportion of the ‘extra distance’ 
generated.
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In the first case study, only 4% of the extra kilometres recorded were generated due 
to extra trips caused by unplanned road congestion. However, the effect that 
unplanned road congestion has on route diversion was not measured in this case 
study. Also, the amount of ‘extra time* that unplanned road congestion generates 
was not measured in this case study. However, in the UK secondary distribution 
operation, the impact of unplanned road congestion was measured in terms of both 
‘extra time’ and ‘extra distance’ due to route diversion. In this operation, unplanned 
road congestion generates 1,448 extra kilometres but only 6 hrs of ‘extra time’ in 
30% of the trips planned in the week of data collection. This contradicts the freight 
best practice report published by the Department for Transport (2007) on key 
performance indicators in the food and drinks supply chains. This report stated that 
19% of delays within the delivery process occur due to traffic congestion. However, 
according to the findings from the third case study, unplanned road congestion is 
much more likely to generate extra kilometres rather than extra delivery hours. 
Since, the transport operation is frequently able to anticipate unplanned traffic jams, 
drivers are encouraged by the case study company sales department to arrive on 
time at outlets, regardless of the amount of kilometres run during the journey. 
Therefore, when an unexpected traffic jam can be anticipated, unplanned road 
congestion generates ‘extra distance’ due to route diversion, but if the unforeseen 
traffic jam could not be anticipated, unplanned road congestion can generate ‘extra 
time’. This is an aspect of unplanned road congestion that is not considered by the 
authors (Fowkes et al. 2004; Golob and Regan 2001,; McKinnon and Ge 2004; 
McKinnon et al. 2009) who have previously undertaken research in this topic.i
Therefore, unplanned road congestion can either generate ‘extra distance’ or delays. 
When unplanned road congestion generates ‘extra distance’ the variable cost of 
transport and the variable CO2 emitted while the vehicle is running increase, but the 
fixed cost of transport remains the same, because of the fact that vehicles do not 
miss their next scheduled loads, so extra vehicles are not needed. On the other 
hand, when unplanned road congestion generate delays, ‘extra time’ always is 
generated but in some cases extra trips are required as well. ‘Extra time’ impact only 
in the variable cost of transport, whereas extra trips have a negative effect on both 
the fixed cost and the variable cost of transport, and also on the variable CO2 
emitted while the journey happens and the fixed CO2 emitted when the vehicles are 
manufactured. The same principle applied to all causes of delays.
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When delays generate extra trips, if a portion of the original volume is ready to be 
loaded and if that volume is very sensitive to the customer, it is despatched and sent 
to the customer’s facilities and the transport operation delivers an extra vehicle later 
to collect the delayed load. These types of problems are linked to some of the 
McKinnon’s CO2 emissions ratios. They generate extra trips with lower capacity 
utilisation, so they decrease the average load in laden trips and potentially increase 
the average empty running. Also, they make the transport operation run twice the 
kilometres that were originally planned, so the average length of haul rises.
In addition, a number of approaches to mitigate and/or respond to delays were 
observed in the case studies. In the UK secondary distribution network, the ICT 
transport system available provides rich live information on the delivery process that 
assists the decision makers to minimise the impact of delays. Also, when a planner 
needs to intervene in the process, they have means to respond to delays as well. On 
the other hand, in the UK primary distribution network, delays are mitigated through 
effective transport planning undertaken in Excel. This operation has four transport 
planners that plan and follow the daily progress of all the primary movement 
throughout the UK. Furthermore, in the UK primary transport operation and in the 
South African secondary transport operations, due to contractual arrangements, the 
suppliers or the customer are charged for extra trips due to delays originated in their 
facilities as long as they are identified as the entity that directly originates the ‘extra 
distance’. Thus, in these two case studies, the suppliers and the customer have an 
econpmic incentive to minimise delays, but the carrier perceives more revenue due 
to delays caused by their partners, because of the fact that more movements are 
needed. In the UK primary distribution operation, suppliers would generally be 
economically incentivised to minimise ‘extra distance’, even though in many cases 
suppliers respond primarily to their customer demand. However, the challenge is that 
most of the time it is not possible for the logistics provider to identify a supplier as the 
cause of the incident. On the other hand, in the UK secondary distribution network, 
the same company manages the transport function and the stores, when a delay at 
an outlet generates an extra trip, the outlet is not internally charged for the delay.
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10.5.2 Variable demand and/or inaccurate forecast
In the case studies, variable demand and/or inaccurate forecast originated at the 
suppliers in the UK primary distribution network and the customer(s) in the two 
secondary distribution networks. In previous literature works, there is an emphasis 
on the excessive variation that this uncertainty cluster generates in the demand for 
transport (Boughton, 2003; Fowkes et al. 2004; Vickery et al. 1999). In two of the 
case studies, the proportion of ‘extra distance’ generated by this uncertainty cluster 
is very large. This has a negative impact on cost and C02 emissions. Overall, in the 
three case studies under this cluster, two uncertainty causes were observed: late 
notification of extra volume and physical load smaller than advised.
These two uncertainty causes affect three of the factors included in the McKinnon’s 
(2007) framework: the average length of haul, the average load on laden trips and 
the average empty running. Most of the time, ‘late notifications of extra volume’ force 
the carrier to run deliveries with a low capacity utilisation and the carrier tends not to 
find a backload for these trips, so the average load on laden trips decreases and the 
average empty running rises. Also, sometimes the increase in volumes comes from 
remote geographical locations where the carrier cannot find the most economical 
subcontractor to run the trip. ‘Physical load smaller than advised’ reduces the 
average capacity utilisation of the vehicles, since when the carrier re-plans the trips 
after ihey were executed, they realise that they needed fewer trips, and as a result, 
fewer kilometres. Therefore, the average length of haul and the average empty 
running increases. In addition, empty running increases when a remote supplier 
needs a trip, because the carrier does not have sufficient time to find an economical 
subcontractor for the trip. Consequently, the extra load is moved with an in-house 
vehicle that needs to return empty to the distribution centre where the trip started.
In the UK secondary distribution operation, about 8% of economic losses and 9% of 
the CO2 emitted due to uncertainty is generated due to ‘late notification of extra 
volume’ from a few outlets and a few suppliers. In this operation, variable demand 
and/or inaccurate forecast represent a relative small proportion of the problem. In the 
UK primary distribution operation, these two uncertainty causes generate 75% of the
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extra kilometres recorded and 75% of the number of ‘extra distance’ incidents 
gathered during the week of data collection. Also, these two uncertainties contribute 
to the ‘extra distance’ recorded on a similar proportion. On the other hand, in the 
South African secondary distribution operation, 40% of extra kilometres gathered are 
caused by ‘late notification of extra volume’, but only 6% of the ‘extra distance’ 
recorded is generated due to ‘physical load smaller than advised’. The reason for 
this is that the first case study is a UK primary distribution network that has more 
than 100 suppliers and only about a few of them have frequently very inaccurate 
forecast of volume demand. Meanwhile, in the South African secondary distribution 
operation, the customer tends to increase the volume, leaving very short notice for 
the carrier to respond efficiently to these changes, but ‘physical load smaller than 
advised’ only occurs in a small area of the network. The South African transport 
operation is very sensitive to volume increases, due to the fact that even though the 
overall vehicle capacity utilisation is 55%, the customer imposed very rigid and tight 
delivery windows to the carrier, so when an extra load is required, it is not possible to 
allocate that load in an existent trip that needs to go to the same neighbourhood 
because departure time of that vehicle is later in the day and is not changeable or 
negotiable.
By contrast, in the UK primary distribution operation, where the target vehicle 
capacity utilisation is 85%, extra trips are generated due to the fact that the transport 
planner does not have enough time to re-optimise the movement in the most 
economical way. A finding that needs to be highlighted is the fact that there are two 
operational factors that influence how large is the impact that variable demand 
and/or inaccurate forecast have on transport performance. These' are the target 
vehicle capacity utilisation and how delivery windows are scheduled throughout the 
daily transport execution.
In the three case studies, variable demand and/or inaccurate forecast generates 
extra trips, so this uncertainty cluster increases the total number of kilometres and 
the total number of vehicles needed. Therefore, economically speaking, this 
uncertainty cluster increases the variable and fixed costs of transport. Similarly, from 
an environmental perspective, it generates unnecessary CO2 emissions due to the 
extra kilometres run and due to the extra vehicle capacity that needs to be
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manufactured. However, the variable CO2 emissions generated due to ‘extra 
distance’ is an avoidable problem, but when a vehicle has been already 
manufactured, it represent a sunk cost and the CO2 emissions previously generated 
cannot be avoided. However, if the supply chain volume demand forecast improves, 
in the long term, the total fleet capacity required within the network could be reduced.
In addition, it is important to discuss the approaches that can be applied in the three 
distribution networks studied to mitigate and/or respond to variable demand and/or 
inaccurate forecast. ‘Physical load smaller than advised’ is a problem that is 
generated in the first two case studies. This issue can be mitigated if the carrier 
improves the internal control of the load size, auditing whether the actual load is the 
same as the planned load. In this way, the carrier can detect the deviations and 
charge their customer, which is a supplier, for the extra trips generated by these 
types of abnormalities. Thus, this supplier will have an economic incentive to reduce 
the occurrence of this issue, although in many cases suppliers are driven primarily 
by their customer demand. However, the challenge is that in many cases it is not 
possible for the logistics provider to identify a supplier as the main cause of the ‘extra 
distance’ incident. On the other hand, in the UK primary and South African 
secondary transport operations, the carriers are charging their customers for the 
extra trips generated by ‘late notification of extra volume’, so the suppliers and/or the 
customers already have an economic incentive to lessen the effect of this issue, but 
in many cases, they are driven by the end customer demand. In the transport 
planning stage, these two causes of extra trips can be mitigated if the carrier works 
together with the suppliers and the customers to make the volume forecast process 
more accurate and holistic throughout the supply chain. Moreover, ‘late notification of 
extra volume’ can be reduced through a responsive approach to the extra volume 
requirements and subcontractors have a key role to play in this when they can move 
the load in a more cost-effective way than the carrier. This was particularly observed 
in the UK primary distribution network.
10.5.3 Insufficient supply chain integration and coordination
In the case studies, insufficient supply chain integration and coordination originates 
at distribution centres. The literature emphasises that operational problems at
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distribution centres can originate delays, synchronisation problems and queues at 
unloading facilities (Esper and Williams, 2003; Morash and Clinton, 1997). However, 
the literature does not appear to identify the impact that internal inefficiencies at 
distribution centres have on ‘extra distance’. This is something that has been 
addressed in this thesis. Overall, in the three case studies under this cluster, three 
uncertainty causes were observed: technical vehicle failure, product not loaded at 
the shipper and planning failure. In the UK primary distribution operation, lack of 
coordination generates about 14% of the total ‘extra distance’ gathered and three 
quarters of the ‘lack of coordination’ incidents gathered were caused by internal 
errors of coordination within the carrier. At this carrier, when the product was not 
loaded or mis-loaded at a distribution centre, additional movements were generated 
as a knock-on effect. When product is not loaded, the capacity utilisation of the 
vehicles is less than the original capacity utilisation planned for the trips. This lowers 
the average load in laden trips identified in McKinnon’s (2007) framework. In 
addition, more trips are needed for the same volume of products, so the average 
length of haul and potentially the average empty running rise. Also, in the South 
African distribution network, when a considerable volume of products was left over to 
the next day, extra trips were needed. That generates 50% of the ‘extra distance’ 
recorded in the exercise. In contrast to the UK primary distribution network, this issue 
originates at the distribution centres run by the customer.
In the South African case study, the more typical causes of this type of coordination 
problem were insufficient picking and sorting staff and IT failures inside the 
distribution centres. When products are not loaded at their scheduled vehicles, this 
generates sheer volume, and as a result, later extra movements are required. On the 
other hand, ‘product not loaded at distribution centres’ only represents around 3% of 
the ‘extra distance’ recorded in the assessment undertaken in the UK primary 
distribution network. Furthermore, planning failures represent 8% of the ‘extra 
distance’ gathered in the UK primary distribution network and only 4% of the ‘extra 
I’ distance’ recorded in the South African secondary distribution operation, but this 
[ problem was not found in the UK secondary distribution network. Planning failures 
| and technical vehicle failures have the same knock-on effect, extra trips due to 
i smaller vehicle than planned. In some cases, when there is a failure in the
distribution network the correct vehicle size is not available and only a smaller 
vehicle is available, so two trips are needed instead of one.
It is important to mention that the uncertainty causes found in the case studies that 
can be linked to the focus group cluster of lack of supply chain integration and 
coordination all relate to lack of coordination rather than insufficient supply chain 
integration. However, as has already been mentioned, insufficient supply chain 
integration is an intangible theme, that even if its effect on performance has not been 
explicitly quantified in the assessments, it generates a great proportion of the ‘extra 
distance’ in the three case studies, especially when ‘extra distance’ is produced due 
to lack of communication and insufficient information visibility within the logistics 
triad.
In the three case studies, lack of supply chain integration and coordination generates 
extra trips. Therefore, from an economical view-point, this uncertainty cluster 
increases the variable and fixed cost of transport. Also, environmentally speaking, it 
generates extra variable and extra fixed C02 emissions.
In most of the cases, the carrier is the entity that can mitigate the impact that lack of 
coordination has on transport performance. First of all, the control of the internal 
operational processes within the carrier can reduce ‘extra distance’. For example, 
inside the distribution centres, in the process of picking and sorting of products, there 
is the need to minimise the errors that generate sheer volume that can cause extra 
trips. However, the planning of resources for this process, staffs and/or machines, 
need to be revised as well. Also, in the case of technical vehicle failures, only the 
maintenance of vehicles needs improvements. On the other hand, in the South 
African secondary transport operation, ‘product not loaded at distribution centres’ 
can only be reduced if the customer, the entity that managed the distribution centres, 
revised the process of picking and sorting of products. Due to contractual 
arrangements, the customer needs to pay extra for the additional vehicles needed 
and also extra for the unnecessary kilometres run due to this issue. Therefore, they 
have an economic incentive to correct this problem, but if this issue is mitigated the 
carrier will receive less revenue.
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10.5.4 Delivery constraints
The only case study where the effect of delivery constraints was measured was the 
UK secondary distribution operation. Previous research works on delivery constraints 
have been primarily focussed on the effects that this uncertainty cluster has on the 
time dimension of performance (Esper and Williams, 2003; Fowkes et al. 2004; 
Morash and Clinton, 1997). However, they do not estimate the impact of delivery 
constraints in terms of ‘extra distance’. The two dimensions of performance, time and 
distance, have been considered in two of the case studies. This is one of the main 
contributions of this thesis. Two causes of delivery constraints were observed in this 
case study: unplanned road congestion and road restrictions. As mentioned 
previously, unplanned road congestion can generate delays if drivers do not 
anticipate a traffic jam, but in this particular case study, the vast majority of the time 
drivers are able to anticipate traffic problems. This can be considered restrictions 
that generate the need for vehicles to be diverted from their originally planned 
routes, so ‘extra distance’ is added to existent trips. Route diversion due to 
unplanned road congestion generates 22% of the ‘extra distance’ recorded in this 
case study. On the other hand, road restrictions only generate route diversion, since 
there is slack time purposively added to the delivery process to tackle them. Ad-hoc 
and unexpected road restrictions generate 38% of the ‘extra distance’ measured in 
this assessment. When road restrictions and/or unplanned road congestion 
increases the distance of originally planned trips, the average length of haul, one of 
McKinnon’s (2007) C02 emissions ratios, rises. These types of delivery constraints 
generate ‘extra distance’ within originally planned trips, so they increase only the 
variable cost and the variable C02 emissions of transport. Road restrictions should 
not be uncertainty per se, but the fact that the 27 London boroughs continuously 
change them in an uncoordinated and ad-hoc manner make this type of road 
restrictions uncertain events.
However, in the specific case of the South African case study, rigid delivery windows 
imposed by the customer inhibit the carrier to use the space available on originally 
planned vehicles. This type of problem can lower the average load on laden trips, 
one of the McKinnon’s (2007) C02 emissions ratios, since the capacity utilisation of 
the vehicles is lower. For example, if an outlet located at the ‘area A’ needs an extra
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half load at 12:00 and there is another vehicle that will drop half load at 14:00 to 
another outlet located in the same area, the customer does not allow changes in the 
delivery time. Thus, this inhibits the reduction of ‘extra distance’. This type of 
restriction cannot be considered uncertainty since they are known before the 
transport plan is undertaken, but it worsens the effect of late notification of volume 
increases required by the customer.
In the UK secondary case study, the transport operation is planned and run in- 
house. The transport movements within the distribution network are planned and 
executed at the central planning office of the North London distribution centre. As 
mentioned in Chapter 10, the planning, monitoring and re-planning of the delivery 
process is undertaken in a fully automated transport system. This system is used to 
minimise the effect of unplanned road congestion and road restriction. However, in 
this study and also in the other two studies, the accuracy of the transport planning in 
terms of time and location restrictions are very important. If the transport planning is 
not effective, restrictions are not included in the transport plan in the form of 
contingency. Furthermore, an additional lesson learnt from the UK distribution 
networks studied is that having an effective transport re-planning process allows the 
operations to respond to unplanned road congestion, so if a vehicle is held in a traffic 
jam, transport planners can re-optimise the network in the best possible way.
10.5.5, Contextual factors
In this PhD, three case studies were undertaken, two from the UK and the other from 
South Africa, so it is important to highlight the contextual factors that can have an 
influence on the findings. Two types of contextual factors were identified in the case 
studies, economic factors and environmental factors. As mentioned previously, 
uncertainty can increase ‘extra distance’ of originally planned trips and/or add extra 
trips to the network. Therefore, ‘extra distance’ increases the variable and/or the 
fixed costs of transport, whereas ‘extra time’ can only increase the variable cost of 
transport. The increases in the variable cost of transport are much larger in the UK 
than in South Africa, since the labour cost and the fuel prices are considerably lower 
in South Africa than in the UK. In the case of the fixed cost of transport, the vehicle 
acquisition cost is the only factor that can influence the findings.
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Meanwhile, three environmental factors were identified in the case studies. They can 
worsen the effect of uncertainty on transport performance. They are the vehicle 
carbon footprint, the vehicle engine efficiency and the fuel efficiency. The vehicle 
carbon footprint influences the fixed carbon emitted due to extra trips. If the vehicle 
manufacturer has a greener production process, the fixed CO2 emissions generated 
due to extra trips can be less. Also, if the vehicle engine is more efficient, the 
variable CO2 emissions due to extra trips and/or ‘extra distance’ due to route 
diversion can be lower. Moreover, the fuel efficiency, one of the McKinnon’s (2007) 
CO2 emissions ratios, is a factor that can positively impact on the variable CO2 
emitted due to extra trips and/or ‘extra distance’.
10.6 Concluding remarks: overall contribution to knowledge of the PhD
In this chapter, the methodological synergies experienced in the application of the 
four methods used in the PhD have been discussed. This chapter intends to show 
how focus groups can contribute to research methodology in logistics. Focus groups 
have the role of supporting the findings from other research methods. Also, in this 
PhD, a framework for the application of focus groups in logistics has been 
developed. This framework can be used as a guide for future applications of the 
focus group method in logistics.
In this thesis, a new and innovative transport uncertainty evaluation tool has been 
developed. This tool can be used to evaluate the effect that different causes of 
uncertainty has on road freight transport performance, in terms of cost and CO2 
emissions. It can be applied to evaluate the impact of uncertainty on the 
performance of other road transport operations in the FMCG sector. The tool can 
assist road freight transport operations to assess the main uncertainties affecting 
transport performance and identify the potential approaches to mitigate them. Also, 
the tool can be used as a guide for future research on uncertainty and road transport 
performance.
The relative importance of the uncertainty themes identified in the conceptual model 
has been explored in the focus groups. Also, the main uncertainty clusters found in 
the focus groups have been confirmed by survey respondents by qualitatively
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assessing their impact and frequency. Furthermore, in the case studies, a 
quantitative evaluation of the impact and frequency of the uncertainty causes 
observed have been undertaken. According to the findings of these case studies, the 
uncertainty clusters that have a greater economic and environmental impact on road 
transport performance are delivery constraints, variable demand and/or inaccurate 
forecast and delays. However, in order to lessen the effect of delivery constraints on 
transport performance, the government needs to intervene. The results of this PhD 
can be generalised with the combined findings from the focus groups and survey. 
However, even though the findings from the case studies cannot be generalised, 
they can be used as a guide for future case studies on uncertainty and road 
transport.
The final contribution of this PhD is the refined decision-making framework that can 
be used as a guide for future diagnosis of uncertainty in transport operations. Also, 
this framework identifies potential mitigation approaches that can be applied to 
reduce uncertainty in road freight transport operations. At this point of the research, 
this framework cannot be generalised, because other distribution networks from the 
FMCG sector and other industries need to be assessed.
The uncertainty evaluation tool has been developed and refined in the three case 
studies. However, in order to improve its validity, it needs to be tested in other freight 
transport operations from the FMCG sector in the UK and other countries. Also, its 
application needs to be tested in other industrial sectors. Hence, a generic tool for 
transport uncertainty evaluation could be developed and the relationship between 
uncertainty and road transport performance can be explored further.
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11.0 Conclusions
In this chapter, each of research objectives outlined in Chapter 1 is matched with a 
concluding statement to show how the thesis has addressed them. In addition, the 
limitations and further enquiries of the thesis are discussed in this chapter.
The deductive stage of this PhD has three objectives (see Chapter 1). The following 
text summarises how these three objectives have been addressed:
A transport-focused uncertainty model has been developed by extending the 
Uncertainty Circle model (Mason-Jones and Towill (1999). A process-based 
orientation has been taken to develop the conceptual model. Also, wider 
theories such as network and general systems theories have influenced the 
development of the model. The contribution to theory in this thesis has been 
achieved by contributing to the evidence in the topic rather than by developing 
new theories. The transport-focussed uncertainty model has been first 
developed conceptually. This model includes five uncertainty sources: shipper, 
customer, carrier, control systems and external uncertainty. It was developed 
from previous literature on supply chain uncertainty (Davis, 1993; Mason-Jones 
and Towill, 1999; Peck et al. 2003). This model has been refined in the focus 
groups and confirmed in the survey. The four main uncertainty clusters affecting 
freight transport operations in the UK are delays, variable demand and/or 
inaccurate forecast, delivery constraints and lack of supply chain integration 
and coordination. The uncertainty causes linked to these four uncertainty 
clusters have also been found in the case studies.
The 15 uncertainty clusters found in the focus groups have been assessed in 
the survey by interrogating the perception of respondents on their impact and 
frequency. The main uncertainty clusters found in the focus groups have been 
confirmed in the survey. Also, the importance of the uncertainty causes found in 
the case studies have been quantitatively evaluated in terms of ‘extra distance’, 
‘extra time’ and frequency of occurrence. This complements previous research 
studies where authors have measured the average and/or absolute 
performance of road freight transport operations (Fowkes et al. 2004; McKinnon
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et al. 2004; McKinnon et al. 2009). The four uncertainty clusters identified in the 
earlier stages of the research have also made a considerable contribution to 
increases in cost and CO2 emissions in the three FMCG distribution networks 
studied. Overall, in the three case studies, variable demand and/or inaccurate 
forecast and delays are the uncertainty clusters that have a greater impact on 
the economic and environmental performance of transport operations. 
However, the negative effects of delivery constraints and insufficient supply 
chain integration and coordination were also identified in the case studies as 
root causes of most of the uncertainties measured.
The links between the main uncertainty clusters and the mitigation tools applied 
by the surveyed companies have been drawn. These links were not found in the 
literature. Companies applied strategic and operational transport optimisation 
tools to lessen the effect of delays and delivery constraints on the performance 
of road freight transport operations. Furthermore, the distribution networks 
studied applied effective transport planning tools to mitigate delays and embed 
delivery constraints into the transport plan. In the UK case studies, the 
importance of having an effective monitoring and re-planning of the delivery 
process has been identified as a key finding. These two transport operations 
lessen the effect of delays by re-optimising the distribution network constantly 
during the execution of the delivery process.
i
The inductive stage of the thesis also has three objectives; because the research 
objectives were derived from the first two case studies (see Chapter 1). The 
following statements summarise how these three objectives have been addressed:
‘Extra distance’ as a measure has been developed and tested in this PhD. 
Three assessments of the effect of uncertainties on road freight transport 
performance have been undertaken. In previous research works, the 
performance of road freight transport operations has primarily been assessed 
based on the time dimension of performance (Fowkes et al. 2004; McKinnon 
and Ge, 2004; McKinnon et al. 2009). The ‘extra distance’ measure has been 
complemented by including the time dimension of performance in the two 
assessments undertaken in the UK and South Africa. In this way, the
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assessment can include the two dimensions of performance, time and distance. 
Hence, the relative importance of these two dimensions can be assessed.
Through the application of the ‘extra distance’ and ‘extra time’ measures, the 
uncertainty causes observed in the cases studied have been evaluated based 
on the additional cost and unnecessary CO2 emissions they generated. These 
uncertainty causes can be linked to the four main uncertainty clusters identified 
in the focus groups. Based on the results of the case studies, a framework for 
the diagnosis and mitigation of uncertainty in road freight transport operations 
has been developed. As demonstrated in Chapter 10, the uncertainty clusters 
identified throughout the research can be connected back to the McKinnon’s 
(2007) CO2 emission reduction framework.
The framework developed in Chapter 10 is a new and innovative decision­
making transport uncertainty evaluation tool, based on a combined assessment 
of ‘extra distance’ and ‘extra time’, that can be used for the diagnosis of the 
effect of different causes of uncertainty on the performance of road freight 
transport operations. This tool includes the causes, clusters and sources of 
uncertainty identified throughout the research. As explained in Chapter 10, this 
tool can be linked to most of the McKinnon’s (2007) CO2 emissions ratios. This 
tool can be used to evaluate the effects that different causes of uncertainty 
have on road freight transport performance, in terms of cost and CO2 
emissions. This tool can be applied to evaluate the impact of uncertainty on the 
performance of other road transport operations in the FMCG sector.
11.1 Limitations and further research
The development of the research topic has been achieved by taking a process- 
based orientation as well as influenced by the network and systems theories. In this 
thesis, transport has been considered as a supply chain process. Further research is 
needed to evaluate the application of other wider theoretical perspectives, such as 
resource dependency theory and transaction cost economics, in future evaluations of
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the impact of different uncertainties on the economic and environmental performance 
of transport operations.
In the focus groups and survey, the analysis has been undertaken at aggregated and 
at more disaggregated levels. The findings from the analysis at aggregated level can 
be generalised, since the combined sample between the focus groups and survey 
consists of 114 observations. However, at more disaggregated levels, the analysis 
was undertaken at two dimensions, the first one based on the supply chain role of 
participants and the second one their sector. The findings from the focus groups and 
survey can only be generalised at aggregated level, but not at the sectoral and 
supply chain role levels. However, the findings from these two disaggregated 
analyses are a starting point for future research on uncertainty.
The overall aim of this PhD has been to clarify how uncertainty affects the economic 
and environmental performance of transport operations within the logistics triad. In 
the case studies, uncertainties affecting transport operations were evaluated based 
on two dependent variables, distance and time. These two variables are transport- 
based variables and can be directly linked to the delivery process. The three 
distribution networks assessed in this PhD are from the FMCG sector and their 
distribution centres are cross-docking rather than inventory-holding operations. This 
justifies the fact that the key aspect of these operations is transport. However, other 
supply chain indicators, such as loss of sales, inventory and refrigeration, have not 
been included in the assessments. Therefore, in future assessments of uncertainty 
affecting transport operations, these variables need to be included in the analysis.
Due to the fact that data on fuel consumption was available in different degrees of 
detail in the three case studies, different approaches were taken to estimate the kg 
of CO2 emitted due to ‘extra distance’. In estimating the CO2 emission of road freight 
vehicles, the Carbon Trust (2009) recommends using the actual fuel consumption of 
vehicles. In the third case study, the researcher follows that recommendation, since 
data on the actual fuel consumption for all ‘extra distance’ incidents recorded in the 
assessment was available. On the other hand, if the actual fuel consumption of 
vehicles is not available, the Carbon Trust (2009) recommends deriving an equation 
from a sample of trips, where fuel consumption per distance travelled is the
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dependant variable and volume capacity utilisation of vehicles is the independent 
variable, in order to estimate the fuel consumption of each trip. However, in the first 
two case studies, only the average fuel consumption of vehicles for the week of data 
collection was available to the researcher. This can be considered one of the 
limitations of the assessments undertaken in the case studies, since this can make 
the comparison between the findings, in terms of the CO2 emissions generated due 
to ‘extra distance’ from the three case studies, difficult.
How companies mitigate the effect of different uncertainties has been one of the 
outcomes of this PhD. In the survey, the link between the four main clusters of 
uncertainty and the uncertainty mitigation tools that companies applied have been 
drawn. Also, in the case studies, different mitigation approaches have been included 
in the refined framework for uncertainty diagnosis and mitigation in road freight 
transport operations. However, the effectiveness of the different uncertainty 
mitigation approaches needs to be explored further.
Before starting the three case studies, Cardiff University and the case study 
companies signed three confidentiality agreements. The first case study company 
was generally stricter in what could and could not be included in this PhD, so 
sensitive data from the first case study company such as absolute kilometres, cost 
per kilometre, fixed cost, average fuel consumption and specific locations have not 
been included in the thesis. However, they were used to undertake the assessments, 
although the data shown is based only in percentages.
The research undertaken in this PhD can be developed further. Firstly, the impact of 
uncertainty on the performance of transport operations has been clarified. However, 
in future studies on supply chain uncertainty, the effects that uncertainty has on the 
whole supply chain need to be explored. There are tradeoffs between inventory, 
transportation, refrigeration and loss of sales. When evaluating the economic and 
environmental effects of different uncertainties on the whole supply chain, future 
assessment could include these variable to clarify how these tradeoffs influence on 
decision making.
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The uncertainty evaluation tool has been applied in three FMCG distribution 
networks from the CJK and South Africa. Two of them are secondary distribution 
networks and one of them is a primary distribution operation. Therefore, in order to 
improve its validity, the tool needs to be tested in other primary and secondary 
distribution networks based in the UK and other countries. Also, the application of 
the tool in other sectors needs to be explored, refining and adapting the tool to the 
realities of other sectors.
In addition, the geographical coverage of the distribution networks assessed in this 
PhD has been national in the first two case studies and regional within the UK in the 
third case study. In the future, it would be important to assess the impact of 
uncertainty on global and/or regional distribution networks. In order to do that, other 
modes of transport need to be included in the analysis. Hence, as well as 
transportation, other key independent variables such as inventory, loss of sales and 
refrigeration need to be considered in the assessments.
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13.0 Appendices
13.1 Appendix 1 - Summary of papers that include focus groups and other 
methods in their methodological path.
Author Research
Strategy
Role of Focus 
Group
Design Conducting Analysis
Descriptive
Holweg and
Miemczyk
(2002)
Focus Group —»■ 
Process Map -*• 
Survey —► 
Modelling
To obtain 
background data 
on the supply 
chain and 
propose future 
state scenarios.
Involved research 
sponsors but no 
other information 
provided.
No information 
provided.
No information 
provided.
Exploratory -  sole method
Mangan and
Christopher
(2005)
Literature 
Review —► 
Focus Group 
and Survey
Obtain the views 
of students of an 
executive 
education course 
on management 
skills.
1 focus group of 10 
students from a 
Masters course run 
by authors.
No information 
provided.
No information 
provided.
Cullen and
Webster
(2007)
Literature 
Review —► 
Focus Group
To determine the 
mechanisms 
used for the sale 
and purchase of 
products, and the 
role of e- 
commerce in 
these.
4 focus groups 
planned but only 3 
carried out. Made 
up of 4 to 6 
postgraduate 
students and 
individuals known 
to the researchers, 
selected by 
purposive 
sampling.
Round table,
structured
discussion.
Identified 
clusters of 
topics and also 
coding of 
results. Theory 
saturation 
tested.
Manuj and
Mentzer
(2008)
Focus Group 
and Interviews
Identify elements 
of risk in global 
supply chains 
and how they are 
mitigated.
1 focus group with 
7 executives from a 
global
manufacturing firm.
No No, although 
theory 
saturation 
testing with the 
interviews.
\
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Author Research
Strategy
Role of Focus 
Group
Design Conducting Analysis
Exploratory -  
development
construct
Sink et al.
(1996) and 
Sink and 
Langley
(1997)
Literature 
Review —> 
Focus Group —► 
Survey
Refined a 
comprehensive 
literature review 
undertaken on 
the 3PL theory. 
Also influenced 
the design 
process of a 
wider-scale 
questionnaire- 
based survey.
1 focus group of 11 
members 
representing a 
broad base of 
industry. Some 
selection criteria.
Semi-structured
discussion.
Identified 
clusters of 
issues.
Mentzer et 
al. (1997) 
and Mentzer 
etal. (1999)
Literature 
Review -*• 
Focus Group —*• 
Survey
Helped the 
researchers to 
understand the 
logistics service 
quality needs of 
the Defence 
Logistics 
Agency’s 
customers. The 
focus groups 
findings
supported the 
research team in 
refining a 
questionnaire.
13 focus groups 
with a broad base 
of opinions. All 
participants 
customers of the 
DLA.
Unstructured. Identified 
clusters of 
topics and also 
coding of 
results. Also 
researcher 
triangulation.
Dinwoodie
(2001)
Focus Group —*• 
Survey
Explore the 
motivations for 
students to study 
a Masters degree 
programme.
The number of 
focus groups is not 
stated but they 
involved enrolled 
students.
No information 
provided.
No information 
provided.
Lancioni et 
al. (2001)
Focus Group —» 
Survey
Develop a list of 
barriers to 
developing 
logistics 
programmes.
4 focus groups of 5 
to 6 administrators, 
faculty and deans 
from Business 
Schools.
No information 
provided.
List of barriers 
produced and 
duplicates 
removed.
Golicic et al. 
(2003)
Literature 
Review -*• 
Focus Group —> 
Survey
Applied to 
explore and 
understand inter- 
organisational 
relationships.
2 focus groups, 
with 5 and 9 
participants. 
Covered 7 
industrial sectors.
Unstructured. Coding of 
results and 
researcher 
triangulation.
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Author Research Role of Focus 
Strategy Group
Design Conducting Analysis
Exploratory -  construct development (continued)
Guinipero et 
al. (2005)
FocusGroup 
—*■ Survey
Gain information on 
trends, skill, 
knowledge and 
training for supply 
chain managers.
4 focus groups 
across the US. 
Participants invited 
from Fortune 1000 
companies. 58 
executives from 41 
companies 
attended.
Unstructured. Identified 
clusters of 
issues.
Evangelista
and
Sweeney
(2006)
Focus Group 
Survey
Verify
completeness of 
the survey 
instrument and 
obtain further 
engagement in 
research.
2 focus groups in 
Milan and Rome 
with a total of 20 
participants from 
industry and 
academia.
Structured, 
based around 
draft survey 
instrument.
No information 
provided.
Tian et al. 
(2008)
Literature 
Review -*• 
Focus Group 
-*■  Survey
Confirm that the 
survey instrument 
was complete and 
understandable.
1 focus group 
involving 3 
managers from 2 
manufacturing 
firms.
Structured, 
based around 
draft survey 
instrument.
No information 
provided.
Exploratory 
-  other
Christopher 
and Juttner 
(2000)
Focus Group 
—► Case 
studies
Gain insights into 
current practice on 
managing supply 
chain relationships
12 focus groups 
arranged at a 
conference. Open 
invitation to 
conference 
delegates.
No information 
provided.
No information 
provided.
Rae-Smith 
and Ellinger 
(2002)
Action 
research —► 
Focus Group
Applied to evaluate 
the extent an online 
logistics system 
(implemented 
through action 
research) was 
helping to improve 
customer service.
1 focus group for 
employees of the 
company involved 
in the action 
research
Structured. No information 
provided.
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Author Research Role of Focus 
Strategy Group
Design Conducting Analysis
Explanatory -  survey 
results
New and
Payne
(1995)
Survey —► 
Focus Group
Applied to validate 
results of a survey 
(2.5% response 
rate) regarding 
supply chain 
integration in 
logistics.
7 focus groups 
across the UK. 51 
participants from a 
range of industries 
with group sizes 
from 3 to 13. 
Invites sent to 
personal contacts 
of research team.
Organised as a 
dinner party 
with food and 
then an 
unstructured 
discussion.
Identified 
clusters of 
issues.
Rinehart et 
al. (2004)
Literature 
Review —> 
Survey -*• 
Focus Group
Conducted in order 
to determine 
appropriate 
descriptive terms 
for each cluster 
identified in the 
survey.
3 focus groups of 
executive MBA 
students and 
company 
executives, all 
involved in 
relationship 
management. 75 
participants in total.
Structured, with 
a range of 
descriptive 
terms provided 
for delegates to 
select from.
Ranking of the 
descriptive 
terms for each 
cluster based 
on frequency of 
selection.
Juttner
(2005)
Survey —► 
Focus Group
Provide more depth 
and insights into 
survey findings 
especially as the 
survey had an 8% 
response rate
6 focus groups 
arranged at a 
conference. Open 
invitation to 
conference 
delegates. Each 
focus group had 7 
to 8 participants.
Structured. Identified 
clusters of 
issues.
Bemon and
Cullen
(2007)
Case studies 
—»Survey —► 
Focus Group
Compare case 
study and survey 
findings with 
participants’ 
experiences in 
reverse logistics.
1 focus group with 
6 sectors 
represented.
No information 
provided.
No information 
provided.
Explanatory -  other opinion based methods
Dainty et al. 
(2001)
Interviews —► 
Focus Group
Refine a set of 
change
requirements for 
improving supply 
chain integration, 
obtained through 
the interviews
3 focus groups 
across the UK. 
Composed of 
smaller
construction sector 
companies and 
interviewees.
Semi-structured 
and facilitated 
by the research 
team.
Data analysed 
using NVIVO 
software.
Blackhurst et 
al. (2005)
Case studies 
—*■ Interviews 
-► Focus 
Group
To identify 
examples of supply 
chain disruptions to 
verify earlier 
findinqs
3 focus groups of 
between 10 and 14 
participants from a 
number of industry 
sectors.
Structured. Identified 
clusters of 
issues.
Juttner et al. 
(2007)
Literature 
Review —*• 
Workshop —► 
Focus Group
Verification and 
improvement of 
framework 
developed in 
workshop
1 focus group of 14 
participants 
representing a 
range of industries.
No information 
provided.
No information 
provided.
Melnyk et al. 
(2008)
Literature 
Review —* 
Delphi Study 
- » Focus 
Group
Discuss and refine 
the findings from 
the Delphi study
1 focus group of 25 
participants drawn 
from the Delphi 
study respondents
Semi-structured 
with a 
clustering 
exercise.
Identified 
clusters of 
issues.
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13.2 Appendix 2 - Copy of the online questionnaire
Purpose of the Questionnaire
The purpose of this questionnaire is to collect information about supply chain uncertainty in 
logistics triads in the UK and their impact on economic, environmental and societal 
sustainability. Supply chain uncertainty refers to decision making situations in the supply 
chain in which the decision maker does not know definitely what to decide. In practical 
terms, the main causes of supply chain uncertainty can be classified as followed:
• The decision maker does not have enough and/or reliable information, e.g. stock 
level, lead time, customer satisfaction, supplier performance, and so on.
• ICT systems available to the decision maker do not have the capacity to process 
sufficiently disaggregated information.
• The forecasting and planning tools available to support decision making are not 
sufficient accurate, and as a result the decision maker is misled.
• Throughout the different supply chain stages, disruptions can occur that can 
ultimately have an adverse effect on the subsequent processes.
(van der Vorst and Beulens 2002)
This questionnaire forms part of the research for the Green Logistics project sponsored by 
the Engineering and Physical Science Engineering Council (EPSRC). The questions are 
based upon the findings of eight focus groups. Therefore, this survey is a confirmatory tool of 
previous research and informs future research within the project.
The results of this survey will be published on the Green Logistics website, 
www.qreenloQistics.org. and they will be available to all the practitioners that take part.
Please, avoid using the Back button in your Internet Explorer browser while you are 
answering the questionnaire, since that could disrupt the flow of the questionnaire. If you 
have any queries with a question, please click on the question mark provided, this will open 
a pop-up window. In order to test whether you have pop-up blocker enable, please click on 
this question mark (?). The survey works best with pop-up blocker disable.
Part 1- Background information
Information sought within this section included:
• The type of company (Shipper, carrier, customer, other)
• The size of company by number of employees
• Annual turnover in the UK (£m)
• Logistics costs as percentage of turnover in the UK
• Industrial sector
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Part 2- Sources of pains within the logistics triad
Question
Number
1
Wording
List what you consider to be the 4 most common sources 
of disruption/uncertainty in the day-to-day logistics 
operation of your business. A definition of each term is 
available including exemplar causes of uncertainty.
Rank the 4 sources of disruption identified above, with 
the most serious ranked as 1.
For each of the 4 sources identified above, what is their 
impact on economic and environmental sustainability? 
(The scale is between 1 and 5, 1 is a significantly low 
impact and 5 is significantly high impact)
How frequently are your logistics operations disrupted by 
each of the 4 main sources identified above?
Response mode
Tick box against list of 
uncertainty causes
Ranking scale (only the 4 
selected in Q1 were 
presented)
Likert scale
Frequency scale
Part 3 - Logistics triad uncertainty mitigation
Question 5 - List the five analysis and design tools that your company uses to improve the 
efficiency of logistics operations [a definition of tools was provided]
Part 4 - Acknowledgement and benefits
We thank you for taking part in this survey, and will send you a final report with the results of 
this research early in 2008. You will receive update information while the project evolves, 
such as new published academic papers, executive reports of all the research streams and 
user-level access in the Green Logistics webpage, developments up to June 2010. If you 
would like further information on the Green Logistics project including regular updates on 
forthcoming activities, please provide your details below. This information will be kept 
confidential.
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13.3 Appendix 3 - Pro-forma used in the data collection
Incident Detail
Date
Incident Number
Identified Time
Departure Time
Planned Kilometres
Actual Kilometres
Consignment Details
Customer
Unit load
Owned Vehicle or Subcontractor
One or Two-way Route
Subcontracted Operator
Actual Route Actual Kilometres
Planned Route (or how route would have been planned with
sufficient notice)
Planned
Kilometres
Problem in the Network Underlying Cause
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13.4 Appendix 4 -  Excel spreadsheetused to calculate the ‘extra distance’ gathered due to extra trips in the first case
study
Description
Date
Km
Extra
Km
Time Plan Actual/Alternative
Cause-and-effect 
'Extra distance'
Volume
increase Depot
(Km)
Delay
Plan Actual Depart Id Route Route Unitload Type
Visible
cause Km Source Supplier
06-Jul 434 834 400 14:00 12:00
Manchester 
to Supplier 
A
Manchester 
to Supplier 
A to
Manchester
50
Load
more
than
advised
Supplier
notified
late
400 Supplier
04-Jul 349 698 349 22:00 14:00 Depot A to Depot B
Two trips 
from Depot 
A to Depot 
B
43
Product
not
loaded
Depot
operational
failure
349
01-Jul 349 698 349 22:00 22:00 Supplier B to Depot B
Two trips 
from
Supplier B 
to Depot B
43 Delay
Supplier
operational
failure
349
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13.5 Appendix 5 -  Excel spreadsheetjjsed to calculate the ‘extra distance’ gathered due to extra trips in the second
case study
Description
Date
Km
Extra
Km
Time Plan
Actual/
Alternative
Cause-and-effect 
'Extra distance' Volume increase
Depot
(Km)
Delay
Plan Actual Depart Id Route Route Type
Visible
cause Km Source Supplier
06-Jan 434 834 03-Feb 14:00 12:00
Depot to 
Outlet 1
Load
more
than
advised
Outlet 1 
notified 
late 400
Outlet
1
I 08-Jan 349 698 14-Dec 22:00 14:00
Two trips 
from
Depot A to 
Depot B
Product
not
loaded
Depot
operational
failure 349
285
13.6 Appendix 6 -  Excel spreadsheet used to calculate the ‘extra time’ gathered in the second case study
Date Extra time'
Extra
Min Time Route Visiblecause
Delays due to
Plan Actual (s) Depart Outlet Supplier Transport
06-
Jan 250 300 50 14:00
Depot to 
Outlet 1
Supplier
notified
late
50
08-
Jan 400 490 90 22:00
Depot to 
Supplier 
1
Depot
operational
failure
90
09-
Jan 300 350 50 22:00
Depot to 
Outlet 2
Supplier
operational
failure
50
13.7 Appendix 7 -  Excel spreadsheet used to undertake the second assessment in the third case study
Descri Dtion
Date
Km
Extra
Km
Time Plan Actual/ Alternative
Cause-and-effect 
'Extra distance'
Volume
increase Depot
(Km)
Delay
Plan Actual Depart Id Route Route
Fuel
consumption
(It/Km)
Type Visiblecause Km Source Supplier
03-
Dec 434 834 400 14:00 12:00
London
to
Outlet 1
Two
trips
from
London
to
Outlet 1
0.312
Load
more
than
advised
Outlet
notified
late
400 Outlet
04-
Dec 349 698 349 22:00 14:00
Depot A 
to
Depot B
Two 
trips 
from 
Depot A 
to
Depot B
0.305
Product
not
loaded
Depot
operational
failure
349
29-
Dec 349 698 349 22:00 22:00
Supplier 
B to
Depot B
Two 
trips 
from 
Supplier 
B to
Depot B
0.320 Delay
Supplier
operational
failure
349
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13.8 Appendix 8 -  Excel spreadsheet used to undertake the second assessment in the third case study
Departure
Lo
ca
tio
n 
1
Lo
ca
tio
n 
2
Lo
ca
tio
n 
3
Fu
el 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n 
(It 
/k
m
)
Planned Time (min) Actual Time (min)
Ne
t 
dif
f 
in 
ve
hi
cle
 
run
nin
g 
tim
e 
(m
in)
Pla
nn
ed
 
Km
Ac
tu
al 
Km
Ex
tra
 K
m
Ex
tra
 
dis
ta
nc
e' 
Ca
us
e
Da
te
Ti
m
e
To
ta
l
Lo
ca
tio
n 
1
Lo
ca
tio
n 
2
Lo
ca
tio
n 
3
To
ta
l
Lo
ca
tio
n 
1
Lo
ca
tio
n 
2
Lo
ca
tio
n 
3
Lo
ca
tio
n 
3
Un
pl
an
ne
d
st
op
s
30-Nov 10:42 Outlet 1 80 60 35 22 0 6 7 1
02-Dec 15:19 Outlet 1 r 89 60 58 43 0 6 7 1
Supplier
27-Nov 19:50 1 118 60 81 32 0 38 43 5
Supplier Suplier
02-Dec 23:07 1 DC 1 2 327 60 30 323 79 83 0 189 191 2
Supplier
03-Dec 21:03 1 117 60 100 56 0 38 44 6
Supplier
03-Dec 23:08 1 DC 1 327 60 30 350 106 79 0 189 191 2
29-Nov 00:51 Outlet 2 180 32 173 105 0 55 56 1
Outlet
02-Dec 09:51 Outlet 3 4 254 42 67 196 44 40 0 88 91 3
04-Dec 10:54 Outlet 4 233 80 172 107 -5 55 55 0
27-Nov 20:03 Outlet 5 115 46 82 27 0 52 53 1
28-Nov 06:06 Outlet 5 172 30 157 96 0 52 53 1
Net diff in vehicle running time = (Actual Total Time -  Total Actual Location Waiting Time -  Unplanned stop Time) -  (Planned Total 
Time - Total Planned Location Waiting Time)
